Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 March 2026
Notwithstanding the practical success of reason from symmetry in the formulations of contemporary science, it is not uncommon to find scientific theoretical counterparts of the disposition toward this sufficient-reason-as-dissymmetry. We might go so far as to say that theoreticians are marked by their disposition toward either symmetry or dissymmetry. On the one hand, Einstein, whose theory of relativity might count as an extended argument from symmetry, and Weyl, for whom symmetry serves as the a priori; on the other, Dirac, for whom constants may be nothing more than a product of contingent initial conditions, potentially varying throughout the cosmos, and Smolin, for whom constants and laws adapt and evolve. For our purposes, these dispositions in their turn predispose to one of two particular forms of the principle of sufficient reason: as an argument from symmetry or from dissymmetry, as a principle of indifference or difference.
Anaximander’s cosmological arguments served us earlier to illustrate the former; if there is complete symmetry in the world, there is insufficientreason for anything to happen. As I hope to have established, the Leibnizian variant of sufficient reason is opposed to this disposition toward symmetry; we might go so far as to say that sufficient-reason-as-dissymmetry rules out of court the use of the principle of insufficient reason in explaining natural processes, for the simple reason that there can be no final symmetry in nature. In the end, for any given scientist, faith in the symmetry of the world is perforce constrained by phenomena; when the practitioner of group theory, for example, divines the mathematical description of physical invariants from among the sophisticated symmetries of an evolving ensemble, this serves first and foremost to distinguish those invariants, those symmetries, from those that have broken. For, as A. Zee points out, nature, if it displayed perfect symmetry, would simply stall:
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