1 Introduction
While the historical roots date back to eighteenth-century aesthetics of nature, environmental aesthetics (slightly broader in scope) emerged as a sub-discipline of philosophical aesthetics during the second half of the twentieth century.Footnote 1 Its focus on the sensory experience of natural – as well as human and human-influenced – environments was partly a reaction to the fact that ‘analytic aesthetics had virtually ignored the natural world’.Footnote 2 While aesthetics in the eighteenth century was largely preoccupied with natural beauty, philosophical aesthetics witnessed, during the first half of the twentieth century, a belated Hegelian ‘shift’ in favour of art.Footnote 3 The initial task of environmental aesthetics was thus to restore a ‘mutilated aesthetics’.Footnote 4 Furthermore, a growing sense of urgency, especially proliferate in empirical research, to tackle threats of the degeneration of nature, helped to put natural beauty back on the philosophical agenda. Today, such worries have developed into a global awareness and knowledge (or in some camps, denial and ignorance) about climate-related disasters around the world. This development is reflected in contemporary environmental aesthetics, with a stream of cognitive, non-cognitive, and virtue ethical models and positions.Footnote 5
Historical perspectives tend to play a secondary and confused role in this context. To remedy the situation, this study focuses on the impact of the third Earl of Shaftesbury. In the early eighteenth century, Shaftesbury developed his ideas about natural beauty via a series of claims about intrinsic value and a disinterested love of God; ideas that by unexpected turns became central in modern aesthetic theory. However, succeeding theories and recent applications appear to flourish at the expense of Shaftesbury’s original idea, making his position in environmental aesthetics confusing, to say the least: On the one hand, he is deferentially recognised as ‘one of the principal architects’ behind the most important ‘axioms of modern Western aesthetics’, on the other hand, he is never studied by detailed first-hand readings.Footnote 6
The main reason for this situation is, I think, that contemporary environmental aesthetics has been largely unsuccessful in addressing ‘any religious veneration of natural beauty’.Footnote 7 In readings of Shaftesbury, this means that philosophers tend to bypass the fact that his theory of natural beauty is integral to a critique of theological voluntarism (from Latin voluntas, will), a doctrine where God determines goodness and truth, and rewards and punishments are the primary motivation for human actions. Shaftesbury portrays the advocates of theological voluntarism as ‘nominal Moralists’ who make ‘Virtue nothing in it-self, a Creature of Will only, or a mere Name of Fashion’ (Moral 126 [257]). He finds the belief that God’s will cancels or amends the laws of nature offensive. Theological voluntarism instrumentalises human motivation and denigrates both human and physical nature. In its place, Shaftesbury proposes a disinterested love of God and argues that virtue and natural beauty have intrinsic value.
The overall aim of this study is to initiate a long overdue dialogue between environmental aesthetics and its neglected past in Shaftesbury’s theory of natural beauty. I want to introduce what I think is a more sensible way of understanding historical and contemporary connections between Shaftesbury, theology, and environmental aesthetics, than is currently available. Two caveats are in order. I neither argue that there was a particular deep ecology in Shaftesbury, nor that we profit from reconstructing such a thing. Rather, by revisiting his theory of natural beauty, philosophy gets, I think, access to a critical resource for rethinking the defining crisis of our time and, hopefully, for perceiving the relevance of environmental aesthetics in a new light.Footnote 8
1.1 The Corpus
Shaftesbury published his three-volume work, Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, in 1711. It contained the revised An Inquiry Concerning Virtue, or Merit, previously published with the title An Inquiry Concerning Virtue, in Two Discourses in 1699, along with four previously published treatises: A Letter Concerning Enthusiasm (1708), Sensus Communis, An Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour (1709), Soliloquy, or Advice to an Author (1710), and The Moralists, a Philosophical Rhapsody (1709). The final volume consisted of a five-chapter commentary on the previous treatises, entitled Miscellaneous Reflections on the Preceding Treatises and Other Critical Subjects.
Though Characteristicks is largely a collection of previously published treatises, it made a big splash in the eighteenth century. During the first half of the century, no major European philosopher remained indifferent to it. In Britain, George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, ridiculed Shaftesbury as an anti-Christian freethinker, and Francis Hutcheson defended him against Bernard Mandeville’s attacks while bemoaning Shaftesbury’s ‘Prejudices’ against Christianity.Footnote 9 On the continent, Leibniz visualised his own theodicy in Shaftesbury’s key work The Moralists and declared that the dialogue raised him into ecstasy, while Moses Mendelssohn translated parts of Characteristicks and introduced it to Lessing.Footnote 10 It has even been suggested that Characteristicks and Shaftesbury’s introduction of disinterestedness heralded the development of German idealism.Footnote 11 At the same time, it remains true that Shaftesbury’s appeal plummeted during the second half of the century, never to fully recover. Today, Characteristicks is a work frequently studied and referred to by historians of philosophy, but less read and, I dare say, understood by contemporary philosophers in environmental aesthetics.
There are of course exceptions. Michael B. Gill stands out with a series of historically minded readings of Shaftesbury that is contiguous to environmental aesthetics. As Gill argues, ‘Shaftesbury was instrumental in initiating’ a ‘modern revaluation of nature’, away from denigrating wilderness towards recognising the intrinsic value and beauty of uncultivated nature.Footnote 12 However, Gill is really the exception to the norm. Rather, what sticks out in contemporary environmental aesthetics is either a systematic lack of interest in Shaftesbury’s theory of natural beauty, or recurring misreadings of his idea of a disinterested attitude as either incompatible with engagement, or as integral to scientific objectivity. In this book I oppose such readings. Instead, I argue that Shaftesbury’s concern with a disinterested attitude stems from its ability to make us recognise our relatedness to natural beauty and its intrinsic value. To be able to make valid arguments about aesthetic and moral attitudes to nature, as well as imagine new futures, it is, I think, important to rectify current misconceptions.
Reading Characteristicks is demanding not by its sheer density of arguments, but because of its unsystematic form. Pursuing Horace’s division of, on the one hand, the Peripatetic and Stoic schools, and, on the other hand, the Cyrenaic school and Epicureanism, Shaftesbury firmly allies with the former (TNA, PRO 30/24/22/7, fol. 524r), while constantly experimenting with the form of writing philosophy. Throughout Characteristicks, he takes pleasure in exploring the different roles of a ‘plain Dogmatist’ and ‘a POET in due form’ (MR 166 [135], 334 [285]). Reading Shaftesbury’s ‘Rhapsodical Philosophy’ (MR 230 [191]) in the twenty-first century can thus be a ‘strange experience’, for many philosophers even ‘off-putting’.Footnote 13 To make things even more complicated, Shaftesbury left behind a large unpublished corpus, which must be studied as well. Hence, apart from a focus on Characteristicks in general, and the key dialogue The Moralists in particular, I will take into account his Askêmata (Ἀσκήματα), which are the private notebooks that he kept during his retreats in Rotterdam (1698–1699; 1703–1704) and continued to work on later on in his life (1707–1708 and in 1712).Footnote 14 At times, I will supplement my arguments with references to Shaftesbury’s correspondence and his unfinished Second Characters.
1.2 Overview
In addition to section 1, which introduces the key questions, this study consists of three main sections. Section 2 explores the roots of Shaftesbury’s anti-voluntarism in the group of thinkers referred to as the Cambridge Platonists, and two of its leading figures, Benjamin Whichcote and Ralph Cudworth. Whichcote never published anything in his lifetime. Shaftesbury’s anonymously published edition of Select Sermons of Dr Whichcote (1698), and his preface, was preceded only by two posthumous collections of Whichcote’s teachings, prayers, and sermons. Still, Whichcote, who is usually considered to be the founding inspiration of Cambridge Platonism, exerted a significant impact on Shaftesbury, not least on his anti-voluntarism. In contrast to Whichcote, Cudworth published one philosophical work in his lifetime, the massive True Intellectual System of the Universe (1678), planned as the first and preparatory volume of an extensive system of philosophy. While Shaftesbury saw an ‘excellent Divine, and truly Christian Philosopher’ (SelSerm 58) in Whichcote, he identified his own philosophical project more closely with Cudworth’s and believed that they shared a ‘common Fate of those who dare to appear fair Authors’ (Moral 132 [262]).Footnote 15
The anti-voluntarism advocated by Whichcote, Cudworth, and Shaftesbury, is formed by three intersecting arguments on divine will, goodness, and rewards and punishments. Together the three thinkers contest a voluntaristic trust in the arbitrary will of God and the view that morality is ‘not by nature (φύσει), but institution (θέσει)’ (TEIM 16). They share a solid belief in God as absolute goodness that has a natural priority over will and power. We are ‘made after the Image of God’ (Aph 798) and it is, they argue, in our disinterested friendship with God that we complete our goodness and morality as inward principles.Footnote 16 There is thus, as Gill observes, a strong ‘internal orientation’ in their writings, where rewards are the ‘internal Reconciliation to the Nature of God’ (SelSerm 109) and punishments are ‘internal Hell’ (SelSerm 153).Footnote 17 Taken together, these three anti-voluntaristic beliefs enable us to approach, and hopefully understand, Cudworth’s view of nature. While nature is beyond ‘Divine Will and Pleasure’ (TISU 147), God must be ‘Inward to every thing, so Nature Acts Immediately upon the Matter, as an Inward and Living Soul or Law in it’ (TISU 156). Cudworth refers to this incorporeal activity or energy, through which God’s plan is achieved, as plastic nature. As such, it is ‘acting Immediately upon the Matter as an inward Principle in it’ (TISU 155). Shaftesbury’s personal interpretation of Cudworth’s plastic nature constitutes, I think, a neglected but critical moment in the history of aesthetics, where natural beauty is established as an aesthetic category, however, not by disconnecting itself from a theological (anti-voluntaristic) position but by embracing it.
Section 3 aims to clarify Shaftesbury’s view of nature by reflecting on three constituent elements that when combined form his theory of natural beauty: (1) The intrinsic value of virtue and affections (a prerequisite value for appreciating natural beauty), (2) the beauty of the whole (identifying the intrinsic value of natural beauty considered as a system), and (3) disinterestedness (the primary virtue for appreciating natural beauty).
In section 4, I will address two of the dominant models – engagement theory and scientific cognitivism – to show how they obstruct further knowledge about the historical roots of the discipline and Shaftesbury’s idea of disinterestedness. I conclude this section with a discussion of the epistemic value of disinterestedness. The two models raise important questions about the role of knowledge and emotions when contemplating nature. Here, I defend the idea that the epistemic value of the contemplation is the result of our emotional absorption in natural beauty. Shaftesbury’s insistence on emotional immersion in the beauty of nature and dependency on other living organisms represent, I think, one of the earliest and most important aesthetic attempts to challenge an instrumental and detached view of nature as a resource to be exploited. As such, it continues to speak to us in the midst of our current crisis.
2 Anti-Voluntarism
Shaftesbury admired and published Whichcote’s sermons, while he championed Cudworth’s ‘Sincerity in the Cause of Deity’ against accusations of atheism (Moral 132 [262]). In this section, I reflect on the intellectual connections between the three thinkers, with a focus on three overlapping arguments – on God’s will, goodness, and rewards and punishments – that underpin their anti-voluntarism. This will, I hope, set the stage for Cudworth’s concept of plastic nature, which is important for Shaftesbury’s theory of natural beauty.
2.1 Will
In a famous passage in Plato’s Euthyphro, Socrates asks if the holy is loved by the Gods because it is holy, or if it is holy because it is loved.Footnote 18 Socrates’ question is in different shapes and forms ubiquitous in monotheistic Christianity, not least by providing a basis for two strains of thought commonly referred to as voluntarism and anti-voluntarism (or metaethical realism).Footnote 19 While voluntarists answer affirmatively to the second part of Socrates’ question (things are holy because and only because God regards them as holy), anti-voluntarists argue that God regards things to be holy because and only because they are inherently holy. Cudworth addresses Socrates’ question in his sermon to the parliamentarians of the House of Commons in 1647 (Commons 27; see also TEIM 19). Given his unwavering belief in God as the ‘highest and most perfect Good’, goodness cannot according to Cudworth be good ‘because God out of an arbitrary will of his, would have it so’ but because it is ‘suitable to the highest Goodnesse; the first Idea, and fairest Copy of which is his own Essence’ (Commons 26). Thus, Cudworth concludes, moral actions by humans are not ‘Good, because God loveth them, and will have them be accounted such; but rather, God therefore loveth them because they are in themselves simply good’ (Commons 26).Footnote 20
Cudworth develops his position further in A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality (written in the 1660s but posthumously published in 1731) by sketching a chronology of the voluntaristic position from Protagoras in Theaetetus, via Epicurus to Thomas Hobbes (the last two often lumped together, see e.g. FW 172; also Shaftesbury SC 86/88 [117–19]), where morality and virtue are not recognised as real or by nature, but as artificial and by arbitrary will.Footnote 21 The doctrine concludes with ‘Modern Theologers’ claiming
that there is nothing absolutely, intrinsically, and naturally good and evil, just and unjust, antecedently to any positive command or prohibition of God; but that the arbitrary will and pleasure of God (that is, an omnipotent Being devoid of all essential and natural justice), by its commands and prohibitions, is the first and only rule and measure thereof.
Here, God’s potentia absoluta centres on a will that is forcefully determined and communicated by God’s commands. The commands are not preceded by any apriori intrinsic value of virtue. It is the commands themselves that communicate and determine value and truth. Thus, there is nothing that naturally and by necessity makes a certain value morally obligatory apart from that God wills it. The unfortunate consequence of the doctrine, argues Cudworth, is that a corrupt standard (lying, blasphemy, and perjury) of morality, determined by God’s will, might appear plausible. Thus, God’s will would become its own standard, rather than, as Whichcote remarks, morality being ‘Laws of themselves; without Sanction by Will; but by the Reason of the thing’ (SelSerm 107; see also Aph 221). What Whichcote and Cudworth caution against is that wrong could so to speak easily be right if God wills it. While ‘ancient fathers of the Christian church’ objected to this doctrine, it ‘crept up afterward in the scholastic age’, with William of Ockham claiming ‘that there is no act evil but as it is prohibited by God, and which cannot be made good if it be commanded by God’ (TEIM 14).Footnote 22 Of course, neither Whichcote, nor Cudworth or Shaftesbury, dispute that the ‘will and power of God have an absolute, infinite, and unlimited command upon the existences of all created things’ (TEIM 17). Their point, however, is that once things are created, they are no longer ‘by will or arbitrary command, but by the necessity of their own nature’ (TEIM 17). Furthermore, not only is the nature of a thing set when God has created something, but given the fact that God could not have created it with any other nature than he did, the very nature of a thing itself is also not arbitrary. Nothing is thus by arbitrary will or command in God, not even the decision to create something with a specific nature (see TISU 873–4).
