Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-2n9c9 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-18T13:09:03.327Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

20 - Deterrability and Moral Judgment

from Part II - Deterrence and Incapacitation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 May 2021

Benjamin van Rooij
Affiliation:
School of Law, University of Amsterdam
D. Daniel Sokol
Affiliation:
University of Florida
Get access

Summary

Abstract: Crime control policies of the latter half of the twentieth century were largely grounded in the notion that punishment effectively deters crime and increases compliance. The inherent assumption is that offenders rationally weigh the costs and benefits of their actions before acting, and then act if and only if the benefits outweigh the costs. In retrospect, the policies informed by this “deterrence” perspective have done little to answer the age-old question of what deters crime and increases compliance, and instead have left us in an era of mass incarceration in which the US prison population has inflated by over 500 percent since the 1970s. However, rather than halt deterrence research wholesale, researchers have shifted to identifying for whom deterrence threats actually work. While the literature is in its nascent stages, studies indicate that individual differences may underlie who may be more or less susceptible to deterrence threats, and support a number of different mechanisms. For instance, emerging research suggests that individuals high in the obligation to obey the law and low in moral disengagement may be more responsive to deterrence threats. This chapter reports the findings of a developing body of research that focuses on identifying key individual differences that may underlie susceptibility to deterrence threats.

Information

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Book purchase

Temporarily unavailable

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×