This chapter examines the President’s constitutional role in overseeing law execution, arguing that the Executive Vesting Clause and Take Care Clause grant the President authority to supervise, but not personally execute, national laws. It posits that the President’s power includes appointing and removing principal officers without congressional interference, as affirmed in the "Decision of 1789" and in Myers v. United States (1926). It explores the Appointments Clause, links the removal and appointment powers, and offers a novel explanation for why the Constitutional Convention did not discuss the removal power. It also addresses inferior officers, whose removal may be vested in department heads with potential tenure protections, provided adequate control mechanisms exist. Along with the next chapter, however, this Chapter suggests that the President cannot necessarily direct principal officers in the exercise of their discretionary duties unless statutorily authorized. The chapter proposes a nuanced view: the President can demand information and remove officers but lacks a constitutional right to control their actions, distinguishing this original account of presidential power from other “unitary executive” and “persuader-in-chief” theories.