When referring to the ‘arbitrary’ will of God, Whichcote, Cudworth, and Shaftesbury all use arbitrary in its Latin form (arbitrarius), meaning something accomplished by means of arbitration, rather than ordered by nature. Thus, arbitration does not have its modern English connotation of negotiation, mediation, or peacemaking. Rather, it is being used in its old Latin sense of relating to choice, judgement, or will. While arbitration as negotiation implies multiple viewpoints, and reasoned arguments from both sides, arbitrary for these anti-voluntarists (and arguably for many of their voluntarist opponents too) means chosen without any antecedent principle to guide the choice. Whichcote sums up his critique of voluntarism in one of his aphorisms, when he writes that ‘Right and Just is determined, not by the Arbitrary pleasure of him that has Power over us; but by the Nature and Reason of Things’ (Aph 257).
This critique is further pursued by Shaftesbury in An Inquiry Concerning Virtue, or Merit. As always, Shaftesbury champions the belief in a compassionate and just God (though he often uses synonymous terms like presence, Deity, mind, or principle): a ‘perfect [i.e. complete] THEIST’ is someone who depends on a divine principle or mind that is permanent and good (Inquiry 36 [11]). On the opening pages, Shaftesbury fleshes out two metaphysical assumptions about the universe. The first assumption is theistic and claims that everything is organised for the best. If right, it is an assumption excluding worries about any ‘real ILL in the Universe’ (Inquiry 32 [9]). Of course, there is still the appearance of evil, but the universe is, according to the theistic assumption, perfectly designed and thus perfectly good (see also Ask 98; for a similar ‘best possible world’ argument by Cudworth, see TISU 873–4). The second assumption is that there is, so to speak, room for improvement in the design of the universe. This assumption contradicts the theistic assumption. If we assume that some things and actions are evil, they must be either formed by rational design or by accident. The fact that such a design would produce harm, evil, and pain suggests that it must be a corrupt designing principle or what Shaftesbury refers to as daemonism (Inquiry 36–40 [11–14]). Here, his critique against voluntarism heaves into view.Footnote 23 While daemonism necessitates belief in a ‘governing Mind, or Minds’, such belief is not ‘necessarily good, nor confin’d to what is best’ (Inquiry 36 [11]). Just as in the critique against voluntarism, the reason is that such a governing principle only seems to be ‘capable of acting according to mere Will or Fancy’ (Inquiry 36 [11]). Given that we have ‘no other Idea of GOD, than of a Being arbitrary’, we are likely to fear God’s unpredictable will (Inquiry 40 [13–14]). For all we know, God could be, in the words of Cudworth, a ‘cruell and dreadfull Erynnis, with curled fiery Snakes about his head, and Firebrands in his hands’ (Commons 38). The unpredictability of divine will could thus, Shaftesbury concludes, be ‘causing ill, and ordaining to Misery’ (Inquiry 40 [14]), with a potential risk of moral decay as a result.
A belief arising merely from the ‘suppos’d Will and Pleasure of a Supreme Deity’ reveals its flaws in a false conflict between human nature and God’s goodness. If we, against our nature, are forced to approve of a ‘DEITY, that has any apparent Character of Ill’ we will learn to confuse the ‘horrid and detestable’ for being ‘good and amiable’ (Inquiry 96 [47]). But even if daemonism and voluntarism succeed in misleading us by threats of punishments, our actions are not always a mirror of our beliefs. To act merely out of fear and without ‘real Heartiness’ and ‘Esteem or Love’ can involve traces of a natural defiance that suggests an ‘Apprehension of Sense still of Right and Wrong’ (Inquiry 98/100 [48–9]). Thus, though it is possible to ‘lose much of […] natural moral Sense’, it requires the complex ‘means of corrupt Religion’ for it to actually happen (Inquiry 94/96 [46]). Still, the threat is not merely hypothetical, but real to Shaftesbury. It works by gradually voiding reality, and existence itself, of moral meaning and beauty.
Thus, in the voluntaristic process we are denied two things. The first thing is a moral standard beyond God’s will, that can justify it and confirm goodness and God as being inseparable. Anyone who believes that God exists and that it is a good and just God must, Shaftesbury stresses, agree too that there is ‘independently such a thing as Justice and Injustice, Truth and Falsehood, Right and Wrong; according to which he pronounces that God is just, righteous, and true’ (Inquiry 100 [49–50]; see also Cudworth, FW 187). There simply has to be a rational moral standard that confirms that God is goodness itself. The second thing denied is, it seems, confidence in active moral agency. We are, as Cudworth argues in his posthumously published A Treatise of Freewill, after all not ‘merely passive to our own practical judgements and to the appearances of good, but contribute something of our own to them, to make them such as they are’ (FW 179). The value of the Gospel is, Whichcote stresses in a similar fashion, that it communicates goodness and morality ‘by which we are made Partakers of the Divine Nature’ (SelSer 92) or, in the words of Cudworth, ‘partakers of his Divine Form’ (Commons 26; referring to Athanasius [c. 296–373] and 2 Peter. 1:4). Of course, this does not mean that we – in our capacity as partakers – are constructing and projecting moral properties either onto nature or onto God. What it means is simply that Whichcote, Cudworth, and Shaftesbury share a solid confidence in the mind’s internal ability to identify God’s goodness and the eternal essence of morality. While Whichcote doesn’t elaborate on this philosophically, he constantly comes back to the conviction of natural religion, truth, and virtue as ‘connatural’ in our souls from creation (SelSer 85, 133, 113; see also 69, 183), knowledge as ‘implanted in us’ (SelSer 86), truth as the ‘Light of that Candle which God set up in Man’ enabling him to actively discover ‘all the Instances of Morality’ (SelSer 74; cf. Prov. 20:27), and the ‘Principles of Reason’ as ‘planted in Man’s Mind’ (SelSer 78).Footnote 24 Thus, when Shaftesbury refers to the ‘Standard of Reason wch he [God] has placd in us’ (AC 389), and replaces ‘innate’ (‘a Word [John Locke] poorly plays upon’) with ‘connatural’ (AC 403) in his letters to his protégé Michael Ainsworth, it goes way beyond a kind gesture of approval to Whichcote.Footnote 25 It is central to Shaftesbury that the human mind holds implanted notions (ἐμφύτους ἐννοίας; PN 200 [214]) and, borrowing from Epictetus, prolēpseis (προλήψεις; Ask 391), which can be translated as preconceptions or ‘natural Anticipation[s]’ (MR 258 [214]; PN 200–4 [214–15]), enabling us to distinguish the eternal essence of truth, goodness, and beauty (Moral 342 [412–13]; see also 340/342 [411–12] on ‘Innate’ and ‘Instinct’).Footnote 26
What is important here is, Shaftesbury stresses, not when we have ‘Principles of Fair, Just, and Honest’ but if they are formed by external factors (‘Art, Culture, or Discipline’) or by nature (Moral 340 [411]). The fact that nature is the foundation does not imply that the mind is passive. On the contrary. Connatural ideas are ‘not ready made propositions somewhere indwelling in the mind’, but an essential part of human nature and naturally active at one point or another.Footnote 27 Preconceptions imply, as Daniel Carey argues, ‘the possibility of knowledge without guaranteeing it’.Footnote 28 In order to gain knowledge, the soul must, Cudworth states (and Whichcote and Shaftesbury certainly agree), draw on ‘some active anticipation or prolepsis within itself’ (TEIM 74).Footnote 29 Thus, ‘knowledge is a comprehension of a thing proleptically, and as it were, a priori’ (TEIM 60).
The reason why Whichcote, Cudworth, and Shaftesbury, with varying emphasis, bring this role of internal preconceptions into focus is because they take knowledge and morality to be eternal and real. Given that ‘perception of external sense as such is a mere relative and fantastical thing’, in that we passively either receive sense data about corporeal things or have particular phantasms or sensations of things that do not necessarily exist at all (TEIM 133–4), the truth of the thing itself must remain beyond our reach. Towering above passive sense, however, is that ‘active exertion from the mind itself’ that is the ‘comprehension of that which absolutely IS and IS NOT’ (TEIM 134). Instead of being hostages to ‘mere seeming and appearance only’, we can in this way reach comprehension of the ‘truth and reality of things’ where ‘objects are the eternal and immutable essences and natures of things, and their unchangeable relations to one another’ (TEIM 143).
However, a denial that truth, goodness, and beauty are real, opens for the prospect that they are determined by arbitrary will. This is, to Whichcote, Cudworth, and Shaftesbury, provocative with respect to both God’s will and the deiform nature of humanity. In both cases we are left at the mercy of a relative standard that is unable to confirm that will (divine and human) is integrated in the eternal and immutable standard of nature. To voluntarists believing that God’s arbitrary will is the only accessible standard, truth, goodness, and beauty, as well as words and concepts themselves, eventually lose their meaning. Naturally, he ‘who sayd he knew not wt the καλον [beautiful] was, εἰ μὴ τὸ ἐπαίνετον [unless it be praiseworthy]’ but ignored the ‘greatest Realitys of things’, also exclaimed that ‘Beauty is Nothing! Virtue Nothing’ (Plasticks 233–4).Footnote 30 A similar danger and successive semantic non-sense is, according to Shaftesbury, destined to occur in Calvinism (associated with a fanaticism ‘that disclaim[s]’ the ‘Use of Reason in Religion’ [AC 349]) and the doctrine of double predestination where some people are saved to the peaceful place heaven, while others are foreordained to hell:
Thus if one Person were decreed to suffer for another’s fault, the Sentence wou’d be just and equitable. And thus, in the same manner, if arbitrarily, and without reason, some Beings were destin’d to endure perpetual Ill, and others as constantly to enjoy Good; this also wou’d pass under the same Denomination. But to say of any thing that it is just or unjust, on such a foundation as this, is to say nothing, or to speak without a Meaning.
The harm caused by both voluntarism and Calvinism consists in that we learn, on the one hand, ‘Adoration and Love of a GOD’, while, on the other hand, mistakenly learning that such a God is ‘furious, revengeful; and revenging himself, when offended, on others than those who gave the Offence’ (Inquiry 98 [48]).Footnote 31 Thus, ‘even Irregularitys and Enormitys of a heinous kind’ might begin to ‘appear illustrious’ when they are ‘admir’d and contemplated with the highest Honour and Veneration’ (Inquiry 98 [48]). Beliefs in God’s permanent goodness, and our natural love of such goodness, might hence be in danger of corruption. While faith in God as the ‘highest Goodness’ protects a ‘Sense of Right and Wrong’, trust in the ‘ill Character of a GOD does injury to the Affections’ and risks to weaken our moral sense (Inquiry 102 [51]). Consumed by emotions of anger and revenge, we could easily raise further ‘Disturbances and Fears within’, distort our perception of the world as a place where goodness prevails, and ultimately only ‘see Wrath, and Fury, and Revenge, and Terrors in the DEITY’ (LCE 346 [33]). With this temperament, we are caught in a vicious circle: banking on God’s arbitrary will and rewards and punishments, our natural moral sense is vulnerable to fears which then might strengthen and confirm the impression of God’s will as precisely arbitrary.Footnote 32
Whichcote, Cudworth, and Shaftesbury do not worry about this vicious circle for their own ethics. They are merely tending to their confused enemies. As we will see next, the confidence stems from a conviction that God is perfect and absolute goodness itself. From the anti-voluntarist perspective, a rigid trust in God’s arbitrary will disregards, as we have observed, the moral standard we need in order to justify and confirm that God is indeed inseparable from goodness itself. This is important to Shaftesbury because the insistence on the nature of the things themselves, rather than God’s arbitrary will, lends, according to him, support to the intrinsic value of virtue and natural beauty.
2.2 Goodness
While he ‘that believes a God, believes all that Good and Perfection in the Universe’, a denier abandons, according to Cudworth, his ‘First and only true Interest, of being Good’ (TISU 661). God is, Shaftesbury argues, the ‘Fountain of all Good, and the Supream Good of all’ (Prayer 541). Naturally, Shaftesbury beholds in Whichcote a philosopher posing a ‘Defence of Natural Goodness’ and compassion (SelSer 58). To Whichcote, God is the ‘mild and gentle Spirit [that] governs the World; loving to Mankind’ (SelSer 126). God is known and loved by us through our knowledge and love of goodness. Thus, there can, according to Whichcote, be ‘no true Notion of God, unless the full Form, Essence, and Substance of Good, be fully in it’ (SelSer 127). As long as we ‘act after His Example’, we should be in no danger of misunderstanding the essence of goodness and we will act according to reason (SelSer 54). To Whichcote, ‘Nothing is clearer in Reason, nothing is fuller in Scripture, than that God is the first and chiefest Good’ (SelSerm 91).Footnote 33
This all seems straightforward enough. Still, goodness is precisely what voluntarists are accused of misunderstanding. When commenting on the ‘credulouse Mr Lock’ and his focus on ‘Fashion & Custome’ as the only moral rule, or so Shaftesbury argues, Locke is also accused of permitting a standard of morality that is determined only by ‘Law and Will’, which makes God a ‘perfect Free Agent’ that is ‘free to any thing however ill’ (AC 405). Thus, goodness is, it seems, optional. But in what sense is God free if he rejects goodness and wills ill?
In his Aphorisms, Whichcote observes that ‘Liberum arbitrium [free will], which men so brag-of; as it includes Posse male agere [the ability to do evil], is an Imperfection: for such liberty or power is not in God’ (Aph 13). To do wrong is, according to Whichcote, not really power at all, ‘but Deficiency and Deformity: and infinite Power includes not in it a Possibility of Evil’ (Aph 13). Is God’s will and power to decide this limited? In a trivial sense, yes. God might from a distorted perspective be free to do whatever he wills, including evil. However, such a corrupt view naturally clashes with a permanent principle about divine goodness. Though they are not mutually exclusive, God’s goodness has, to Whichcote, Cudworth, and Shaftesbury, a natural priority over will and power.
