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21 - The Coup in Myanmar—What Do We Know?: (The Interpreter, 3 February 2021)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 July 2025

Andrew Selth
Affiliation:
Griffith University, Queensland
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Summary

The military coup in Myanmar on 1 February 2021 took almost everyone by surprise. There immediately followed a tsunami of news reports and popular punditry, in an attempt to make sense of what had happened and to consider its implications, both for Myanmar and the region. Many of these reports relied on incomplete or unverified information. Most were highly speculative. There was a need for sober assessments that weighed the available evidence and cautioned against unsupported conclusions.

On 1 February, Myanmar's armed forces (or Tatmadaw) declared a oneyear state of emergency, arrested State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and detained more than 50 politicians and activists. It had been just ten years since the former military regime permitted the transition to a “disciplined democracy”.

The official reason given for the coup was the need to respond to massive electoral fraud during last November's elections, which saw Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) win an even greater number of seats than in 2015, while the pro-military Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) was reduced to a mere handful. Yet, few foreign observers believed that was the real reason, prompting a wave of speculation, personal views and rumours in the news media and online.

Hard facts being in such short supply, these comments are not easily judged. However, some are more plausible than others.

Many observers have suggested that the crushing defeat of the USDP last November humiliated the generals, who saw it as a rejection of the Tatmadaw and its political role. The result certainly highlighted the armed forces’ unpopularity, but the military leadership already knew that the vast majority of the population supported Aung San Suu Kyi and the idea of a genuinely democratic system of government. Also, given the USDP's marginal role, the generals are unlikely to have been too concerned about the loss of the party's “bargaining position” in the national parliament.

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