This chapter analyzes the 1990–1991 Gulf War to illustrate two distinct rationales for insincere coercion: mobilizing support and moving the goalposts. Following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the United States initially employed coercive diplomacy, using United Nations Security Council resolutions, economic sanctions, and troop deployments in an effort to compel an Iraqi withdrawal. While this effort failed to gain immediate Iraqi concessions, it successfully mobilized a massive international coalition and secured domestic approval for military action. As the subsequent air campaign decimated Iraqi defenses, the true balance of power was revealed, significantly increasing the coalition’s expected outcome for a ground war. Consequently, the Bush administration’s minimum demands shifted. Fearing a Soviet-brokered peace deal that would leave Saddam Hussein’s Republican Guard intact, the United States “moved the goalposts” by issuing an ultimatum demanding an immediate, humiliating withdrawal. Knowing Saddam would reject these terms, the United States intentionally chose coercion failure. This allowed the coalition to launch a brute force ground invasion, achieving its expanded foreign policy objective of liberating Kuwait while simultaneously seriously attriting Iraq’s offensive military capabilities.