To suggest that God’s will includes the freedom and power to refuse to comply with goodness would absurdly imply that God might oppose his own nature.Footnote 34 In this sense, God’s will and power are limited. At the same time, such a conclusion is empty and absurd. We are, Cudworth stresses, not in any true sense of the word suggesting that God’s power is limited when we claim that ‘Omnipotence or Infinite Power, is that which can Produce and Do, all whatsoever is Possible, that is, whatsoever is Conceivable, and Implies no manner of Contradiction’ (TISU 647).Footnote 35 God’s omnipotence cannot consist of self-contradictions. Cudworth accuses Descartes (‘though otherwise an Acute Philosopher’) of making morality and truth contingent on the ‘Arbitrary Will and Power of God’, thus suggesting that, for instance, the eternal geometrical truth that ‘Three Angles of a Plain Triangle, Equal to Two Right ones’ might depend on God’s freedom to exercise his will (TISU 646; see also FW 187; TEIM 17, 118–21).Footnote 36 But freedom and power to replace the nature of geometry is neither to God nor to human beings freedom and power at all. Of course, I might very well have a ‘false opinion’ (TEIM 137) – an opinion that is not ‘agreeable to the immutable nature of a triangle’ (i.e. the truth that the triangle’s three angles equal two right ones) – which might produce further scepticism questioning the permanence of God’s good nature and perhaps suggest a divine imperfection in the reality of things. However, all this is just human errors.
Due to human ignorance or lack of self-awareness, we might disregard that ‘In respect of [God’s] Relation to his Creatures, earthly Parents do but resemble him’ (SelSerm 91; John 3:16). Of course, when we turn away from God and forget that our souls are God-like and thus naturally good, we are in a trivial sense exercising our will; our will to abandon beliefs. But this is a self-deluded will that strays from reason, which is, according to Whichcote, the ‘natural voice’ that speak to us ‘according-to the very make of our nature’ (Aph 877). Thus, it provides only an empty sense of personal freedom. If ‘no Man [can be] Free, unless he be Wise’ (cf. Prov. 16:32), a lack of wisdom (a lack of self-governance) and a failure to act in accordance with reason can only produce self-imposed slavery (SelSerm 162; Aph 725).Footnote 37
True freedom must at all times be separated from religious hypocrisy. Cudworth frequently calls attention to this separation, where ‘little Puppets that skip nimbly up and down, and seem to be full of quick and sprightly motion, whereas they are all the while moved artificially by certain Wiers and Strings from without’, are distinguished from those that move ‘by any Principle of Motion, from themselves within’ (Commons 75). When this inner principle – or what Shaftesbury refers to as ‘inward Liberty’ (AC 369) – assumes its natural form, we are in a sense obeying a law. In one of his aphorisms, Whichcote refers to this ‘inward Principle of Life’ as a ‘Living Law, Informing the Soul’ and removed from a ‘Law without, that enlivens not’ (Aph 625). This inner law is, as we have seen, addressed by various terms (see 2.1), all distancing themselves from externally imposed ones. Cudworth refers to it as the law of love. A law that, while freeing us from an external law, makes ‘us become a Law unto our selves’ (Commons 76; cf. Rom. 2:14).Footnote 38 The law of love is thus a ‘Freedom from all Law’ which is a ‘State of purest Liberty’, even though it is the ‘most constraining and indispensable Necessity’ (Commons 76).
In their explorations of the mechanisms of this inner principle, reason is neither distinctly separated from natural instinct, emotion, or faith, nor is it strictly divided into practical and theoretical employment.Footnote 39 Whichcote, Cudworth, and Shaftesbury, all ‘tended to blur lines between the rational and the affective’.Footnote 40 Being the ‘Divine Governor of Man’s Life’ (Aph 76), reason is always embodied in actions and affections. To reject reason is to ‘go against God’ (Aph 76). However, the same line of argument is valid for God. God is also morally prevented from going against reason. Our disinterested friendship with God, and our natural love of goodness, rest on shared moral principles and instincts. God is, Whichcote stresses, only able to act according to ‘Right, and Reason’ which therefore makes ‘whatever he does’ ‘Accountable; because Reasonable’ (Aph 417). Thus, there is no conflict between reason and faith. God’s goodness is perfect and permanent rationality. As such, it speaks naturally to our human (God-like) reason and innate moral disposition.Footnote 41
It follows from this that goodness and morality are not drily communicated by the Ten Commandments, but recorded, according to Whichcote, in ‘Mens Hearts’ and intertwined ‘into the Principles of our Reason’ (SelSerm 70). Cudworth agrees and emphasises that the core of the ‘great Mysterie of the Gospel’ is in ‘Christ inwardly formed in our hearts’ (Commons 42). As far as goodness and morality are concerned, dry knowledge of the Gospel leads us nowhere. The Gospel ‘is not merely a Letter without us, but a quickning Spirit within us’ (Commons 5) and religion is not a ‘Book-craft’ or a ‘mere paper-skill’ (Commons 3).Footnote 42 To be relevant, the Gospel has to be ‘inwardly digested & concocted into our souls’. It is only then that it is a ‘living thing in our hearts’ (Commons 43). He who does other than respect his heart’s will, neglects reason, or in the words of Shaftesbury pursues ‘Sick Reason’ (Prayer 536) by ‘undo[ing] his own Being’ (SelSerm 70) and giving up his moral self-government.Footnote 43
To sum up, the second argument underpinning anti-voluntarism is the conviction of God as goodness itself. Neither God, nor human beings, can in any meaningful sense of the word exercise a freedom that contradicts goodness. As Cudworth states, God ‘cannot possibly deviate from’ the perfection of nature without becoming ‘Ungod it self’ (TISU 874). God’s goodness is rationality; a rationality that is furthermore inseparable from the affections. As we will see in section 3, the intertwined features of rationality and affections will go a long way to establish Shaftesbury’s claim that not only virtue has intrinsic value, but natural beauty too.
2.3 Rewards and Punishments
Neither Whichcote, Cudworth, nor Shaftesbury perceive heaven and hell primarily as physical places.Footnote 44 The Calvinist doctrine of double predestination mistakenly implies, Whichcote stresses, that there is an ‘external Hell’ (SelSerm 153) that is ‘an incommodious place, only; and that God, by his Sovereignty, throws Men therein’ (SelSerm 109).Footnote 45 Instead, Whichcote argues, ‘Both Heaven and Hell have their Foundation within Us’ (Aph 100). They are internal states of mind (an ‘inward Health’ [Aph 884]) consisting of affections and thoughts. Of course, rewards and punishments are important aspects of a virtuous life – ‘Virtue has Reward, and Vice has Punishment, arising out of itself’ (Aph 241) – but as such, they are first and foremost internal modes of the self, not external events awaiting us.Footnote 46 The focus ought to be, Cudworth argues, on a personal movement away from external ‘Principles without us’ towards the ‘inward Self-moving Principle, living in our Hearts’ (Commons 74). Any ‘outward Formes and Models of Reformation’ must remain of ‘little worth’ without a true ‘inward Reformation of the heart’ (Commons 81–2). In this internalization of the Commandments, rewards and punishments are thus converted into mental states of mind.
As expected, concentrating on internalization and mental states of mind brings the question of moral accountability into sharp focus. A failure to recognise the natural goodness in human nature is by definition a personal failure to appreciate the essence of God. Shaftesbury repeats Whichcote’s belief that there is a ‘secret Sympathy in Human Nature, with Vertue and Honesty’ (SelSerm 56 [Shaftesbury] and 265 [Whichcote]). A failure to act in accordance with this belief and thus defile rationality entails a personal internal punishment, or what Whichcote refers to as a ‘Wound within’ (SelSerm 109; see also Aph 226). Virtue is the ‘Foundation[…] of Peace and Happiness’, while vice – ‘contrary to the Nature of Man’ (SelSerm 144) – is the basis of ‘Sorrow and Misery’ (SelSerm 58). Given our God-like human nature and its moral elements, there is thus, Shaftesbury argues in his reading of Whichcote, ‘inherent Punishment belonging to all Vice’ (SelSerm 58). To claim that God is the ‘Cause of his Creatures Sin, or of his Creatures Misery’ is to malign a good God who neither can inflict pain nor ‘make Hell’ (SelSerm 152). Rejecting reason is to reject nature, and the punishment we receive for this rejection is intrinsic to the rejection itself: ‘For, this is most certain; that the greatest Punishment of Sin, is inherent in it self’ (SelSerm 152). Here, moral accountability involves a strong insistence that it is we who are accountable to act according to nature, not God. As far as we act immorally or experience misery, they are self-inflicted punishments – a ‘Reasonable Act, directed by Wisdom, and Limited by Goodness’ (Aph 311) – and do not ‘proceed[…] from God’s Arbitrary Will and Power’ (SelSerm 108).
However, a failure to act in accordance with nature, is not only (though primarily) a personal dereliction causing inherent punishments, but a menace on a broader level. One reason why Shaftesbury attacks Hobbes already in his preface to Whichcote, is that he takes the sermons to underpin his own disapproval of a union between the ‘Arts of Government, and Mysteries of Religion’ (SelSerm 48). Hobbes is, to Shaftesbury, the progenitor of recent attempts to form an ‘Unprosperous Alliance’ and generate a ‘Political Christianity’ governed by selfish interests (SelSerm 50). When commenting on Hobbes’s replacement of natural social affections (elaborated in more detail in Inquiry) with the ‘Master-Passion, Fear’ which leaves room ‘only for that infinite Passion towards Power after Power’ (SelSerm 50), Shaftesbury’s concern is that atheism – which denies or distorts our apprehension of the permanent and objective nature of goodness – is cumulative and reproduces itself by its own too strong self-interests. Atheism is, neither to Shaftesbury, nor to Whichcote and Cudworth, straightforwardly defined as the rejection of the proposition that God exist. Similar to voluntarism, atheism is primarily a matter of ethical values or rather lack thereof.Footnote 47 All this is, to Shaftesbury, plain to see in the case of Hobbes who sets great and destructive forces in motion by introducing selfish motives for religious beliefs.
The antidote to Hobbes’s position is according to Shaftesbury natural affections. Natural affections are to him directed towards the good of the public and society at large (Inquiry 156 [86]). Shaftesbury is heavily influenced by Whichcote’s interpretation of Romans 1:31 in this matter. In Romans, Paul talks about those who fail to honour God as God. They pursue the unrighteous path and are without ‘natural affections’ (Rom. 1:31). Such affection is, Whichcote stresses, a ‘Parent-Like Affection’, by which he means that it is an unselfish love without any thoughts about rewards or personal gain. An affection where the ‘Parent hath emptied himself’ but ‘expects no return’ (SelSerm 204). In a similar manner, when we love God ‘for what he is in himself’ and not ‘for what he is to us’, there is little or no room left for selfishness or a too strong self-interest because our contemplation of God’s goodness naturally ‘fill our Souls’ to such a point that ‘Foreign Things’ are ‘driven away’ (SelSerm 173). As Whichcote states in one of his aphorisms: ‘[Christian] Religion consists in Things, that are Good in themselves; or that are for the Recovery in us of what are Good in themselves’ (Aph 89).
Whichcote’s ambition to unite natural (unselfish) affections, a shared good, and the love of God as God without thoughts about rewards or punishments, are important to Shaftesbury. By ignoring the good of natural affections, we fail to see how we are ‘held together in Society’ (SelSerm 50). Thus, Hobbes’ distorted view of his own nature – his ‘Atheistical Principles’ – seems to speak volumes about his self-interested focus on ‘Terror and Punishment’ rather than ‘Moral Rectitude and Good-nature’ (SelSerm 52). As we have seen, people who are of ‘naughty Dispositions’ simply tend to believe in a ‘revengeful’ God who ‘drive[s] Designs of Ill upon his Creatures’ (SelSerm 127; also Aph 388; for Shaftesbury, see LCE 350 [35]).
However, a caveat is in order here. Self-interest or interest are not entirely rejected by Shaftesbury or, which is sometimes argued by philosophers in environmental aesthetics, opposites of disinterestedness.Footnote 48 What Shaftesbury, with the support of Whichcote and Cudworth, pursue is the idea that a right kind of self-interest is intimately related to virtuous agency (‘a better SELF’) (Sol 198 [281]), while a corrupt kind of interest is related to immoral selfishness burdened by a bleak view of human nature and by a strong desire for dominance and power. Shaftesbury certainly rejects this latter kind of interest, however not the former (Socratic and Stoic) kind that pursues self-knowledge. In fact, when pursuing this kind of interest, Shaftesbury claims that it is the ‘height of Wisdom’ to ‘be rightly selfish’ (SC 92 [121]):
ΓΝΩΘΙ ΣΕΑΥΤΟΝ [know yourself]. Know but this SELF only & what SELF is indeed: and then fear not being too selfish: fear not to say ἐμοὶ παρ᾿ ἐμὲ φίλτερος οὐδείς [no one is dearer to me than myself] and τοῦτο πατήρ, καὶ ἀδελφός, καὶ συγγενὴς καὶ πατρὶς καὶ θεός [this (i.e. the self’s own interest) is its father and brother and kinsmen and country and God].
However, this kind of natural self-interest shares a common effect with a selfishness, promoted by Hobbes, gauged to oppose nature: They are both formative of our view of the world and have bearing on our beliefs in God’s goodness. A greedy, self-interested focus on gaining external rewards or avoiding punishments, might result in ‘that one can hardly tell what there is in it, after all, that can be worth rewarding’ (SC 66 [97]). If we are ‘brib’d only or terrify’d into an honest Practice’, it will eventually appear as if the solid foundation of morality is pulled away and nature will soon seem to be devoid of meaning (SC 66 [97]).
In conclusion, the third argument supporting anti-voluntarism affirms that rewards and punishments are internal states of mind. Actions motivated by a wish to gain rewards or avoid punishments are selfish and immoral. As we will see in section 3, this is important to Shaftesbury because it introduces a key element in his theory of natural beauty, namely the primary virtue of disinterestedness, by which we eschew immoral selfishness and appreciate the intrinsic value of natural beauty.
2.4 Plastic Nature
Though morality and truth originate in the eternal divine forms, they are, as we can see, persistently foregrounded as internal human principles. Morality and truth are neither fashioned by artificial laws, nor changed at the whim of God’s will. The Ten Commandments are, Whichcote stresses in a typical manner, preceded by God writing ‘them upon the Heart of Man’ (SelSerm 70), thus making them inseparable from recta ratio. The primary task of the ‘Law externally given’ (SelSerm 70) is to lead abusers of morality and truth back to the connatural truth of reason.Footnote 49 In this internalization of morality and divinity – where God remains ’Inward to every thing’ (TISU 156) as an incorporeal energy – nature plays an integral role. This becomes especially clear when we turn to Cudworth’s True Intellectual System of the Universe (1678).
