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Chapter 25 - Moral Emotions

from Section VI - Social Emotions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 September 2025

Jorge Armony
Affiliation:
McGill University, Montréal
Patrik Vuilleumier
Affiliation:
University of Geneva
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Summary

Moral feelings (e.g., guilt, pity) and values (e.g., honesty, generosity) motivate humans to act on other people’s needs. Research over the last two decades has suggested that these complex constructs can be decomposed into specific cognitive-affective and neuroanatomical components. This chapter gives operational definitions of what distinguishes moral from other forms of social and emotional functions. The cognitive components that distinguish different moral feelings (e.g., guilt being related to self-agency and indignation to another person being the agent) are elucidated. An overview of evidence from brain lesion and functional imaging studies on moral judgement and feeling in general is presented, with a focus more specifically on recent evidence that links particular brain networks to specific moral feelings (in particular, guilt and sympathy). The implications of this evidence for understanding psychopathology are addressed. The chapter also discusses the implications of opposing models of frontal cortical function for the understanding of moral cognition. Suggestions for future avenues of research in this area are provided. The cognitive neuroscience of moral emotions and motivations may provide novel and powerful ways to gauge complex aspects of adaptive and maladaptive human social behaviour.

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