Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 September 2026
Plato is generally thought to use alethic terms in (at least) two ways: for semantic and for ontological truth. Semantic truth is the sort of truth had by true propositions and the contents of true belief and knowledge. Ontological truth is at issue when we say that someone is a true (i.e. genuine) friend, or that such and such a thing is true (i.e. real). It’s often thought that, in central metaphysical and epistemological contexts in such dialogues as the Phaedo and Republic, ontological truth is to the fore, especially as it applies to forms. It’s also been thought that in these contexts, Plato sometimes uses ‘truth’ in place of ‘wisdom’, and so for a high-level cognitive condition. In this chapter, I argue that in one central passage – Phaedo 65–67 – semantic, not ontological, truth is to the fore. Neither forms nor any cognitive conditions are called ‘truth’; nor are they said to be true. When Plato speaks of something’s being true, or of the truth in Phaedo 65–67, he has in mind the contents of true mental states or, more generally, such things as true sentences.
To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.
To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.
To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.