Cudworth refers, at one point in The True Intellectual System of the Universe, to nature as ‘Ratio Mersa & Confusa’ (TISU 155) by which he means that reason is immersed and diffused into matter. Thus, let us start by recognising that nature can be roughly defined as reason in matter (though, as we will see, this definition must be carefully qualified to be accurate). Of course, such nature is not superior to God’s laws. But we can perceive laws ‘neither as Verbal things, nor as mere Will and Cogitation in the Mind of God’ (TISU 161). Rather, nature follows the ‘Laws or Commands of the Deity’ by being an ‘Energetical and Effectual Principle’. After creating a taxonomy of philosophical atheism, Cudworth pins down this principle with reference to the ‘Plastick life of Nature’ (TISU 146), henceforth plastic nature, a concept that is, as we will see ahead, important to Shaftesbury. Before I explain what Cudworth means by plastic nature, it is necessary to clarify the taxonomy. Here, as elsewhere, Cudworth’s provocative method – refined by Shaftesbury – for proving the weakness of philosophical atheism is not primarily by addressing Biblical statements, but by appealing to ‘Philosophick Reasons’ (TISU, preface unpag; see also Moral 132–58 [262–80]).Footnote 50 Unlike in ‘fair War’, we cannot ‘work underground, or as in Sieges by the Sap’ in philosophy (Moral 142 [269]). Thus, atheists must be ‘reason’d with, like other Men’ (Moral 128 [259]), and Shaftesbury’s apologetic words in defence of himself as a philosopher practicing ‘perfect Indifference, even on the Subject of a Deity’ (Moral 138 [266]) applies to Cudworth too.
Cudworth distinguishes a quadripartite structure of philosophical atheism (though none of these are inherently atheistic). The first type is Hylopathian (or Anaximandrian) atheism. It ascribes no life to matter. Instead, it ‘derives all things from Dead and Stupid Matter in the way of Qualities and Forms, Generable and Corruptible’ (TISU 135). This focus separates Hylopathian atheism from the second type, Atomical (or Democritical) atheism, where objects originate from the structure of atoms. The third type, Cosmoplastic (or Stoical) atheism, is different by supposing living matter as in ‘one Plastic and Methodical but Sensless Nature, to preside over the whole Corporeal Universe’ (TISU 135). The fourth and final type, Hylozoick atheism (or Stratonical; from Strato of Lampsacus [c. 335–c. 269 BCE], see TISU 107–8), acknowledges a certain ‘Plastick Life’ but ascribes this property only to matter, which it considers to be the single substance in the world (TISU 105). Hence, here there is indeed a ‘Living and Energetic Nature’ in matter, though without self-reflectivity and consciousness (TISU 135).Footnote 51
While the first two types of atheism (Hylopathian/Anaximandrian and Atomical/Democritical) consider matter to be devoid of life, the third and the fourth type (Cosmoplastic/Stoical and Hylozoick/Stratonical) might seem more promising to Cudworth by attributing life and vitality to matter. However, the problem is that whether or not we perceive ‘One […] Plastick and Spermatick Life only, in the whole Mass of Matter or Corporeal Universe’ (TISU 136) (as Cosmoplastic/Stoical atheism), or every singular part of matter to have a plastic life by itself (as Hylozoick/Stratonical atheism), we are still hostages to the corporeal world. Atheists seem to suffer, Cudworth notes, from pneumatophobia, ‘an irrational but desperate Abhorrence from Spirits or Incorporeal Substances’ (TISU 135; Shaftesbury agrees in MR 90 [64–5]).Footnote 52 Sticking to his guns by, as Shaftesbury remarks in his defence of The True Intellectual System of the Universe, analysing atheists and theists ‘fairly together’ (Moral 134 [262]), Cudworth does agree with Cosmoplastic/Stoical atheism and Hylozoick/Stratonical atheism when they insist on plasticity. But he disapproves of the materialism governing such insistence (in this case also the materialism advanced by ‘professed Theists of later times’, such as Descartes) (TISU 146). Cudworth’s critique is that materialism rejects ‘all Final and Intending Causality in Nature’ (TISU 147) and acknowledges no other cause of things than mechanical and material. The causality necessary to protect the world from being reduced to a ‘mere Heap of Dust’ is ‘Divine Causality’ (TISU 147). The idea of living in a ‘Dead and Wooden World’ that ‘hath nothing neither Vital nor Magical at all in it’ is not only disenchanting, but deceitful (TISU 148). If we fail to acknowledge that there is a plastic nature that acts ‘for the sake of something, and in order to Ends, Regularly, Artificially and Methodically’ (TISU 147), we are destined to trust that things are either fortuitously formed without the direction of a mind (thus reducing God to a useless spectator), or that God’s hand tirelessly interferes to form every single body in the universe (which is ‘not so Decorous in respect of God’ [TISU 149]).Footnote 53 Cudworth rejects both the materialism of the former and the voluntarism of the latter. To him, they empty the world of life and meaning.Footnote 54
This leads us back to the idea that nature follows the laws of God by being an energetical principle. ‘Inanimate things’ are simply not susceptible to external laws. There has to be an incorporeal substance that achieves God’s plan. Plastic nature is the art that does precisely that. It does not operate by laws of external force, but ‘act[s] immediately upon the Matter as an Inward Principle in it’ (TISU 155). Unlike human art, where a sculptor forms her matter into a statue, or a carpenter builds a house out of wooden planks, plastic nature is, Cudworth argues with explicit reference to Plotinus, the art that is ‘Incorporated and Imbodied in matter, which doth not act upon it from without Mechanically, but from within Vitally and Magically’ (TISU 156; see Plotinus, Ennead, III.8.2).Footnote 55 Thus, this is the law of plastic nature: it is a self-activity that acts on matter as an inward principle.
However, he hurries to clarify that nature is not to be mistaken for a divine art which is ‘Unbodied Reason’, but, as I mentioned earlier, nature is reason immersed and diffused into matter (TISU 155). As such, plastic nature is not knowledgeable in the sense of being self-reflective, but is a mimetic activity and energy unable to understand its purpose (see also Plotinus, Ennead, IV.4.13). This does not suggest, however, that plastic nature is less important than self-reflective activities. Rather, the opposite. Plastic nature works like a deep-rooted and embodied habit – an energy operating from within. Similar to a skilled dancer whose body moves ‘Regularly and Orderly, in a long Train and Series of Motions’ but without reflecting on the laws of harmony and movement which it obeys, plastic nature acts without reflecting on its own activity (TISU 157–8; see also Plotinus, Ennead, III.2.16).
With reference to my initial rough remarks on Cudworth’s view of nature as reason in matter, we can now add that it is not rationally self-conscious of its activity, by which he means that it is not the initiator or master of the reason that it obeys.Footnote 56 However, nature is nevertheless rational by following the divine laws ‘imprest upon it’ (TISU 162). Thus, the activity of plastic nature differs from human actions which are, at least sometimes, not carried out ‘Fatally only, but Electively and Intendingly, with Consciousness and Self-perception’ (TISU 162).Footnote 57
As we have observed, a rejection of plastic nature leaves us either with a materialism where things are thought to be accidentally formed by something lacking mind, or with a degrading occasionalism where a busy God is required to act on every single thing in the universe.Footnote 58 Given the complexity of a body, this last alternative does not cater for a need of interaction and unity. For instance, the design behind human veins cannot be disconnected from the design behind arteries and nerves (TISU 163). Everything is perfectly united. Thus, there must be an entity that includes the ‘entire Idea and the complete Model or Platform of the Whole Organick Body’ (TISU 163–4). Cudworth moves efficiently from the physiological functions of (human and animal) nature to the plastic nature of the corporeal universe where ‘all things are ordered together conspiringly into One’ (TISU 164). Here, the proof is the harmony itself. Limbs and internal organs work together for the good of the harmonious whole. The same goes for the world at large: the incorporeal plastic principle operates by means of a ‘Sympathy, Harmony, and Agreement, which is in things’ (TISU 372) and in the rational whole of the corporeal world.Footnote 59 Plastic nature preserves a unity in variety in nature. Trees, vegetables, and herbs may all be ‘differently formed, according to their different Seeds, as also Minerals and other Bodies framed’ but unified by ‘one Plastick Nature or Life, belonging to the whole Terrestrial (or Terraqueous) Globe’ (TISU 171).
Now, what has this to do with Shaftesbury’s understanding of natural beauty? Neither Whichcote nor Cudworth has much to say about beauty.Footnote 60 Still, Cudworth declares succinctly that ‘God is Beauty’ (Commons 51).Footnote 61 It seems counterintuitive to assume that God’s rational and perfect nature is not beauty itself and that human nature reflects and embodies divine beauty by being God-like and by pursuing goodness and virtue (see e.g. Aph 694; SelSerm 202). The fact that ‘Shaftesbury’s concept of nature is, similar to the Cambridge [Platonist’s] form of plastic nature, characterised by the topoi of beauty and unity’, signals, I think, a critical moment in the history of aesthetics where natural beauty converts into a key aesthetic category.Footnote 62 However, it seems to me that such a moment does not emerge, as is commonly argued, from Shaftesbury’s idea of natural beauty as disconnected from a strong theological (anti-voluntaristic) position, but rather from him embracing such a position. I will explore Shaftesbury’s theory of natural beauty in section 3. Before that, let me stress that he is not only inspired by Cudworth in his construal of natural beauty, but he also puts plastic nature to surprising use when addressing art.Footnote 63
Characteristically, his reference to Cudworth in Soliloquy appears in a paragraph aiming to distinguish injudicious (modern) poets from true ones. While the former exploits wit and fancy aimlessly, the latter is a ‘second Maker: a just PROMETHEUS, under JOVE’ (Sol 110 [207]). Here, suggested similarities and convergences with God’s creativity are important. Unlike later references to the Promethean myth, suggesting a possible separation between, on the one hand, Prometheus and artistic autonomy and creativity, and, on the other, Zeus and following God, Shaftesbury argues for a poetic creativity at one with the ‘beauty of God’s design’.Footnote 64 This ideal poet is ‘Like that Sovereign Artist or Universal Plastick Nature’, by which he means that the poet resembles God in the creative act and completes God’s design by ‘form[ing] a Whole, coherent and proportion’d in it-self’ (Sol 110 [207]). The ideal poet is not God, but successfully ‘imitate[s] the Creator’ (Sol 110 [207]). Thus, the poet’s creativity resembles the plasticity we detect in God’s nature: a natural self-activity that acts on something as an inward principle.
A similar kind of logic is present in paintings. In his fragmentary Plasticks, or the Original, Progress, & Power of Designatory Art – planned as the fourth treatise in the unfinished Second Characters – Shaftesbury addresses ‘Materia plastica’ by arguing that a ‘good Painter (quatenus Painter) begins by working first within’ because that’s where the ‘plastick Work’ is set (Plasticks 184). The mimetic activity (be it that of a painter or a poet) is not an act of copying and thus making something that is less real than the original. Rather, imitation is the creative expression of originality. An artist that ‘strictly copies Life’ and ‘follows Nature too close’ is merely ‘unnatural’ (SC 120 [142]). Above all, mimetic ideals originate in creativity and integrity. Rather than stressing, as Cudworth does, that plastic nature acts ‘without Comprehending the Reason of what it doth’ (TISU 158), Shaftesbury emphasises that a poet with true self-knowledge is naturally also ‘knowing in the inward Form and Structure of his Fellow-Creature’ (Sol 110 [207]), that is, she is not only conscious of the self-forming inward principle of plastic nature as such but knows how it works in herself and in human nature in general. Thus, Shaftesbury implies that we ought to exercise our powers to realise this plastic nature. As Thomas Wormald argues, the ‘paradigmatic shift between Cudworth and Shaftesbury with respect to plastic nature’ is that the latter thinks that it is a power that should be emulated to make us ‘conscious plastic nature’.Footnote 65
In this section, I have addressed the anti-voluntarism advanced by Whichcote, Cudworth, and Shaftesbury. The beating heart of their anti-voluntarism is, as we have seen, three overlapping arguments, the first of which disputes a trust in God’s arbitrary will; a trust neglecting that morality is instituted by nature, not by will or power. The second argument is that God is goodness itself, which is an incontrovertible truth that possesses priority over will and power. The third argument is that rewards and punishments are internal states of mind. It is important to recognise the persistent turn from external principles which Shaftesbury associates with selfish wants to either gain rewards or bypass punishments, towards inward principles motivating our disinterested attitude. What these three intersecting arguments imply becomes clear in Cudworth’s plastic nature. If nature is beyond God’s arbitrary will and constant intervention, it means that it must be inward to, and inscribed in, everything as an incorporeal property of a thing’s essential qualities. A plant, for instance, evolves due to the inward energy of plastic nature. Though Cudworth says virtually nothing about beauty, plastic nature turns out to be central in Shaftesbury’s theory of natural beauty, which I will address next.
3 Natural Beauty
In this third section, I will first explain Shaftesbury’s theory of natural beauty and, second, try to show its current relevance for environmental aesthetics. Voluntaristic beliefs in God’s arbitrary will as the standard of truth and value allow no leeway, Shaftesbury argues, for the intrinsic value of virtue and nature.Footnote 66 In his aesthetics he aims to show that not only is virtue real and has intrinsic value, but the same goes for natural beauty. I will clarify Shaftesbury’s view by exploring three elements that when combined make up his theory of natural beauty.
(1) The intrinsic value of virtue and affections, which constitutes a prerequisite value for appreciating natural beauty.
(2) The beauty of the whole, which identifies the intrinsic value of natural beauty considered as a system where plants and animals have their rightful place.
(3) Disinterestedness, which is the primary virtue with respect to natural beauty.
3.1 Virtue and Affections
Many of us are accustomed to thinking of virtue as something moral and individual, and thus separated from aesthetic and assumed non-moral questions of natural beauty. However, Shaftesbury sees things differently. The primary reason why virtue and affections (the latter being, as we will see in this section, the principle of the former) are so important to him is because together they form the moral ground on which we ultimately must appreciate the intrinsic value of natural beauty. I write ‘must’, because to Shaftesbury this is a metaphysical necessity, in the sense that it could not have failed to be the case that a recognition of the intrinsic value of virtue and affections includes the appreciation of the intrinsic value of natural beauty. I will get to this shortly, but to start at the right end we have to revisit Shaftesbury’s realism.
