The concluding chapter translates the book’s theoretical insights and empirical findings into concrete implications for both scholarship and policy practice. It challenges three persistent myths about arms control: that agreements emerge from good relations between states, that past violations preclude future cooperation, and that agreements serve as rewards for good behavior. Drawing on the book’s analysis of political volatility, uncertainty, and agreement information provisions, the chapter develops specific recommendations for when policymakers should pursue agreements and what forms they should take. Rather than always pursuing incremental steps or maximum verification, practitioners should calibrate monitoring provisions to match their prior expectations about adversaries’ incentives. The chapter also examines how emerging technologies affect prospects for arms control, arguing that innovations in monitoring capabilities have countervailing effects – some reduce the costs of verification while others create new vulnerabilities. These insights are especially relevant as states confront contemporary challenges including great power competition to autonomous weapons and AI systems. For scholars, the chapter outlines new research directions on agreement effectiveness, institutional design, and the intersection of technology and security cooperation. The findings suggest that while arms control remains a vital foreign policy tool, its successful application requires careful attention to political conditions and strategic trade-offs.