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This chapter asks whether increasing electoral competitiveness in weak states might be a way to induce pressure for state-building and the provision of public goods. The evidence suggests it cannot: that when politics do not cleave along programmatic lines, electoral competition is unlikely to have these salutary effects. A case comparison of two public bureaucracies charged with tax collection in contexts of widespread economic informality and clientelistic electoral politics illustrates how different levels of electoral competition can produce very different incentives to invest in state capacity. Interviews with current and former members of the Internal Revenue Service in Dakar and Lagos suggest that greater electoral competition in Senegal weakened political will to regulate and tax the informal sector, while longer time horizons of ruling party elites in Lagos increased the perceived future benefits of making costly investments in fiscal capacity. Using a panel dataset of 31 countries from 1870 to 2010, I then show that increases in electoral competition reduce subsequent tax revenue collection, but only in polities where elections cleave along less programmatic lines.
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