The anti-voluntaristic position embraces a realist view of virtue. A defender of realism in divinity is, according to Shaftesbury, inseparable from ‘whoever sincerely defends VIRTUE, and is a Realist in MORALITY’ (Moral 140 [268]). While rebutting accusations against himself and Cudworth for ‘giving the upper hand to the Atheists’ (Moral 132 [262]), Theocles in The Moralists reminds the reader that Shaftesbury’s realism challenges voluntarism by showing that virtue is
really something in it-self, and in the nature of Things: not arbitrary or factitious […] not constituted from without, or dependent on Custom, Fancy, or Will; not even on the Supreme Will it-self, which can no way govern it; but being necessarily good, is govern’d by it, and ever uniform with it.
Shaftesbury’s moral realism is partly the result of his ambitions to deal with atheism on ethical grounds. Without a genuine understanding of the ground itself, there can be, he argues, no actual improvement of faith. Of course, insistence on the doctrine of rewards and punishments is equally awkward to him. By addressing the gain of rewards or avoidance of punishments, voluntarism puts the cart before the horse: How can we insist on the value and necessity of either future rewards or relief from punishments without knowing anything about virtue as such (Moral 138 [267])? Thus, both atheists and voluntarists obstruct, according to Shaftesbury, further insights into the groundwork of virtue. What is in fact true of virtue, and genuine in our relationship with God, Shaftesbury wonders, if we subscribe to nominalism and merely refer to virtue as a matter of will (Moral 126 [257]). While Theocles does not want to establish as an absolute ‘Rule, “That those who make only a Name of Virtue, make no more of DEITY, and cannot without Affectation defend the Principles of Religion”’, he stipulates that anyone aspiring to treat virtue seriously, must by necessity be a moral realist as well as ‘a Realist in DIVINITY’ (Moral 140 [267–8]).
Integrated in Shaftesbury’s realism is furthermore the claim that virtue has intrinsic value. His main claim on the topic occurs in An Inquiry, which coheres with The Moralists and its ‘aesthetic construal of morality’.Footnote 67 I will have something to say about this construal later on (in 3.3 and 4.1). However, Shaftesbury’s most distinct account of the intrinsic value of virtue appears in Sensus Communis, where he argues that
If the Love of doing Good, be not, of it-self, a good and right Inclination; I know not how there can possibly be such a thing as Goodness or Virtue. If the Inclination be right; ’tis a perverting of it, to apply it solely to the Reward, and make us conceive such Wonders of the Grace and Favour that is to attend Virtue; when there is so little shewn of the Intrinsick Worth or Value of the Thing it-self.
With modern terminology, we could say that Shaftesbury favours objective final value in the sense that intrinsic value does not consist of properties that are produced by us, as much as they are discovered and naturally loved by us. That there really is such ‘Divine Excellence in Things’ making them the ‘most ingaging, and of highest Satisfaction and Enjoyment’ is proved by the ‘wise and perfect Order’ of internal and external nature itself (Moral 150 [274]).
To insist on intrinsic value might make philosophers favouring value pluralism uncomfortable.Footnote 68 How does a claim on the intrinsic value of natural beauty square with value pluralism? Contemporary worries in environmental aesthetics and ethics, are, I think, understandable, but not justified in the case of Shaftesbury. Neither Shaftesbury, nor virtue ethical theories in general, are much concerned with cataloguing things that matter to us. Instead, they tend to explore how they matter. Statements about a thing’s intrinsic value are ‘claims about how it makes sense for us to care about the thing’.Footnote 69 To state that God, virtue, or natural beauty holds intrinsic value, or to pursue a focus on responsibilities or deontological rights theory, can only take us so far. That something has value simply ‘underdetermines how it matters, and […] how things matter depends upon more than the type of value that they have’.Footnote 70 Thus, a focus on how things matter is intimately related to the assumption that we might value things differently and that it is ‘possible for two things to matter, to both have final value, but matter in very different ways’.Footnote 71 Similar to the belief that there ‘is no distilling down all the bases and forms of moral responsiveness into one common moral currency’ in environmental ethics,Footnote 72 there can, to Shaftesbury, be no monistic responsiveness neither to the richness of God or virtue, nor to natural beauty itself.
This might seem to contradict another important aspect of Shaftesbury’s philosophy: his insistence on the virtue of disinterestedness. I will explain Shaftesbury’s view of disinterestedness in detail in 3.3. But let me give an illustration already at this point by rephrasing the worries as a concern for whether disinterestedness invites monism or pluralism. Counter to established accounts, I think we have sufficient reasons to believe the latter.Footnote 73 The account of the primary virtue of disinterestedness is Shaftesbury’s most detailed attempt to answer the how question. As such, it involves a variety of secondary, however no less crucial, virtues, such as, for instance, love and friendship, integrated to the point of being almost inseparable from the primary virtue of disinterestedness. Accordingly, Shaftesbury thinks that the counterpart of having a ‘consciousness of doing good for Good’s sake’ is to act ‘disinterestedly’ and thus to ‘love’ the world ‘for its own sake’ (TNA, PRO 30/24/47/25, fol. 1r–2r). In voluntarism, the likelihood of such a love is limited, and thus a genuine relationship with God obstructed: ‘by making Rewards and Punishments the principal Motives to Duty, the Christian Religion in particular is overthrown, and its greatest Principle, that of Love, rejected and expos’d’ (Moral 156 [279]).
The same point can, I think, be made about the secondary virtue of friendship. In the Jewish dispensation, Shaftesbury observes an ideal friendship between Jonathan (son of the first king of Israel, Saul) and David (second king of Israel); a friendship that did not ‘claim a future Recompence under a Religion’ (SC 68 [101]). Rather, it shows to Shaftesbury a ‘noble View of a disinterested Friendship’ which then enables all Jewish people to be ‘instructed in the sublime part of Virtue, and induc’d by Reason to that which was not injoin’d ’em by Command’ (SC 68 [101]). Naturally, there is no ‘Premium or Penalty’ involved here. The core of the perfect friendship between Jonathan and David, and its importance for the Jewish people, was that the ‘disinterested Part subsisted’ and that ‘Virtue was a free Choice’ (SC 68 [101]). So although Shaftesbury’s account is normative concerning how we value things by arguing that disinterestedness is indeed the primary virtue, this does not imply that he neglects a manifold of other values. The virtue of disinterestedness is simply deduced from an integration of a plurality of secondary virtues, for example love and friendship. To Shaftesbury, the world is too rich and beautiful to be reduced to questions about (monistic) explanatory attitudes. Rather than being a prescribed method that we conveniently apply when viewing flowering gardens or wild nature, the virtue of disinterestedness is a moral root system with an endless set of branches in human life: a moral view of the beauty of the world and the best possible way to humanly interact with it and all its spectacular life forms.
As we can see in the friendship between Jonathan and David, Shaftesbury is concerned with how the intrinsic value of virtue relates to our motives for action. It is important to recognise that Shaftesbury does not think that it is the latter, but the former, that defines virtue. To him it is absurd to insist that someone acts morally when only refraining from an ‘ill purpose, thro a fear of some impending Punishment, or thro the allurement of some expected Pleasure or Advantage’ (Inquiry 52 [21]). Virtuous actions neither happen by chance, nor do they spring from external pressure or force, divine or otherwise. As Gill observes, someone ‘who does good from selfish motives is morally equivalent to a person who does ill from selfish motives’.Footnote 74 However, while they cannot determine the motivations for virtuous actions and pleasure (Inquiry 112 [58]), a plurality of values involved in the doctrine of rewards and punishments can, Shaftesbury argues, occasionally be a ‘Support to Virtue’ (Inquiry 116 [60]) and help those in danger of ‘apostatiz[ing] from Virtue’ (Inquiry 118 [61]). After all his bashing against the doctrine, this is indeed a surprising claim. However, the doctrine is justified only as long as it functions as a means that ensures that we eventually learn to be disinterested and love virtue as such (see Inquiry 124 [66]). Rewards and punishments are thus sometimes instrumentally valuable motivating factors, unlike virtue, which is always intrinsically valuable. So Shaftesbury is not opposed to value pluralism with reference to motives. He acknowledges the presence and great relevance of different kinds of values, as long as they support and are integrated in our appreciation of the intrinsic value of virtue.Footnote 75 To insist on a pluralism of arbitrary incentives as a desirable virtuous approach in itself, would only prove that our motives are weak and reduce our chance to appreciate a ‘good and deserving Object, worthy of Love and Admiration for its own sake’ (Inquiry 114 [59]). However, with the proviso that we eventually are disinterested and love virtue for its own sake, a plurality of motives is embraced.
Socrates – ‘the very Founder of Philosophy it-self’ (MR 292 [244]) – and his question in Euthyphro resurfaces in this context of human motivation.Footnote 76 Why do we (when we do) behave and act in conformity with God? In An Inquiry, Shaftesbury provides two answers.
The first (rejected) answer consists of the awkward voluntaristic insistence on obeying God because of his power. Due to power, God enforces ‘Obedience to his absolute Will by particular Rewards and Punishments’ (Inquiry 108 [55]). Here, neither God nor virtue has intrinsic value. We are simply forced to obey God (whether God’s will is justified or not is irrelevant), and our ‘Obedience is servile, and all that is done thro it, merely servile’ (Inquiry 108 [55]). This obsequiousness increases a harmful self-interest, and our actions are thus guided by wrong motives. Though a balanced self-interest is not a problem to Shaftesbury (see 2.3), a voluntaristic and too strong self-interest is. A focus on external rewards or punishments, and accordingly a too strong self-interest, produces a ‘diminution of Piety’ where ‘God is belov’d only as the Cause of private Good’ (Inquiry 114 [59]). Thus, God turns into an ‘Instrument or Means of Pleasure’ rather than being acknowledged as the goodness that we ought to love in itself (Inquiry 114 [59]).
This last point is the second (accepted) answer provided by Shaftesbury. Here, we participate in nature and act in conformity with God due to the fact that he is the ‘highest Excellence of Nature’ and permanently good (Inquiry 110 [56]). Thus, we love God as such and our actions are based on the right motives. The ability to love divinity for itself, and to do good because it is right, might, as Cudworth had stressed ahead of Shaftesbury, be prevented by a series of wicked projections where we, due to our own vice, gradually are alienated enough to believe that morality has ‘no foundation in Nature, but only in Law or Arbitrary Constitution’ (TISU 662). This belief is the opposite to the freedom that we desire. If we hold such a false belief, we will perceive God’s justice negatively, as an obstacle to what we wrongly take to be our ‘True Liberty and Chief Good’ – namely, the selfish pursuit of our own interests – and consequently, come to view the ‘Severity of the Deity so much spoken of against Wickedness, to be nothing else, but Cruelty and Arbitrary Tyranny’ (TISU 662). Love is in this process reduced to either obeying ‘Anothers Power’ or merely ‘a certain kind of Merchandizing for Utilities’ (TISU 662).
The affections play a decisive role in both the rejected and the accepted answers above. In the first case, my ‘violent Affection towards private Good’ displaces ‘the other sort towards Goodness it-self, or any good and deserving Object, worthy of Love and Admiration for its own sake; such as GOD is universally acknowledg’d’ (Inquiry 114 [59]). In the second case, however, my natural affections increase and, accordingly, my affections for virtue itself are strengthened. It is, Shaftesbury concludes, only someone who actually has genuine feelings towards virtue as such, without any instrumental motives, that can be regarded as virtuous (see Inquiry 124 [66]).
If the relationship between virtue and affections seems complex and overlapping – references to moral affections are frequent (see e.g. Inquiry 130 [70]) – it is because Shaftesbury makes the latter the ‘very Principle of Virtue’ (Inquiry 132 [71]). Affections are defined by their internal, rather than external, relationship with virtue itself. In the latter case, our affections for virtue are merely attached to something annexed to a virtuous behaviour, like a promised reward. Gaining awareness of the intrinsic value of virtue, however, requires a cognitive accord with our appreciative affections. While external incentives related to our affections might support a recognition of the intrinsic value of virtue, such stimuli are, as we saw earlier, means to a higher end. A virtue consists ‘in a certain just Disposition, or proportionable Affection of a rational Creature towards the Moral Objects of Right and Wrong’ (Inquiry 86 [40]). Thus, a virtuous motive is basically a virtuous affection.
However, while the meaning of virtue and affections frequently intersect, Shaftesbury introduces a distinction that is central for his account of natural beauty, namely the difference between being moral and being virtuous. While the first is reachable for both rational natures (humans) and sensitive natures (animals), the latter requires a second-order affection that is accessible only to humans (Inquiry 66–70 [28–31]). This second-order affection is characterised as a ‘Reflex Affection’ (printed marginalia, Inquiry 66 [28]). A mere feeling is not a sufficient motive for a virtuous action. Affections must be ‘raised to a conscious principle in the rational agent by reflection on affection and the sorts of actions endorsed by affection’.Footnote 77 The ‘internal harmony of virtue’ is determined by a relation between the ‘first-order affections and the rational agent’s awareness and critical appreciation of them, his second-order affections’.Footnote 78 A principle for virtue is thus that ‘by means of this reflected Sense, there arises another kind of Affection towards those very Affections themselves, which have been already felt, and are now become the Subject of a new Liking or Dislike’ (Inquiry 66 [28].Footnote 79 In this virtuous state, the active mind ‘feels the Soft, and Harsh, the Agreeable, and Disagreeable, in the Affections’ themselves (Inquiry 68 [29]). For the mind, the relation between first-order affections and second-order affections is just as consistent and strong as in the case of ‘outward Forms or Representations of sensible Things’ (Inquiry 68 [29]). The success of the coordination between virtuous actions and human affections, suggests that we possess an ‘INTIRE AFFECTION or INTEGRITY of Mind’ and, as such, it is ‘accountable to it-self’ and the satisfaction emerging from it is ‘full, and noble, in proportion to its final Object’ (Inquiry 202 [113]). In short, this kind of emotional completeness is a virtue that is directed ‘towards what is morally good, and can like or affect such Good for its own sake, as good and amiable in it-self’ (Inquiry 124 [66]).
As we have seen, virtue holds intrinsic value to Shaftesbury. However, this only gets us so far towards understanding his theory of natural beauty. The second element of his theory takes us, as I will show next, further by zooming in on the intrinsic value of natural beauty as a system – the ‘Beauty in the WHOLE it-self’ (Inquiry 130 [70]) – where individual plants and animals are integrated. The second-order affections constitute a central part in Shaftesbury’s shift of focus from the intrinsic value of virtue to natural beauty. The latter is contingent on the virtuous state of our affections, which enables us to reflect emotionally on rational (human) nature and its relatedness to vegetative and sensitive (animal) nature.
