This book presents an account of normative practical reasons and the way in which they contribute to the rationality of action. Rather than simply 'counting in favour of' actions, normative reasons play two logically distinct roles: requiring action and justifying action. The distinction between these two roles explains why some reasons do not seem relevant to the rational status of an action unless the agent cares about them, while other reasons retain all their force regardless of the agent's attitude. It also explains why the class of rationally permissible action is wide enough to contain not only all morally required action, but also much selfish and immoral action. The book will appeal to a range of readers interested in practical reason in particular, and moral theory more generally.

"It is a great contribution to contemporary philosophical debate and is likely to make an impact."
Philosophy in Review

"Brute Rationality is a very fine book. It is crisply written, laced with wit, and carefully argued.... I recommend Brute Rationality to anyone who is interested in issues of practical rationality and how they bear upon moral theory."
Ethics

"Brute Rationality is a remarkable book. It is elegant and engaging, and it aims to deliver s traightfoward solutions to problems not addressed by other theories of practical rationality. The theory of normative reasons developed in Brute Rationality is both detailed and novel." - Sergio Tenenbaum, University of Toronto