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7 - Equal Sacrifice in Taxation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2025

Satya R. Chakravarty
Affiliation:
Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata
Palash Sarkar
Affiliation:
Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata
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Summary

7.1 Motivations and Objectives

A long-established reasoning for progressive taxation is that all taxpayers should be subjected to equal utility sacrifice in paying taxes. The term “equal sacrifice” may be interpreted in three different ways. According to equal absolute sacrifice, everybody gives up the same amount of utility while paying taxes so that the difference between the utility of before-tax income and the utility of after-tax income is the same across taxpayers (Mill, 1989). Thus, implicit idea under the notion of equal absolute sacrifice is that the social evaluation function is of symmetric utilitarian type. That is why often equal absolute sacrifice rule is referred to as the “utilitarian” form of equal sacrifice (see Lambert and Naughton, 2009).

Equal sacrifice rule of taxation has sometimes been interpreted as sacrifice proportional to one's wellbeing (Cohen Stuart, 1889; Seligman, 1894). In other words, under equal proportional sacrifice everybody should give up the same percentage of utility while paying taxes. Evidently, given the positivity of utilities, equal proportional sacrifice is the same as equal absolute sacrifice in logarithms of utilities. In this case there is a tacit assumption that the social evaluation is of the symmetric Cobb–Douglas category so that under logarithmic transformation of utilities it becomes the symmetric utilitarian sum of logarithms of utilities. Finally, the equal marginal sacrifice principle claims that the total tax burden should be divided out among the taxpayers such that the after-tax marginal utilities of the taxpayers are equalized.

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