This chapter examines the conception, conduct and collapse of the 2000 Camp David Summit, analysing the roles of the American mediators and the Israeli and Palestinian delegations. The summit unfolded in four phases: initial exploration (11–15 July), intensive negotiation (16–19 July), a pause during President Bill Clinton’s trip to Japan (20–22 July) and final, unsuccessful attempts to secure an agreement (22–25 July). The chapter focuses on the leadership of Ehud Barak, Yasser Arafat and Clinton – each bearing substantial responsibility for the summit’s failure. Despite ambitious intentions, the gaps between the parties’ positions proved too wide to bridge within two weeks. Jerusalem and the Temple Mount emerged as the central obstacles, alongside the unresolved issue of Palestinian refugees’ right of return. Neither side was prepared – or politically able – to make the painful compromises required for peace. For Israel and the United States, Camp David ended in frustration and disillusionment; for the Palestinians, it ended in relief at resisting external pressure to concede core principles without sufficient guarantees. Ultimately, the summit exposed the profound mistrust, asymmetry and entrenched national narratives that continued to thwart a just and durable peace settlement.