This chapter defines the analytical framework of the book by examining the concept of the “Party-state” and positioning it as a unique institutional structure in which the Party (CCP) operates both inside and outside the state apparatus. The chapter outlines two central themes: the Party’s control over decision-making within state institutions and the structural roots of corruption, particularly judicial corruption. It emphasizes the opacity and institutional complexity of the Party, whose internal disciplinary and normative systems have expanded significantly but remain understudied in the English-language scholarship. The author highlights the analytical value of formal Party norms, especially in regulating elite politics and disciplining political behavior. By investigating corruption—understood not as isolated deviance but as a routine institutionalized practice—the book seeks to uncover causal mechanisms embedded in Party-state governance that can explain both rule-abiding and rule-evading conduct. Methodologically, the chapter previews an approach that combines historical institutionalism, normative analysis, and case-based empirical inquiry. It also outlines the book’s structure: Part I focuses on judicial corruption as an entry point to understanding Party-state governance, while Part II explores the Party’s disciplinary and normative architecture as instruments of the Party's self-governance.