The final chapter concludes by outlining practical policy guidance implied by the theory and exploring speculative but promising pathways out of the weak-state trap from both Senegal and elsewhere. First, it considers nascent constituencies that might serve as advocates for a stronger, more programmatic state. In particular, it tells the story of Senegal’s wealthiest businessman, who built an incredibly successful corporation and whose political interests are now at odds with those of the traditional economic elite. It then traces the rise of a new, externally mobilized political party (a recipe for success suggested by the literature) that has a more credible claim to making programmatic promises than its predecessors, which have all been borne out of elites from the ruling party. Finally, it introduces two possibilities suggested by cases outside Africa: mixing strategies (clientelistic and programmatic) and compensating intermediaries. I additionally consider whether and how the book’s theory might extend beyond Africa, to Latin America in particular, and conclude with a discussion of the book’s academic contributions and policy implications.