This chapter examines Aquinas’s account of will in God, showing how it builds on his teaching about knowledge. For Aquinas, will follows from intellect: as truth is the object of understanding, so good is the object of desire. Since God knows himself as perfect goodness, he necessarily delights in himself and thus has will essentially. God also wills creatures, yet not by necessity: creation is free, not compelled by divine nature or by anything external. Aquinas contrasts divine willing with human volition, stressing that while human will involves deliberation and change, God’s will is identical with his essence. Love, as the first movement of will, is also properly ascribed to God: God loves creatures insofar as he wills their existence and goodness, though unequally. The chapter also considers modern critiques – such as Kretzmann’s appeal to Dionysius and Swinburne’s theistic personalism – arguing that Aquinas avoids anthropomorphism by rooting will in divine simplicity.