Michael F. Joseph's The Origins of Great Power Rivalries advances a comprehensive rationalist theory of how great powers assess emerging threats; why enduring great power rivalries unfold through either delayed competition, or delayed peace; and how diplomacy functions when rising powers emerge on the scene. In an important departure from traditional realist theory, Joseph argues that countries are motivated by distinct principles - normative values that shape foreign policy beyond simple security concerns. Exploring instances of great power competition, he explains why rational states draw qualitative inferences about rivals' intentions by examining the historical context of their demands, not just military capabilities. Offering an analysis of great power rivalries since 1850, Joseph illuminates British reactions to Stalin at the beginning of the Cold War, among other rivalries. He animates a theoretically sophisticated defense of America's approach to China in the post-Cold War era with 100s of Washington-insider interviews.

‘The book makes an important contribution to the theory of international relations. One explanation of why Britain decided to fight Hitler when he took the rest of Czechoslovakia is that it did not fit with a nationalist German program but signaled more extensive ambitions. Joseph formalizes and generalizes this core insight and shows that it applies in a number of other important cases over the past 200 years of international history.’

Andrew H. Kydd - University of Wisconsin

‘Michael Joseph sheds valuable new light on a central question of international relations theory. He explains that understanding why an adversary wants to expand enables a state to make calibrated decisions about how intensely to compete or cooperate. Joseph supports his nuanced theory with an impressive array of empirical tests. The Origins of Great Power Rivalries makes a major contribution to IR theory.’

Charles Glaser - Senior Fellow, Security Studies Program, MIT

‘In The Origins of Great Power Rivalries, Michael Joseph cogently explains why status quo states often take ‘too long’ to respond to rising challengers. Joseph theorizes that declining powers judge the challenger’s actions against a historically informed and articulated principle announced by the latter: only when actions deviate from this principle does the defender learn the challenger has more expansive goals and turns to competition. Joseph explains not only past cases but sheds important light on contemporary US-China relations.’

David A. Lake - Distinguished Professor of the Graduate Division, University of California, San Diego