3.2 The Beauty of the Whole
In his corpus, Shaftesbury introduces several hierarchies and classifications of beauty and nature.Footnote 80 Here, I wish to pursue his rarely considered focus on three mutually dependent forms: Nature as (1) vegetative, (2) sensitive, and (3) rational (Ask 87).Footnote 81 The three forms are supplemented by a fourth form, nature as a whole, which I will explain shortly. While vegetative nature is a property of plants, sensitive nature distinguishes animals, and rational nature characterises human beings. Any difference between these three forms is, to Shaftesbury, a matter of degree, not kind. If we view the forms separately, they will remain obscure; and if we view nature as a fixed object of aesthetic contemplation or as a cultural construction, we will fail to recognise, on the one hand, the divine ‘Sole-Animating and Inspiring Power’ (Moral 276 [366]) permeating all of nature, and, on the other hand, Shaftesbury’s realism. Though the ‘integral link between beauty and virtue’ might be ‘lost on us today’,Footnote 82 it is natural for Theocles to argue that ‘Beauty and Good are […] the same’ (Moral 346 [416]; see also SC 120 [142]). From Shaftesbury’s realist position – where ‘in the very nature of Things there must of necessity be the Foundation of a wrong and a right TASTE’ (Sol 268 [336]) – flawed judgements do not change the fact that ‘HARMONY is Harmony by Nature’ and ‘Symmetry and Proportion founded still in Nature’ (Sol 286 [353]). However, it remains central to him that we recognise the relatedness – ‘the mutuall dependance’ (Ask 86) – between the three forms of nature; a proto-ecosystem claim recycled in several of his works (see Moral 166/168 [285–8]; Inquiry 50 [18–19]).Footnote 83 Here, in a note from Askêmata under the heading ‘DEITY’ written during his retreat in Rotterdam in 1698:
The Elements are combin’d, united, & have a mutual dependance one upon another. all things in this world are united. for, as the Branch is united & is as one with the Tree; so is the Tree with the Earth Air & Water wch feeds it, & with the Flyes Worms & Insects wch It feeds. for these are made to it. and as much as the Mold is fitted to the Tree, as much as the strong & upright Trunk of the Oak or Elm is fitted to ye twining & clinging Branches of the Vine or Ivy; so much are the leaves, the seeds, the fruits of these Trees fitted to other Animalls, & they again to one another. All holds to one Stock. Go farther: & view the System of the bigger World. See the mutuall dependance, the relation of one thing to another; the Sun to the Earth, the Earth & Planets to the Sun; the Order, Symmetry, Regularity, Union, & Cohærance of the WHOLE.
Here, Shaftesbury introduces a fourth form that completes his understanding of the different forms of nature, namely nature as a whole. This fourth form is in equal parts the ‘impowering DEITY, Supreme Creator’ and the very ‘Source and Principle of all Beauty and Perfection’ (Moral 246 [345]) that enables us (rational natures) to identify the beauty of vegetative and sensitive nature by appreciating the unity of the whole. The beauty of the whole is thus the second element in Shaftesbury’s theory of natural beauty.Footnote 84 It is a divine metaphysical form that unites the beauty of vegetative, sensitive, and rational nature, enabling us to recognise that we, along with every plant and animal, have a rightful place in the world.
Thus, this second element helps us identify our relatedness with nature, by exploring it as a system. The appreciation of the intrinsic value of natural beauty in particular cases, say a tree or a flower, depends on us identifying a relatedness on a system level. While this is the general premise of the main character of The Moralists, Philocles’, crossing from loving one particular ‘Individual’ to loving the whole ‘Species’ of humankind (Moral 106 [243]), I will here remain primarily focused on external nature and animals. Characteristically, when Shaftesbury advises Ainsworth how to counteract ‘a wrong Judgment of what is supreamly Beautifull & Good’ (AC 385) and ‘seek & find out the true Pulchrum the Honestum the τὸ καλὸν [beauty itself]’ he recommends his protégé to ‘Seek for ye τὸ καλὸν in every thing; beginning as low as the Plants’ (AC 389). However, to complete his understanding of the supreme beauty – that ‘impower’d Creatreß’ (Moral 246 [345]) – Ainsworth must also recognise a relatedness on the system level, namely that there is, as Shaftesbury argues in An Inquiry, a beauty of the whole as such (Inquiry 130 [70]). It is, from Shaftesbury’s perspective, simply impossible for us to pay proper ‘reverence or respect [to] any particular subordinate Beauty of a Part’ if ‘THE WHOLE it-self is thought to want Perfection’ (Inquiry 130 [70]).
The symbiotic relationship between beauty and virtue fortifies our ability to act in the right way. It is vital that virtuous actions relate to our ‘Character, Conduct, or Behaviour towards [our] Fellow-Creatures’ (Inquiry 210 [118]), and that our moral affections are directed ‘towards the Species’ (Inquiry 116 [60]). Thus, a major concern for Shaftesbury is ‘How […] the Species [should] be preserv’d’ (Inquiry 146 [79]). His focus here is neither limited to human species, nor compatible with current ambitions to connect ‘aesthetics to environmentalism through its moral ambitions to protect and preserve nature’ by drawing ‘on science as a ground to aesthetic experience and judgement’.Footnote 85 Instead, Shaftesbury’s point is that the ‘whole System of Animals, together with that of Vegetables’ must be recognised ‘in one System of a Globe or Earth’, and that such a system is, furthermore, related to ‘something still beyond; as, for example, either on its Sun, the Galaxy, or its Fellow-Planets’ (Inquiry 50 [19]). Given that we all have a ‘Relation to the mere Earth it-self, the very Mould or Surface of that Planet, in which, with other Animals of various sorts, We […] were also bred and nourish’d’ (MR 176 [144]), we share the earth. Thus, we must also ‘allow the common Animals, and even the Plants of all degrees, to claim an equal Brotherhood with us, under this common PARENT’ (MR 180 [147]). Since animals ‘have their Sense and Feeling, their mere Passions and Affections, as well as our-selves’, the ‘profound modern [Cartesian] Hypothesis of animal Insensibility’ (MR 258 [213]) is rejected by Shaftesbury. Here, in a fragment from Plasticks:
Those Philosophers (modern) the poorest & most shifting, for ye sake of a System, Hypothesis, who, surpassing all antient Conceits & Extravagancys of ye kind deny Ideas, Sense, Perception (i:e Life) to Animals.
The fact that rational (human) nature and sensitive (animal) nature disclose similar emotional capacities, while human beings at the same time hold the exclusive ability to exercise reflex affections, improves to Shaftesbury our chance of moral self-reflection on resemblance and interdependence. In The Moralists this is manifest in an intriguing passage where Theocles is allowed the ‘PEGASUS of the Poets’ to provide a synoptic view of the natural world (Moral 298 [382]). In a hostile winter landscape, where animals are ‘forc’d by Hunger out of the naked Woods’ and ‘vast Sea-Monsters pierce thro floating Islands’, humans are, Theocles tells Philocles, physically inferior and vulnerable (Moral 300 [383–4]). However, due to our rational nature, the ‘Superiority over Creatures of such stupendous Size and Force’ remains complete. Here, knowledge about human rationality is not employed for purposes of power and dominion over the animal kingdom, but considered an opening for man to become ‘mindful of his Privilege of Reason’ (Moral 300 [384]); a self-reflective contemplation which naturally will make him ‘adore the great Composer of these wondrous Frames, and Author of his own superiour Wisdom’ (Moral 300 [384]). Rationality might indeed set humans apart from other animals, but to have any value such a difference must, to Shaftesbury, cause further moral reflection on a shared set of emotional abilities.
Characteristically, when Philocles questions what he thinks is an unfair distribution of qualities between humans and animals – the former appearing ‘weak and impotent’, while the latter (the ‘irrational Species’) ‘act[…] with so much Strength, and exert[…] such hardy Vigour’ (Moral 184 [300]) – he is ridiculed by Theocles for his anthropocentric wish.Footnote 86 In a comment dripping with irony, Theocles encourages him to ask ‘“Why he has not Wings […] for the Air, Fins for the Water” so that he can “take possession of each Element, and reign in All”’ (Moral 186 [301]).
The relevance of metaphysical realism (aesthetic or otherwise) for a critique of the anthropocentrism that drives much of the ongoing environmental crisis, has recently been recognised by Alexander Hampton.Footnote 87 I think a similar argument can be made here. From Philocles’ anthropocentric perspective, humans are naturally the most important species on the planet. However, precisely because there are things that are determined neither by human habits, nor God’s will, but by being real and having independent existence, he simultaneously struggles to make sense of his own feelings of inferiority. Why does human superiority over other animals, and nature in general, not produce a reassuring feeling of satisfaction? Philocles simply finds it humiliating that the superiority of man – the ‘noblest of Creatures’ (Moral 184 [300]) – is limited and prevented unless first underpinned by the physical advantages of those to be dominated. To Theocles, Philocles’ observations are deeply flawed. Nature does not exist ‘for MAN, but Man for NATURE’, he tells his friend (Moral 186 [302]), who retracts his wish and admits that claiming to be ‘LORD of All’ in nature would perhaps be presumptuous (Moral 186 [301]). While ‘THOUGHT and REASON’ remains ‘principal in Man’ (Moral 194 [307]), which makes rational nature different, though not detached, from sensitive nature, we discredit God and the perfection of nature as a whole (by disturbing the ‘admirable Distribution’ itself), Shaftesbury suggests, if we exploit the difference as a motive for human power and dominion (Moral 194 [306]). Thus, his focus is on interdependency and order in nature, rather than antagonism and disorder.
However, such order is remote from a French formal garden.Footnote 88 The perfect interdependency and harmony of nature are fundamental in sublime wilderness itself (see Moral 308 [388–9]) and determined by the fact that one animal naturally ‘lives by the Destruction of another’ (Inquiry 52 [20]). The spider preys on the fly. The latter’s ‘heedless Flight, weak Frame and tender Body’ simply ‘fits and determines him as much a Prey, as the rough Make, Watchfulness and Cunning of the former, fits him for Capture, and the ensnaring part’ (Inquiry 50 [18–19]). An organic symmetry is, for Shaftesbury, ubiquitous in nature and between species. Rational (human) nature, vegetative nature, and sensitive nature, are systematically and purposively structured in a long chain of connections to form a whole; plants and humans are intimately related and the ‘whole Species of Animals contribute […] to the Existence or Well-being of some other Species’ (Inquiry 48 [18]). Hence, ‘in contemplating all on Earth, we must of necessity view All in One, as holding to one common Stock’ (Moral 168 [287]; see also Inquiry 50 [18–19]; Ask 86).
For the ‘just Contemplator of the Works of Nature’, the connections reveal a ‘mutual Dependency of Things’ and a ‘Union, and Coherence of the Whole’ (Moral 168 [287]). To pursue happiness and well-being is to recognise that we are part of this system of nature, and to act in accordance with this insight. The kind of mutual dependency explored by Shaftesbury has further significance for how to understand a self. Questions about identity are not limited to the human self. Vegetative and sensitive nature are to Shaftesbury selves too.Footnote 89 Consciousness is not a necessary condition for personal identity, since it might ‘be as well false as real, in respect of what is past’ (MR 234 [193–4]). Instead, what determines identity is the internal self-forming purpose belonging both to rational (human) nature, sensitive (animal) nature, and vegetative nature. For instance, if ‘a Figure of Wax, or any other Matter, were cast in the exact Shape and Colours of [a] Tree’ it might be tempting to conclude that it is ‘a real Tree of the same Kind or Species’ (Moral 250 [348]). However, there is ‘Oneneß or Sameneß’ lacking in whatever is ‘piec’d together by our Hand or Fancy’ (Moral 250 [348]). Trees hold a ‘real relation within themselves’, meaning that there is a ‘Sympathizing of Parts’, a ‘plain Concurrence in one common End, and to the Support, Nourishment, and Propagation of so fair a Form’ (Moral 250/252 [348]). Hence, the tree is a self by its internal self-forming purpose that is related to the rest of nature. Here, Shaftesbury’s line of argument is not only reminiscent of Cudworth’s plastic nature, but, as I have argued elsewhere, Aristotle’s Physics.Footnote 90 For Aristotle, the oak’s nature is determined by the ‘internal causal principle that potentially will turn the acorn into the oak’.Footnote 91 As such, the oak tree is different from whatever is made by craft (τέχνη) simply because, unlike the oak tree, such creations do not contain ‘within itself the principle [τὴν ἀρχὴν] of its own making [τῆς ποιήσεως]’.Footnote 92 The fact that the oak tree consists of an internal self-forming purpose gives it, to Shaftesbury, a strong identity, and the ‘natural world as a whole’ is, as Gill recognises, ‘just as organized as a tree’: Nature as a whole ‘has an identity that is as robust as that of an oak tree’.Footnote 93
In this way, Shaftesbury navigates the particularity of vegetative and sensitive nature – the ‘tall Oak’ (Moral 250 [347]) or the ‘beautiful Feather’ of a bird (Moral 356 [423]) – and the divine metaphysical form of nature as a whole that enables us to recognise relatedness and unity. To appreciate beauty as an intrinsic value of an oak tree, we must concurrently understand that there is a beauty of the whole. This Shaftesburian idea resonates (or ought, I think, to resonate) with environmental aesthetics. A ‘particularist approach to natural beauty’ and theories of unity and oneness in nature, are, Ronald Hepburn argues, not diametrical opposites.Footnote 94 Instead, a consideration of individual objects is likely to generate a ‘nisus towards the other pole, the pole of unity’.Footnote 95 To ‘speak of oneness with nature’ is to recognise the ‘numerous common properties that we share with the nature we contemplate’.Footnote 96 However, claims about ‘oneness’ also triggers a tendency towards so called ‘aesthetic eliminativism’ which tries to ‘theorize away the metaphysical component of aesthetic responses’.Footnote 97 While a stress on metaphysical aspects contains an ‘abstract quality’, this is, as Emily Brady argues, ‘not, in itself, a reason to set the metaphysical aspect aside’.Footnote 98 Perceptual properties – ‘where the stimulus of the aesthetic response begins’Footnote 99 – are intimately connected to claims that ‘arise on and beyond the boundary of science’.Footnote 100 The metaphysical claim on nature is ‘not an outmoded concept tied to eighteenth-century experience’ but ought to be recognised as ‘relevant for contemporary debates’.Footnote 101
3.3 Disinterestedness
While the first element of Shaftesbury’s theory of natural beauty establishes the importance of virtue and affections, and the second element presents the intrinsic value of natural beauty considered as a system, the third narrows down the focus to the primary virtue of disinterestedness. Shaftesbury makes scattered references to disinterestedness in Characteristicks (e.g. SC 68 [101]; Sol 132 [224], 200 [283]; Inquiry 68 [30], 202 [113]; MR 98 [72], 266 [221], 288 [242]). The one with strongest bearings on anti-voluntarism is undoubtedly his (explicit and implicit) insistence on a ‘Disinterested Love of GOD’: The ‘most excellent Principle’ shunning the doctrine of rewards and punishments in favour of a ‘Love of God or Virtue for GOD and VIRTUE’S sake’ (Moral 144/146 [271–2]). A trust in the doctrine of rewards and punishments is ‘but an ill Token of Sincerity in Religion’ (Moral 146 [271]) and a failure to reciprocate God’s love: God who, according to Cudworth, acts ‘according to goodness and wisdom’ by ‘being infinite disinterested love displaying itself wisely’ (FW 205) in the world. But what does this imply for Shaftesbury’s theory of natural beauty? Here, I will focus on The Moralists, the piece that Shaftesbury claimed stood out as ‘an Undertaking of greater weight’ (MR 332 [285]) compared with his Inquiry.
