To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
This was supposed to be a book about Republicans. In the summer of 2016, I had an idea for a book chronicling how the Republican Party dealt with their embarrassing loss to Hillary Clinton. Surely they were going to have to rethink how their presidential nomination system worked, why it utterly failed in 2016, and how a patently unelectable candidate like Donald Trump somehow got the nomination and cost them an election that was obviously theirs to win. It would be a difficult period of self-reflection for the GOP (Grand Old Party), and it seemed like something that would be fascinating to observe in action.
It has been nearly two centuries since an American presidential election has evoked a crisis of confidence like that following the election of 2016. Not since the election of Andrew Jackson in 1828 has there been such a public display of anxiety concerning the methods by which we choose our chief executive. As in the contest of 1828 pitting the Democrat Jackson against his Federalist opponent John Quincy Adams, the presidential nominating process of 2016 produced a contest between a celebrity populist, widely seen as unqualified by experience or temperament, and a highly experienced and competent but deeply uninspiring political insider who had been anointed by establishment elites.
Despite the rapid growth of online political advertising, the vast majority of scholarship on political advertising relies exclusively on evidence from candidates’ television advertisements. The relatively low cost of creating and deploying online advertisements and the ability to target online advertisements more precisely may broaden the set of candidates who advertise and allow candidates to craft messages to more narrow audiences than on television. Drawing on data from the newly released Facebook Ad Library API and television data from the Wesleyan Media Project, we find that a much broader set of candidates advertises on Facebook than television, particularly in down-ballot races. We then examine within-candidate variation in the strategic use and content of advertising on television relative to Facebook for all federal, statewide, and state legislative candidates in the 2018 election. Among candidates who use both advertising media, Facebook advertising occurs earlier in the campaign, is less negative, less issue focused, and more partisan than television advertising.
Chapter 1 lays the groundwork for developing my theory of the gendered qualification gap and the empirical tests I conduct in later chapters. I start by defining the gendered qualification gap. The gendered qualification gap explains the empirical phenomenon where female candidates are just as likely to win their elections as male candidates but win by smaller margins and run in more competitive races. This empirical outcome is taken by some scholars and political pundits to mean that there is no consequential bias in voter decision-making. Yet these successful women have better qualifications than their equally successful male counterparts. This means that highly qualified female candidates are just as likely to win their elections as less qualified male candidates. If there were no gender bias in voter decision-making, then female candidates would be more likely to win their elections compared with less qualified male candidates. This chapter discusses how current explanations overlook the role that gender bias plays in how voters evaluate candidate qualifications. Past research examines how institutional barriers and socialization patterns contribute to the gendered qualification gap, but missing from the extant body of scholarship is how voters contribute to the qualification gap.
Russian interference in the 2016 election was not an isolated event but was, rather, a cluster of related techniques, each of which will be described in this chapter. There is wide agreement in government and intelligence circles about what happened, though the Trump administration has at times stated contradictory things about whether the interference occurred, or contradictory characterizations of the interference. There was: (1) hacking of email accounts and the public release of information stolen from these accounts; (2) social media campaigns, including paid advertisements on Facebook and postings on Twitter engineered by so-called troll farms; and (3) the infiltration of advocacy organizations such as the National Rifle Association, with the goal of influencing the domestic political landscape. These activities raise two important issues that are analyzed in this chapter. First, are the actors who engage in this interference private actors or state agents, and does it make a difference? Second, based on the methods used, what conclusions can be drawn about Russia’s strategic objectives in interfering in the 2016 elections? These questions must be answered in order to answer the fundamental question, i.e., whether election interference violates international law, and if yes, in what way.
The introductory chapter situates the sociopolitical context in which Muslim Americans find themselves in contemporary America. They appear to be front and center in contemporary American politics, occupying a prominent space in the national discourse. The chapter also introduces who Muslim Americans are and highlights the diversity within the group and emphasizes that intersectionality is important to consider when evaluating the status of Muslim Americans. Next, the chapter argues that Muslim Americans, despite being a religious minority, have been racialized. Finally, the chapter concludes with a plan for the rest of the book.
Is support for democracy in the United States robust enough to deter undemocratic behavior by elected politicians? We develop a model of the public as a democratic check and evaluate it using two empirical strategies: an original, nationally representative candidate-choice experiment in which some politicians take positions that violate key democratic principles, and a natural experiment that occurred during Montana’s 2017 special election for the U.S. House. Our research design allows us to infer Americans’ willingness to trade-off democratic principles for other valid but potentially conflicting considerations such as political ideology, partisan loyalty, and policy preferences. We find the U.S. public’s viability as a democratic check to be strikingly limited: only a small fraction of Americans prioritize democratic principles in their electoral choices, and their tendency to do so is decreasing in several measures of polarization, including the strength of partisanship, policy extremism, and candidate platform divergence. Our findings echo classic arguments about the importance of political moderation and cross-cutting cleavages for democratic stability and highlight the dangers that polarization represents for democracy.
