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7 - Shareholder II

External Governance by Exit: Mergers and Acquisitions

from Part III - The Other Three Players and Incentive Bargaining

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 December 2025

Zenichi Shishido
Affiliation:
Musashino University, Tokyo
Wei Shen
Affiliation:
Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China
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Summary

Chapter 7 will compare how shareholders in the three countries monitor management by exit, that is, the threat of hostile takeover, from the perspective of the tradeoff between management autonomy and monitoring management. In the United States, substantial numbers of hostile takeovers have occurred since the 1970s. In Japan, hostile takeover attempts have rarely been successfully done since the majority shareholding of listed companies was stabilized by cross-shareholding networks in the 1960s. After 2020, the control market emerged with several successful hostile takeovers by competitors, and at the same time, hedge fund activism exploded. In China, hostile takeovers are still nearly absent, particularly for SOEs. Regarding the balance between management autonomy and monitoring management, the United States has a relatively buyer-friendly legal system, and Japan has a seller-friendly legal system. China has the UK-type mandatory takeover bid rule, and the black letter law looks to create a UK-type balance between autonomy and monitoring, but the actual implementation of the statutes allows abuses by both buyers and sellers.

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  • Shareholder II
  • Zenichi Shishido, Musashino University, Tokyo, Wei Shen, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China
  • Book: Incentive Bargaining and Corporate Governance
  • Online publication: 12 December 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009152808.012
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  • Shareholder II
  • Zenichi Shishido, Musashino University, Tokyo, Wei Shen, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China
  • Book: Incentive Bargaining and Corporate Governance
  • Online publication: 12 December 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009152808.012
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Shareholder II
  • Zenichi Shishido, Musashino University, Tokyo, Wei Shen, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China
  • Book: Incentive Bargaining and Corporate Governance
  • Online publication: 12 December 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009152808.012
Available formats
×