Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 April 2023
It began, to use the formula familiar in today's newspapers, with an “act of state-sponsored terrorism.” The archduke Francis Ferdinand was the heir apparent to the Habsburg throne of Austria–Hungary; when, on June 28, 1914, a Serbian student shot him and his wife to death in Sarajevo, the capital of the Austrian province of Bosnia, the act provoked astonishment and outrage throughout Europe. Public excitement quickly receded, however, despite lingering rumors in the newspapers – subsequently substantiated – that officials of the Serbian government had been complicit in the assassination. In Germany and elsewhere the summer season had begun. The onset of warm weather signaled travel for those who could afford it; and, for those who could not, it brought less idle adjustments in the annual rhythms of life in town and countryside.
In Berlin, as elsewhere, the events in Sarajevo provoked a series of fateful deliberations during the first weeks of July. The German leadership concluded that the assassination carried far-reaching implications for German security. Austria–Hungary was Germany's principal ally. The Serbian affront promised to encourage discontent not only among the South Slav inhabitants of Austria–Hungary but also among the other ethnic groups that made up the Habsburg monarchy. In the eyes of the German leaders, the logic of this process boded the dissolution of the monarchy and, ultimately, Germany's full diplomatic and military isolation in Europe.
This alarming prospect loomed over the consultations in the German capital. The decisions that emerged out of these deliberations have themselves given rise to a bitter dispute among professional historians. At the center of the dispute stands the German chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg (see Plate 1), the civilian head of the German federal government. Some historians, with Fritz Fischer in the lead, have argued that Bethmann seized upon the assassination as the pretext to launch a long-planned war of aggression, whose goal was German hegemony on the European continent. The preponderance of evidence now suggests instead, however, that the chancellor pursued a somewhat more cautious policy, which grew out of his anxiety over the future of the Austrian monarchy, whose survival, he believed, did justify the risk of a European war. Bethmann was strengthened in this belief by the country's leading soldier, the chief of the army's General Staff, Helmuth von Moltke. Moltke's calculations were technical.
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