There has been a clear shift in relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia in particular, from their proxy war in 1960s, where there was ideological competition between them in North Yemen, to their cooperation on the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen in 2015. This has been due to a number of reasons, but none probably more important than the demise of Egypt's focus on pan-Arabism as the driving force behind its regional engagements. In the 1970s, Saudi oil wealth was a decisive factor in Saudi Arabia being able to spread its own influence. In relation to Egypt, this was done primarily through employing Egyptian migrant labour who absorbed social conservatism from the Kingdom and brought it back to Egypt. Coupled with Saudi support for Salafism in Egypt, an ideological fissure was opened up between opposing Islamic traditions: fundamentalism and modernist Islam as well as between the policy imperatives of a ruling monarchy and republic.

Egypt's relations with many of its Arab Gulf neighbours soured after president Sadat signed a peace deal with Israel in 1979 and again in 2012 when Egypt elected the Muslim Brotherhood to power. However, tensions quickly gave way to an alliance formed around shared interests, especially during periods of conflict. For example, during the Iran - Iraq War 1980-88, and again during the 1991 Gulf War. Whilst state differences vary, the strategic alliance has generally been maintained in the midst of a kaleidoscope of changing regional variables.

From 2012, Morsi established a new exclusive alliance with Qatar. Doha's regional calculations were reasonably justified, after the precedent and continued a dangerous precedent set by the Ennada Islamist movement in Tunisia of Islamists winning at the ballot box. However, this time given the size of Egypt, its strategic location and historic links in the Middle East, the new alliance directly threatened the regime security of the Gulf monarchies. Fortunately, for the GCC states, the 2013 popular and military backed ‘coup’ against the Muslim Brotherhood due to both ideological and performance issues, facilitated a reversion back to the status quo. Cash injections from the Arab Gulf states certainly aided the Egyptian economy during a period of economic crisis, but also illustrated a degree of assurance and continuing GCC state commitment to Egypt, especially in the post-Muslim Brotherhood era.