This chapter continues the exploration of knowing-that and knowing-how. It begins with a comparison of Michael Polanyi’s idea of tacit knowledge to Ryle’s concept of knowing-how. While the previous chapter shows that knowing-how cannot be reduced to knowing-that, this chapter argues for radical anti-intellectualism, according to which the reduction can be achieved the other way round: knowing-that to knowing-how. In other words, by using a similar strategy to Timothy Williamson and Jason Stanley, knowing-that can be reduced to a linguistic ability to provide answers to questions of how something should be done. From this viewpoint, linguistic competence is seen as a skill rooted in the correct use of language, essentially a form of practical mastery—a kind of knowing-how. This line of argumentation goes further than Ryle’s initial insight. In the latter half of the chapter, Stephen Hetherington’s and John Hyman’s thinking, which is congenial with radical anti-intellectualism, is examined. The chapter concludes by showing that neopragmatism is anti-intellectualist at heart.