The Moralists is a dialogue centred on Philocles and his Socratic ‘Midwife’ Theocles (Moral 338 [410]). While Philocles previously has ‘never dreamt of […] Master-pieces in NATURE’ and thus ‘never gone in search of Beauty it-self’ (Moral 328 [402]), he wishes to learn ‘How beautiful the Plants [are] themselves’ (Moral 302 [386]). Given that Philocles hopes to discover how even ‘scaly Serpents, the savage Beasts, and poisonous Insects’ can be considered ‘beauteous in themselves’ (Moral 308 [388]), the aesthetic category of natural beauty is extensive. The interdependency and order Shaftesbury perceives in nature includes foreignness and sublime fear as well.
To be able to appreciate the beauty of plants and animals, Philocles must emotionally internalise the virtue of disinterestedness; a virtue that is intimately related to pleasure and contemplation. The ‘rational sort of Enjoyment’ (Moral 92 [233]) that Shaftesbury promotes in The Moralists requires a contemplative attitude. Rather than concluding ‘dogmatically’ that ‘our real Good is PLEASURE’ (Moral 84 [226]), we have a moral obligation to ask ourselves ‘Whether we are rightly pleas’d’ (Moral 84 [227]). A hedonistic attitude prevents us from experiencing a ‘real Enjoyment’ (Moral 86 [229]). Of course, whenever ‘Pleasure is call’d in question, and attack’d’ by the critics of ‘modern Epicures’, it is convenient to introduce virtue to defend its ‘Constitution’ (Moral 92 [233]).Footnote 102 However, while the attack temporarily produces an ominously ‘complicated Form’ of pleasure that seems to include ‘all that is generous, honest and beautiful’, pleasure itself returns, once the attack has ceased, ‘to her former Shape’ (Moral 92 [233]). In short, the hedonistic attitude ensures that pleasure remains detached from virtue and natural beauty.
The main reason why this separation is maintained in life, is that the hedonistic attitude is unable to move beyond the sensuous qualities of natural beauty, while in fact it ought to be nearly impossible to ‘admire the outward Beautys, and not recur instantly to the inward, which are the most real and essential’ (MR 224 [185]). A contemporary cognate to Shaftesbury’s attack on the hedonistic attitude is Brady’s criticism of a hedonistic model of aesthetic appreciation. Here, the ‘desire for pleasure is what motivates aesthetic appreciation’ governed by subjective taste.Footnote 103 Appreciation is thus a ‘purely instrumental concern, being significant only insofar as it increases or decreases’ pleasures, blurring the differences between aesthetic pleasure and ‘pleasures connected to use’.Footnote 104 As Brady claims, we must recognise that sense perception draws on ‘all of our senses plus meanings that we attach to sense perceptions through thought and imagination’.Footnote 105 The sensuous qualities are mileposts, not destinations. To limit the sensuous qualities to refer to our perceptive awareness of the appearance of things would be to reduce the complex activity of the mind. To remain occupied with sensuous qualities is, Shaftesbury argues, to be ‘captive to Sense’ and thus unable to ‘enter in competition, or contend for Beauty with the virtuous MIND of Reason’s Culture’ (Moral 360 [425]); we are, as Cudworth stresses, simply incapable of reaching the things themselves. Without diminishing the relation between sense and the external world, ‘knowledge is not a knock or thrust from without’ but consists ‘in the awakening and exciting of the inward active powers of the mind’ (TEIM 60).
In order to reach beyond the sensuous and thus avoid ‘seeking the Enjoyment elsewhere than in the Subject lov’d’ (Moral 318 [396]; see also Ask 99), we need, according to Shaftesbury, to exercise a contemplative attitude that allows us emotionally to step ‘out of the Road and beaten Track of Life, that tedious Circle of Noise and Show’ (Moral 80 [224]). This beaten track is only burdened by distractions and immoral interests. Tellingly enough, in one of his many letters of advice to Ainsworth, Shaftesbury urges him, in order to remain ‘morally free’ and maintain his personal liberty, to concern himself only with ‘the Thing itself; not the Appearance’ (AC 369). Though Shaftesbury in this response letter comments on Christian liberty, it is clear that he thinks that a hedonistic attitude focusing on pleasures and preoccupied with sensuous qualities is a kind of emotional slavery (AC 367) unable to liberate the ‘Inward Man’ from ‘his Chains’ (AC 369).
Thus, Philocles needs to go beyond the sensuous qualities of nature, to appreciate the intrinsic value of natural beauty. In order to get there, he must nurture a special emotional attitude. Shaftesbury introduces this attitude in a thought experiment staged by Theocles. Here (for references below, see Moral 320/322 [396–7]) Philocles is asked to imagine himself ‘being taken with the Beauty of the Ocean’ while at the same time ‘seek[ing] how to command it; and like some mighty Admiral, ride Master of the Sea’. They agree that this would be ‘absurd’. Power and dominion have, as we observed earlier (see 3.2), no place in Shaftesbury’s theory of natural beauty. Furthermore, to try, as Philocles suggests, ‘VENETIAN-like, to wed the Gulf’ in a ‘Nuptial Ceremony’ and to call the ocean ‘properly my own’ must be equally strange and irrational. Given that they share the view that there is a difference between, on the one hand, satisfaction gained from power and possession, and, on the other hand, emotional enjoyment that ‘naturally follow from the Contemplation of the Ocean’s Beauty’, the unanimity is natural. Taking this a step further, they agree that there is a kind of possession that in fact outdoes property ownership, namely the ability to experience natural beauty itself. Here, represented by the emotionally mesmerised and disinterested shepherd positioned in the midst of nature:
The Bridegroom-Doge, who in his stately Bucentaur floats on the Bosom of his THETIS, has less Possession than the poor Shepherd, who from a hanging Rock, or Point of some high Promontory, stretch’d at his ease, forgets his feeding Flocks, while he admires her Beauty.
A similar set of thought experiments follow, where Philocles is invited to reflect on how the ‘Property or Possession of the Land’ might differ from enjoying natural beauty, or whether we must satisfy the desire of eating the fruits of a tree in order to enjoy its beauty. The purpose of the thought experiment is to stress a virtuous way to emotionally contemplate nature: a ‘rational and refin’d Contemplation of Beauty’. This contemplation is disinterested in the sense that the beauty of the ocean holds a value that is free of any relation to its usefulness.
But the thought experiment also reveals a non-virtuous focus that furthers non-aesthetic ends; a focus that is indeed ‘very different’ from the shepherd’s disinterested contemplation. To ‘ride Master of the Sea’ or to consider nature to be a property that must be possessed, is an aesthetic and environmental vice. While the Doge of Venice has political power as well as wealth, he has, as we can see, ‘less Possession than the poor Shepherd’.Footnote 106 The shepherd exercises an emotionally disinterested contemplation of the beauty of the ocean, to the degree that he ultimately ‘forgets his feeding Flocks, while he admires [the ocean’s] Beauty’.
Does this imply that the shepherd detaches the natural object from its surrounding environment? While it is true that the motive of the artist to create beauty can be ‘as independent of other results as is the shepherd’s joy in the beauty of the ocean’,Footnote 107 it is, I think, wrong to imply that Shaftesbury introduces the idea that objects (natural or works of art) are, as Arnold Berleant argues, ‘separate and distinct from what surrounds’ them and ‘isolated from the rest of life’ and therefore ‘require[…] a special [disinterested] attitude for [their] proper appreciation’.Footnote 108 Given what we observed in 3.2, about appreciation of the intrinsic value of natural beauty in singular cases as contingent on our relatedness with nature on a larger scale, Berleant’s claim seems especially implausible. Shaftesbury is no doubt promoting the disinterested attitude as a virtue, but it seems wide off the mark to claim that the ‘object’ contemplated is detached from life itself. Of course, the properties and purposes of art and natural beauty are not identical. This does not suggest, however, that art and nature are poles apart. As we have observed (see 2.4), art fails whenever it imitates nature too closely. In order to contain truth (‘For all Beauty is TRUTH’), art has to be partially autonomous in relation to nature (SC 120 [142–3]). However, a work of art is only ‘compleat’ and thus ‘independent’ when it, just like nature, forms ‘a Whole, by it-self’ (SC 120 [143]). The ‘Creature of [the artist’s] Brain must be like one of Nature’s Formation’ (SC 122 [145]). Art – created ‘from the many Objects of Nature, and not from a particular one’ (SC 122 [145]) – thus uncouples itself from nature with the purpose of confirming the inseparability.
Given the distressing effects of detachment, Berleant argues that the aesthetic experience of nature must be considered ‘not [in terms of] disinterested contemplation but total engagement, a sensory immersion in the natural world that reaches the still uncommon experience of unity’.Footnote 109 From what we know thus far of Shaftesbury’s theory of natural beauty, proposing a binary opposition between disinterestedness and engagement seems confusing. Is not the former a prerequisite for the latter?Footnote 110 However, the binary, and Berleant’s attempt to jettison disinterestedness from environmental aesthetics, is crucial in one of the most influential so-called non-cognitive models in the field: The engagement theory.Footnote 111 It is high time to address this theory, along with the leading cognitive model introduced and defended by Allen Carlson: Scientific cognitivism.
4 Two Disagreeing Theories
In this final section, I will introduce the two theories – the engagement theory and scientific cognitivism – with a special focus on what they imply with reference to Shaftesbury’s theory of natural beauty. I think the two theories leave a lot to be desired especially regarding the virtue of disinterestedness.
4.1 The Engagement Theory
Berleant is a revisionist. He suggest a ‘radical re-examination of the foundations of modern aesthetics’, and calls for the discipline to be ‘invaded by a Trojan horse’ ready to contest the status of what he labels traditional theory.Footnote 112 Such theory is ‘inveterately attitudinal’ for Berleant and one of its key representative is Shaftesbury and his idea of disinterestedness.Footnote 113 Berleant argues that disinterestedness suggests an abstraction of ‘both natural objects and appreciators from the environments in which they properly belong and in which appropriate appreciation is achieved’.Footnote 114 Rather than affirming engagement and participation, disinterestedness reduces ‘perception to the parochial dominance of one sense, vision’.Footnote 115 The engagement theory then is the ‘direct alternative to the traditional dualistic frame of aesthetic disinterestedness’.Footnote 116 The only way forward is, Berleant argues, to ‘replac[e] disinterestedness with engagement and contemplation with participation’.Footnote 117
But in what way is disinterestedness not a particular kind of engagement? And why is not contemplation considered a kind of participation?Footnote 118 When he claims that ‘Shaftesbury […] wanted to deal with beauty in nature as contemplative and not as active’, Berleant introduces, I think, an unfortunate dichotomy that has been haunting environmental aesthetics for decades.Footnote 119 In his most recent work, he insists that disinterested contemplation – qualitatively different from engagement and participation – is essentially passive and produces an awkward dualism between subject (mind) and object (nature) by stipulating ‘an attitude characterized by distance and separation’.Footnote 120 Though binary thinking seems to me to be out of place in this context, it is easy to see where it derives from, namely the mistaken impression that Shaftesbury’s theory of natural beauty is quintessentially modern and secular, with no, or only irrelevant, premodern or religious roots. As Jerome Stolnitz argued in his account of disinterestedness in the 1960s – a series of contested readings that Berleant relies on – Shaftesbury’s ‘metaphysics is the villain’ by introducing ‘the presence of the invisible kingdoms which lie behind things merely seen’.Footnote 121 To make sense of Berleant’s account, the so-called secularization thesis holds, I think, an explanatory value.
Dating back to influential works by Marx, Durkheim, Weber, and Peter Berger, the thesis maps a ‘process by which sectors of society and culture are removed from the domination of religious institutions and symbols’.Footnote 122 By the 1960s, the secularization thesis was well established, not least in sociology of religion. However, the pendulum was, at the same time, shifting and reservations about the thesis’ validity were raised (by the turn of the century by Berger himself). There are more layers to the thesis than I am able to explore here; naturally, a plurality of meanings is ascribed to secularism. What I wish to stress, however, is that the thesis undergirds a historical self-reflection in aesthetics too. Without having to concern itself with normative issues (whether the thesis is good or bad), or the role of religious communities in contemporary culture at large, philosophers tend to confirm the thesis by regarding the term ‘aesthetics’ itself (defined by Baumgarten as scientia cognitionis sensitivae in the 1750s) as integral to a turn from an ‘epistemology based in theological belief’ to conditions where ‘man must find from within himself the grounds of knowledge’.Footnote 123 The aesthetic experience is thus ‘caught up within a discursive network’ that ‘collectively amount[s] to a re-drawing of the map upon which we chart our senses of self’.Footnote 124 Berleant ascribes to this common idea by arguing that disinterestedness introduces an ‘awareness’ that is ‘distinct from’ a ‘religious experience’.Footnote 125
Now, this conceptualisation of a modern self (pace the problems of dovetailing the secularization thesis and aesthetic theory) introduces a matter that ought to be self-evident to readers of Shaftesbury, namely that there is a creative overlap between ancient metaphysics and ethics (especially of Socrates, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius), premodern philosophy in general, and Shaftesbury’s own writings.Footnote 126 In the spirit of philosophia perennis where we, as Cudworth stresses, ‘listen to one and the same original voice of the eternal wisdom that is never silent’ (TEIM 132), Shaftesbury often centres on timeless connections in a living tradition of philosophy, especially when addressing nature. This is in no way to say that a modern social imaginary of nature is the same as a premodern understanding consistent with a strong theological and metaphysical conceptualisation of the self.Footnote 127 As Hampton shows, while conceptualisations of a modern self depend to a large degree on autogenous meaning making processes, identity is to a premodern self largely ‘manifested through a relational framework, where meaning and value are intelligible ontic realities, adhering both in the external corporal realities that instantiate them, and the internal mental thought of the minds that think them’.Footnote 128 This affects agency, making it ‘heteronymic’ and determined by an ‘interdependent subject–object dialogue, where meaning and value is determined dialogically’.Footnote 129 While conceptualisations of a modern self might, due to their insistence on ‘self-originating concepts of meaning and value’,Footnote 130 wind up with precisely the kind of dichotomy that Berleant detects between self and nature, such a dichotomy makes no sense to Shaftesbury. In fact, one reason why his theory of natural beauty still speaks to us is, I think, precisely because it is tinged with premodern realism and a trust in not only active human agency but in ‘Nature [as] a SELF’ (Moral 262 [356]). As such, his theory falls within Hampton’s relational structure between various agencies.