What role did the Republican Party play in the South before the mid-1960s? On the national side, Republican presidents and presidential candidates engaged in near continuous attempts at winning Southern states. In addition, a number of Republican presidents – including Hayes, Arthur, Harrison, Harding, Hoover, and Eisenhower – invested significantly (though, most often unsuccessfully) in rebuilding local party organizations in the South. Importantly, we show that every single Republican president between Grant and Nixon relied on some form of a “Southern strategy” aimed at winning (re-)nomination at the national convention and/or strengthening state party organizations in the South. This corrects a misconception in various historical accounts that Republican presidents effectively gave up on the South by the early twentieth century. At the state level, executive (federal) patronage, and the considerable profits that could be gained from controlling it, inspired frequent contestation over control of the local party organizations. That is, while many Republican state parties no longer functioned as regular political parties – often failing to even run candidates in state elections – control of the state party organizations continued to be valuable to local party elites. Initially, these contests largely involved different mixed-race groups surrounding (former) elected officials and federal office-holders. But over time, contests began to take on an increasingly racial hue, as Black-and-Tans (a faction of black and white Republicans) vied for control with Lily-Whites (a faction of white Republicans that sought to ban blacks from leadership positions in the party).
Hillary Clinton had a thousand reasons to be upset by the 2016 presidential election. Her book, What Happened, lists them all. In Chapter 16 (helpfully entitled Why), Clinton lays out her reasons in 120 well-crafted paragraphs. FBI director James Comey is her star performer, far outdistancing Vladimir Putin & Co. Clinton also acknowledges her own shortcomings as a candidate and recounts other popular explanations for the election’s outcome – angry blue-collar workers in the Midwest, a disorganized Democratic Party, fear of immigrants swarming the southern border, etc.1What Happened is a conflicted book, as Clinton tries to explain “how sixty-two million people – many of whom agreed Trump was unfit for the job – could vote for a man so manifestly unqualified to be President.”2
The Nineteenth Amendment to the US Constitution was ratified in August 1920, setting off a flurry of speculation about how newly-enfranchised women would vote in the upcoming presidential election. Although women in fifteen states already enjoyed the right to vote by 1920, politicians and observers nonetheless expressed uncertainty about what to expect. “Women’s Vote Baffles Politicians’ Efforts to Forecast Election” claimed one newspaper. Another reported that “anxious politicians of both parties are sitting up nights worrying about [women’s votes].” Appeals to new women voters emphasized issues specific to women, such as equal pay and maternity care, and issues related to women’s roles as mothers, such as child labor and education. In the aftermath of the election, many claimed that women had handed the election to Republican Warren G. Harding, for reasons ranging from his good looks to the Republican party’s support of women’s suffrage. Others attributed the Republican advantage to specific groups of women; the women many considered most likely to turn out to vote in 1920 – suffrage activists – tended to be native-born white women, who like native-born white men, were expected to vote Republican.
Politicians often extoll the common sense of running government like a business. Indeed, business acumen was arguably the principal qualification of then-candidate Donald Trump to become president of the United States. Likening government to a business, however, invites another analogy: voters as employers. Employers are constrained by practical and legal considerations in choosing employees. For example, it’s almost impossible to imagine a board of directors selecting Donald Trump as its CEO after the revelation of the Access Hollywood tape on which he boasted of grabbing women by their genitalia without their consent. The reputational and legal exposure for the business would be too great. Yet American voters elected Trump as the nation’s CEO.
As the world knows, Donald Trump, a White male, won the presidency in 2016. But entertaining the hypothetical, one wonders, what if he had lost? What if one of the other twenty or so serious contenders for the presidency had emerged victorious? And what if the winner had not been a White male?
The unprecedented diversity of the presidential candidates in 2016 – two Hispanics, one African American, one Asian American, and two women – gives us the chance to think more deeply about race and representation. In the previous chapter, to gauge minority representation, I simply tallied how many racial and ethnic minorities won office. The 2016 presidential election tells us why this calculus is insufficient to understand the complexity of race in the American political context.
Aided by illustrative anecdotes from the worlds of politics, journalism and culture, Chapter One dives into the scholarship on the role of emotions in shaping political behavior to establish the questions at the heart of the manuscript. How does race moderate the emergence of anger, and its impact on political behavior? What is the racial anger gap, and what are its implications for black Americans’ capacity to achieve their policy goals? What are its implications for partisan politics? What factors—both psychological and structural—work to constrain the emergence and translation of political anger to political action among African Americans? Finally, do positive emotions such as hope and pride shape African American decisions to participate in politics in a manner different from their white counterparts? This chapter introduces a theoretical framework that connects the distinct racial lenses through which black and white Americans view the political environment to the divergent set of emotional sentiments they generally carry within that environment. The emotional sentiment of resignation exhibited by African Americans is the root cause of the anger gap, laying the foundation for the exploration of the causes and consequences of this gap in U.S. politics.
Existing approaches to campaign ethics fail to adequately account for the “arms races” incited by competitive incentives in the absence of effective sanctions for destructive behaviors. By recommending scrupulous devotion to unenforceable norms of honesty, these approaches require ethical candidates either to quit or lose. To better understand the complex dilemmas faced by candidates, therefore, we turn first to the tradition of “adversarial ethics,” which aims to enable ethical participants to compete while preventing the most destructive excesses of competition. As we demonstrate, however, elections present even more difficult challenges than other adversarial contexts, because no centralized regulation is available to halt potential arms races. Turning next to recent scholarship on populism and partisanship, we articulate an alternative framework for campaign ethics, which allows candidates greater room to maneuver in their appeals to democratic populations while nevertheless requiring adherence to norms of social and political pluralism.