Brandom gives two inconsistent accounts of the prehistory of his inferentialism: that Kant only contributed its concept–>judgment component, which was not taken up again until Frege vs. that Kant also contributed its judgment–>inference component, which was already taken up by Hegel. This chapter supports a version of the latter account. It argues against Brandom both that by 1790 Kant, like Brandom, espoused an inferentialist position incorporating a ‘linguistic turn’ and that Kant’s inferentialism is superior to Brandom’s (by providing better arguments for its concept–>judgment component and a necessary limitation of its judgment–>inference component thanks to the analytic/synthetic distinction). The chapter also argues that Kant’s inferentialism led him to the additional project of a “transcendental grammar.” Finally, it pursues the influence of this whole Kantian version on successors: Hegel did indeed take over Kant’s inferentialism, but whereas Brandom detects this in Hegel’s Phenomenology, it is even more evident in Hegel’s Logic, and whereas Brandom leaves it at that, for Hegel inferentialism was only the beginning of a more original and daring project. Not only did Kant’s inferentialism motivate Humboldt’s holistic conception of language, but in addition Kant’s project of a “transcendental grammar” inspired Humboldt to the same.