When Vietnamese troops stormed into Kampuchea (Cambodia), seized its capital, Phnom Penh, ousted its Khmer Rouge government and installed a puppet regime within two weeks in January 1979, Raja's world changed.
It crystallised for him a stark realisation: This could happen to other countries in the region, too – including Singapore, and particularly Thailand, which was now a frontline state. It could lead to a savage and protracted war spreading to the rest of Southeast Asia, a war that would inevitably involve the contending major powers. This was thus not merely an attack on Kampuchea – it was also a serious and direct threat to the stability and peace of the region.
It seemed clear to Raja that Vietnam's aggression was ushering in a dangerous new era of regional tension. This too was clear: the invasion of a smaller country by a larger neighbour, along with the deposition of a legitimate government by external force and the imposition of a proxy by a foreign power, was a direct challenge to the fundamentals of Singapore's foreign policy.
The far-reaching implications of Vietnam's naked aggression, sparking what was known as the Third Indochina War, had a profound influence on his approach to regional risks and dangers as well as on his conduct on the international stage. It would present him with one of the greatest strategic, diplomatic and moral challenges of his life.
Having tracked Vietnam's behaviour going back decades, Raja did not underestimate its fighting power and its hunger to dominate its weaker neighbours. Flush from its victory over the United States in 1975, Vietnam, which had almost 50 million people, had effectively subsumed Laos with its three million people. Nothing, it appeared, could contain the influence of Communist Vietnam, supported by its treaty ally, the Soviet Union.
As Vietnam digested its latest conquest – Kampuchea, with its seven million people – Raja's most pressing concern was the impact on Thailand. His visit to Bangkok just two weeks before the invasion had given him a keen sense of the nervous mood in the Thai capital. As he told the American ambassador to Singapore, Richard Kneip, on 21 December 1978, he found the atmosphere akin to the aftermath of the Vietnam War in 1975 – “with the government feeling alone and exposed”.
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