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9 - Pay for Performance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 March 2020

Jed DeVaro
Affiliation:
California State University, East Bay
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Summary

This chapter instills an appreciation for the powerful effects (both positive and negative) of performance pay on employee behavior. It opens with a performance-pay success story, namely a field experiment by Shearer (2004) in which the piece-rate compensation of Canadian tree planters was changed. It then develops some examples of the darker side of performance pay, including the Wells Fargo employees who opened false accounts to meet a quota. Section 9.2 provides visual representations of performance pay in which the pay graph has a positive slope (i.e., it increases when the worker’s performance measure increases), sometimes linearly as with piece-rate pay and sometimes nonlinearly as with bonuses. The chapter emphasizes the incentive and sorting effects associated with performance pay as well as its prevalence. Workers’ attitudes towards risk (of earnings fluctuations) and how risk affects performance pay is covered, along with performance measurement, various drawbacks of performance pay, and how to design performance-pay contracts. Readers will finish the chapter with an understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of performance pay and when it can be effectively used.

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  • Pay for Performance
  • Jed DeVaro, California State University, East Bay
  • Book: Strategic Compensation and Talent Management
  • Online publication: 23 March 2020
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108861458.010
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  • Pay for Performance
  • Jed DeVaro, California State University, East Bay
  • Book: Strategic Compensation and Talent Management
  • Online publication: 23 March 2020
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108861458.010
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Pay for Performance
  • Jed DeVaro, California State University, East Bay
  • Book: Strategic Compensation and Talent Management
  • Online publication: 23 March 2020
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108861458.010
Available formats
×