Methodologism might be thought to encounter a problem with justification. Wilfrid Sellars’s the Myth of the Given teaches that we cannot justify our beliefs by appealing to a non-inferential, neutral arbiter. Does this force us to conclude that some beliefs are unjustified or caught in ever-continuing inferential justifications? It is argued that we are not compelled to choose between absolute certainty grounding all epistemic practices and an infinite regress of justifications. Hinge epistemology, drawing on Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, offers a solution. Some beliefs function as hinges – enablers of a given practice, including epistemic ones. These beliefs must remain in place for the practice to be possible, though they are not universally valid. Hinges are treated as certain in one context but may be abandoned in another for pragmatic reasons. Anna-Lisa Coliva’s frame interpretation and Danièle Moyal-Sharrock’s animal interpretation of hinges are also examined. These views are argued to be compatible – if propositions are reinterpreted as linguistic natural entities that can serve as the basis of knowing, capable of generating inference and carrying truth-values.