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6 - What is the Subject?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 August 2026

Didier Debaise
Affiliation:
Université libre de Bruxelles
Tomas Joseph Weber
Affiliation:
University of Cambridge
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Summary

A New Economy of Object and Subject

In his reading of Descartes, Whitehead extracts a definition of the subject as a relation through which feelings are unified and appropriated. The key point of disagreement is found in the inverse relations that each constructs between the subject and feeling. If Whitehead does in fact take up the problem's terms, he is nevertheless radically opposed to the Cartesian economy organised around a subject qua foundation of feeling.

Descartes in his own philosophy conceives the thinker as creating the occasional thought. The philosophy of organism inverts the order, and conceives the thought as a constituent operation in the creation of the occasional thinker. The thinker is the final end whereby there is the thought. In this inversion we have the final contrast between a philosophy of substance and a philosophy of organism. (PR, 151)

Whitehead's reading could be criticised, of course: he takes a Cartesian proposition, pushes it in the direction of speculative philosophy, only to return, finally, to Descartes’ own internal coherence, opposing it to an entirely different economy of thought. This, however, would be to lose what is important in Whitehead's reading of Descartes. Whitehead is not doing history of philosophy. The relevance of each of his critiques and reprises could, of course, be justly attacked in so far as they are constructed on grounds that would have been completely foreign to the original thinkers. A highly singular relation to philosophy is set up in Process and Reality, a relation that deserves a whole work of its own.

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