Like in the other two cases, Lagos’ fuel protests have relied on contentious repertoires developed under autocracy in the 1980s. In contrast to Johannesburg, Lagos’ fuel protests are quite centralized, typically mobilizing tens of thousands of city residents, and are largely controlled by the country’s labor unions. Many activists and protesters in Lagos blame labor and trade unions for constantly “selling out” in negotiations with the federal government. Conversely, I argue that the real reason Nigeria’s fuel subsidies have had limited success is that the mass protest is the only viable pathway for contestation. Both local government and the courts are much weaker mechanisms here, so there is simply less traversion. I trace this confrontational relationship between civil society and the state to Nigeria’s democratic transition. In Nigeria, the military was able to maintain considerable influence over the country’s democratic transition (e.g. the drafting of the constitution, centralization of power). As a result, successful protests in Lagos require a high level of mobilization to force concessions from the federal government.