Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 April 2023
The military failure to resolve the war in 1914 surprised soldiers in Germany and everywhere else. It also surprised civilian leaders in all the belligerent countries, who now confronted unanticipated and unprecedented challenges. They had to redirect the productive energies of society towards the massive demands of industrial warfare. The first year and a half of the war established the framework of mobilization in all these lands. Public institutions invaded economies and societies, as vast material and moral resources were channeled to military ends.
The transition to new modes of organization for war took place everywhere by improvisation during the first months of the conflict, but some of the belligerent powers were better able than others to adjust. Imperial Germany, which in 1914 was reputed to be the most efficiently organized society on earth, faced major impediments to meeting the challenges. Deficiencies in the organization of mobilization contributed to the mounting burdens of war on the home front. They also fed the political controversies that attended the prolongation of the war.
Bureaucratic foundations
Institutions were a fundamental problem. Germany's reputation for bureaucratic efficiency was deceptive, for the country's basic administrative structures were fragmented among federal, state, and local institutions. Administrative particularism had its champions, but it posed grave obstacles to the execution of common policies in a national emergency.
The institutions of military administration, which were conceived with national emergency in mind, only compounded the difficulties. These institutions were as much geared to the wrong century as was Schlieffen's plan. They were designed to mobilize forces rapidly in the event of war (or revolution) and to provide basic services and security at home during a limited period of crisis, as they had in 1870–1. Their legal foundation was the Prussian Law of Siege, which had first been promulgated in 1851 and then taken over into the imperial constitution in 1871. Upon declaration of national emergency, this law specified that executive power passed into the hands of the corps commander in each of the country's twenty-four military districts. Because these commanders accompanied their corps into battle, however, their executive powers devolved to their seconds-in-command, the so-called deputy commanding generals.
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