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Chapter VIII - Causes, Correlations, Information, Neural Codes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 May 2026

Robert Boncardo
Affiliation:
Australian Catholic University.
Inja Stracenski
Affiliation:
The University of Potsdam
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Summary

What are we talking about?

As in the case of voluntary movement, all of these observations from the cognitive neurosciences reinforce Spinoza's rejection of causal relations of the mental upon the body, thus confirming the second movement of Ethics III, 2.

Does this nevertheless imply a belief in an inverse causality, of the body upon the mental, which Ethics III, 2 rejects just as forcefully? Is brain activity the cause of the feelings, thoughts and, more generally, of all the representations of an image, a word or a number, with which it is correlated?

There is an apparent tendency to answer this question in the affirma¬tive in the descriptions provided by many neurobiologists of results in the cognitive sciences. This tendency also appears in the commentaries of phi-losophers who are interested in the neurosciences and who reflect on the implications of the project of the naturalisation of the mind within which this work is carried out. Indeed, these spectacular results naturally lead to a description of mental phenomena in terms of brain activities. Moreover, the medical applications of these results understandably strengthen this tendency, since the direct or indirect intervention into the brain of a subject produces obvious effects upon her mental state.

We must ask ourselves, however, to what extent the language used in such descriptions, when it results in the affirmation of a causal relation between the body and the mind, in fact leads to confusion – to a materialist monism of body and mind that is simultaneously a dualism, one that is most often disavowed (if not unconscious!) insofar as it concerns the mysteries of the alleged causal interactions between the two.

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