In this book Daniel Smyth offers a comprehensive overview of Immanuel Kant's conception of intuition in all its species – divine, receptive, sensible, and human. Kant considers sense perception a paradigm of intuition, yet claims that we can represent infinities in intuition, despite the finitude of sense perception. Smyth examines this heterodox combination of commitments and argues that the various features Kant ascribes to intuition are meant to remedy specific cognitive shortcomings that arise from the discursivity of our intellect Intuition acting as the intellect's cognitive partner to make knowledge possible. He reconstructs Kant's conception of intuition and its role in his philosophy of mind, epistemology, and philosophy of mathematics, and shows that Kant's conception of sensibility is as innovative and revolutionary as his much-debated theory of the understanding.

Winner, 2025 Henry Allison Senior Scholar Book Prize, North American Kant Society

Winner, 2025 Book Award, American Philosophical Association

‘This highly engaging book offers a convincing and original interpretation of what it dubs ‘Kant's apperceptive approach to the cognitive faculties,' revealing among other things its surprising implications for the nature of sensibility and intuition.  Ranging over Kant's methodology, philosophy of mind, logic, epistemology, and philosophy of mathematics, Smyth brings fresh light to a number of key ideas and distinctions in Kant's mature theoretical philosophy.'

James Messina - University of Wisconsin-Madison

‘As far as I can say, there is no comparable book on Kant that has ever investigated Kant’s conception of the senses in the way in which it is investigated here, namely as a capacity for cognition, as it is known through self-consciousness. I think this perspective on the senses is really fascinating and makes an important - and certainly provocative - contribution to our understanding of ourselves as sensible beings. I highly recommend the book.’

Andrea Kern - Professor Philosophy, University of Leipzig

‘A terrific treasury of gems about Kant’s less-treated cognitive faculty: sensible intuition. … those who are interested in Kant should read this book. Smyth offers a great account of what intuition is and does for Kant. Given the importance of intuition for Kant’s Critical project and Kantian metaphysics, having a firm grasp on what is so distinctive about Kantian intuition and why Kant’s account is plausible and attractive is a desiderium ably discharged by Smyth’s terrific book, putting us all, Kantians or otherwise, in his debt.’

Bonaventure Chapman, O.P. Source: The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review