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4 - n-Person Pure Bargaining Games

from Part II - Coalitional Bargaining Games

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2026

Akira Okada
Affiliation:
Hitotsubashi University
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Summary

This section presents non-cooperative bargaining models for n-person pure bargaining games in Section 3.1. Initiated by the seminal work of Rubinstein (1982), the bargaining models have a sequential structure in which some player proposes a payoff allocation, and all other players sequentially respond to it. Bargaining continues until an agreement is made. A rule that selects a proposer is called a bargaining protocol. The relationship between non-cooperative equilibrium and the Nash bargaining solution is considered.

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