Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 January 2011
Labor allocation and wage-scale formation are studied in the context of competitive hierarchic firms. We show that (1) the wage per effective laborer and his quality increase with the hierarchical position of the employee, and (2) up to a point, the imposition of a minimum wage for production labor increases the quality and quantity of production workers and reduces the wage, quality, and number of supervisors. These results help to explain the skewness of income distribution, and the wage differentials across layers which are inexplicable in terms of differences in labor quality and difficulty of tasks.
This paper presents a theory of labor allocation and of wage-scale formation within hierarchic firms facing a competitive labor market. Our aim is to give an endogenous explanation of the hierarchic differentials in worker quality, wages, and degree of supervision. We also explore the effect of minimum-wage imposition upon such firms and the related problem of interlevel conflicts of interests.
The problem of “internal wage scales” and of internal labor use looks trivial under the neoclassical assumptions that firms are able to make (and costlessly enforce) contracts with their employees in terms of labor services. The solution becomes much less obvious if, instead, we take the more realistic view that the management of human resources within firms involves a “game” between employees who seek to maximize utility and residual owners whose aim is to maximize profits and who resort to incentives and punishments to achieve their goal.
To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.
To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.
To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.