Here we run the risk of reducing the agency of nature if we ignore that ‘nature is physis (φύσις)’, by which Shaftesbury means that nature ‘operates as a rational principle, inherent and pronounced in every organism (and cosmos as such)’.Footnote 131 Thus, nature does not consist of reactive aesthetic objects that require human disinterestedness in order to be meaningful. Given that ‘All things stand together’, Shaftesbury is confident that there is ‘One Nature of all things’ (Ask 91) where ‘all things are related to one another, depend on one another, and every thing is necessary to every thing’ (Ask 112). Of course, flowers and trees are central, but not as detached and passive entities separated from human agency. Cudworth’s worst nightmare – the atheistic view of nature as a ‘Dead Cadaverous thing’ without ‘Vitality acting in it’ (TISU 147) – might very well have come true in the modern social imaginary, thus giving the impression that if there is a meaning (aesthetic or otherwise) of nature, it must be externally imposed. However, a realism confirming that there is ‘Intelligence in Things’ (Ask 88), and a belief in the ‘Prerogative of Nature’ (Sol 286 [354]), makes such acts of meaning-imposition unjustified to Shaftesbury. In fact, any anthropocentric desire of imposing meaning on nature is, as we have observed, vain and futile (see 3.2). Rather, it falls on us to actively participate in a dialogue with nature. Entering the ‘conversable Woods’ we do wisely, Theocles argues, to ‘hear the Notes’ of a ‘chearful Quire’ of birds and positively ‘find the Echoes rather agreeable’ (Moral 314 [391–2]). Thus, the disinterested contemplation of the birdsong is ‘inviting us to talk’ (Moral 314 [392]); not to wield power by imposing meaning and values, but to actively immerse ourselves in natural beauty itself. In his fragmentary Plasticks, Shaftesbury refers to this immersion by urging himself, or perhaps potential readers, to ‘dive into Beauty’ and thus
be present with Nature in her sweetest Aspects, see her Causes & Dependancys her Drawing, Design, Muscling; her Prosperity [πᾶν μοι συναϱμοσῃ &c.] her Flourishing, a Beauteouse Perspective, the Woods the Rivers, Animals, Birds (the rising singing Lark) & thus joyntly with ye rest, celebrate Nature’s Festival her Birth-day, Marriage, Progeny, & give Joy to the incessant Creator.Footnote 132
I struggle to see any ambitions to introduce a detachment between subject and object in this passage and in Shaftesbury’s corpus overall. While his theory of natural beauty remains important today, its roots are simply of a different kind. The contemplation of the intrinsic value of natural beauty is the greatest and most challenging virtue we can attain. It requires, for Shaftesbury, the strongest kind of commitment a human being can muster, and intends to erase a dualism between mind and nature. The critical moment of emotional immersion is the instant we see that ‘Nothing is out of the Whole, nor nothing happens but according to the Laws of the Whole’ (Ask 91). To recognise the intrinsic value we must, as we have observed, appreciate that there is a unity and beauty of the whole. If anything, Philocles’ untiring struggle to realise that natural beauty holds an intrinsic value is, I think, intended to illustrate this. That this process remains challenging, is not only confirmed by Berleant’s misreading, but by the fact that society at large fails to appreciate the importance of the intrinsic value of natural beauty.
In the aftermath of Berleant’s engagement theory, disinterestedness has been branded a ‘villain’, and, as Brady observes, often written off as a ‘distanced, and even elitist approach, which is connected to a dispassionate, abstracted perspective’.Footnote 133 As we move forward, it will, I hope, become clear that historical sources don’t support the rationale behind the engagement theory’s reading of the history of philosophy. If anything, Shaftesbury’s idea about disinterestedness is trying to mend the dualism between man and nature that Berleant accuses him of establishing. I think that Brady’s observation, that ‘disinterestedness does not entail cool, distanced detachment; rather, it requires detachment from self-interested concerns, and it does not follow from this that the percipient’s aesthetic response is passive’, is equally true with reference to Shaftesbury.Footnote 134 Not only are natural beauty and virtue inseparable, but, more importantly, the disinterested contemplator is according to Shaftesbury expected to actively recognise her relatedness to vegetative and sensitive forms of nature. To appreciate this relatedness is to engage entirely with, and to fully recognise, the intrinsic value of nature.
The importance of such relatedness occurs in The Moralists in a passage about the function of scientific knowledge.Footnote 135 There is an ongoing debate on Shaftesbury’s view of the relevance of science in appreciating natural beauty. While Gill argues that ‘[b]y acquiring scientific knowledge, Philocles comes to see a deeper beauty’,Footnote 136 I have argued elsewhere that we have textual evidence of Shaftesbury’s scepticism of natural science in connection with natural beauty.Footnote 137 Here, I will remain focused on The Moralists, where a moderate scepticism is, I believe, revealed during an ‘Evening-Walk in the Fields’ (Moral 160 [282]). When admiring ‘Plants which grew here to great Perfection’, Philocles, who claims to have ‘acquir’d a little Insight into the nature of Simples’ (Moral 160 [282]), tries to communicate his expert knowledge. But he is immediately faulted for being ‘so ill a Naturalist in this WHOLE’ (Moral 162 [283]). Though Philocles evidently has a significant amount of scientific knowledge and demonstrates his expertise about the ‘Particulars’ of nature (that is, specific plants and animals), he remains incapable of contemplating and emotionally appreciating the organic ‘Anatomy’ of ‘Nature’ and the beauty of the ‘Relation of Parts’ and ‘Consistency’ (Moral 162 [283]). In short, he fails to recognise the relatedness of everything in nature enabling an ‘Order, Union, and Coherence of the Whole’ (Moral 168 [287]).
Shaftesbury’s point raises the persistent question about the role of scientific knowledge. In recent decades the ‘natural environmental model’ (or scientific cognitivism, which is the term I apply here) and the claim that we should value nature ‘in light of knowledge provided by the natural sciences’ has had an enormous impact in environmental aesthetics.Footnote 138 Let’s look at the main characteristics of scientific cognitivism with reference to Shaftesbury.
4.2 Scientific Cognitivism
The leading representative of scientific cognitivism, Allen Carlson, is a ‘reformist’, meaning that he thinks that ‘a number of the best-known frameworks for appreciating nature […] are wrongheaded’.Footnote 139 In Carlson’s model, natural science ‘support[s] aesthetic judgments that are appropriate to their objects because the judgments are made from a solid foundation of objective knowledge’.Footnote 140 Informed by scientific knowledge we are especially ‘well equipped to aesthetically appreciate nature’.Footnote 141 Rather than being improved by historical knowledge, aesthetic appreciation of nature itself is thus defined by natural science. A nature ‘revealed by science’ simply ‘seems’, Carlson argues, ‘more fully beautiful’.Footnote 142 Similarly to the engagement theory, Carlson’s model relies on an implicit historical narrative about how our present understanding of nature came to be, but we will see that here, as in the case of Berleant, Shaftesbury’s actual views show that Carlson has gravely misread the past.
Though Carlson pays scarce attention to the historical roots of his argument, he seamlessly aligns his theory with a common assumption that suggests a continuity between the past (the rise of natural science) and the present (scientific cognitivism). Such an assumption rests to a large degree on the secularization thesis where modernization and a cumulative view of science inevitably relate to a weakening relevance of religion.Footnote 143 In the process, religion is not only disaggregated from aesthetics, but, as Berger stressed in the 1960s, from ‘science as an autonomous, thoroughly secular perspective on the world’.Footnote 144 Though it is unfortunate, it is hardly surprising that a philosophy ‘impressed by a materialist interpretation of the science of nature’ is, as T. J. Diffey remarks, either ‘hostile to religion’ or towards religious worship of natural beauty (or, in many cases, both).Footnote 145 As in the case of the engagement theory, it thus appears crucial to recognise the role played by an assumed disaggregation of religion from aesthetics, to understand the effect of scientific cognitivism.
Carlson’s assumption that aesthetic appreciation of nature is hamstrung by religious beliefs and liberated by natural sciences, becomes visible via a series of arguments about disinterestedness, beginning with the assumption that aesthetic appreciation (of both nature and art) favours the concept of the aesthetic at the expense of the concept of appreciation.Footnote 146 Here, I do not want to get bogged down with possible negative consequences of this biased focus, but rather reflect on Carlson’s attempt to initiate a ‘shift of emphasis’ from a myopic ‘obsession with the aesthetic’ to appreciation.Footnote 147 He recognises that this shift is ‘evident within the disinterested tradition itself’, where the precedence of the object is postulated.Footnote 148 To ‘follow the lead of the object’ is to be ‘object-ively guided’.Footnote 149 Appreciation is furthermore ‘not only responsive to the object but informed by knowledge about it’.Footnote 150 Thus, knowledge about the object is not incompatible with the precedence of the object, in fact they are mutually dependent parts. As long as we appreciate nature ‘object-ively’, we pursue the tradition of disinterestedness by ‘appreciating the object as and for what it is and as and for having the properties it has’.Footnote 151 Thus, disinterested appreciation is objective, while experiencing the object as something other than it is, or ascribing properties to it that it does not have, is a (mistaken) subjective appreciation. This suggests, argues Carlson, that ‘appreciation is isolating only in the sense that both object and appreciator must be divorced from that which is not true of the object’.Footnote 152 Thus, detached and passive conditions of appreciation make no sense, neither for the appreciator, nor for the rich diversity of nature itself. There is no such thing as pure and isolated perceptions or detached aesthetic objects.
By giving priority to the qualities of the object qua object – and thus pursuing an object-oriented appreciation of nature – natural science becomes the ‘paradigm’ by its intention to reveal ‘objects for what they are and with the properties they have’.Footnote 153 Here, natural science is a necessary ‘source of objective truth’, while also identifying what is subjective and false with reference to the aesthetic appreciation of nature.Footnote 154 It is, argues Carlson, in this sense that science is ‘in part a legacy of the notion of disinterestedness’.Footnote 155 However, aesthetic appreciation and philosophical investigation of natural beauty, was, according to Carlson, for a long time, and occasionally still is, ‘hamstrung by religion’.Footnote 156 The ‘reigning religious tradition’ perceived nature as a ‘poor’ substitute ‘for the perfect harmony lost in humanity’s fall’.Footnote 157 By the ‘rise of a secular science’ and the true ‘objectification of nature’ (along with ‘secular art forms’ and ‘subjectification’) nature is ultimately ‘free’ from religious ‘associations’ and can be correctly appreciated.Footnote 158 Carlson dates the emergence of this process in aesthetics to early eighteenth-century Britain. It is here, he argues, that Shaftesbury, and other philosophers of the period (Hutcheson and later on Edmund Burke and Archibald Alison), held that disinterestedness encapsulates the connection between scientific objectivity and aesthetic appreciation of nature.Footnote 159 Disinterestedness is to Carlson a motley collection of aesthetic ideas that ultimately allows natural beauty to be ‘severed not only from religious associations’, but from moral interests as well.Footnote 160 The ‘upshot’ of this separation is, according to Carlson, a ‘mode of aesthetic appreciation that looked upon the natural world with an eye not unlike the distancing, objectifying eye of science’.Footnote 161
Now, the problem with Carlson’s account is, I think, that it pays no attention to the fact that Shaftesbury’s idea of a disinterested love of God, along with his anti-voluntarism, are key elements in his critique of praxes in philosophia naturalis, ‘that pretended studdy & Science of Nature’ (AC 377). It is no secret that Shaftesbury thought that natural philosophy clashed with the human quest for self-knowledge.Footnote 162 To him, philosophy maintains the Ciceronian title of ‘Vitae Dux, Virtutis Indagatrix’ (Sol 220 [299]; see also MR 194 [158–9]) and its moral purpose is to determine all other human practices.Footnote 163 Not only is this a critical part of Shaftesbury’s anti-voluntarism – where anyone depending ‘on mere Authority and Will’ is forced to measure morality ‘without a Standard’ (Sol 220 [298]) – but reflective of his scant interest in natural philosophy. Shaftesbury happily leaves it to others to ‘weigh Vacuums, and define Spaces, and Extensions’ (Sol 220 [298]), while reserving to philosophy to ‘solve the PHÆNOMENA in a true sence’ (Ask 288). He spots a ‘truncated rationality’ and a method of knowledge production that obstructs the aesthetic experience of natural beauty, in the practice of natural philosophy.Footnote 164 The ‘objectifying eye of science’ that Carlson has in mind merely holds back Philocles’ disinterested contemplation of natural beauty. Though there have been recent attempts to move beyond the debate between scientific cognitivism and non-cognitivism, I think it is important to recognise that scientific knowledge might often ‘dominate appreciation in ways that divert attention from aesthetic qualities’.Footnote 165 A ‘respectful aesthetic appreciation can’ indeed ‘be wider and richer than scientific constraints allow’.Footnote 166 To be successful in his task, Philocles must, to speak with Hepburn, ‘realize’ the relatedness.Footnote 167 Here, ‘realize’ implies an ‘essential episodic component’, a ‘making, or becoming, vivid to perception, or to the imagination’.Footnote 168 As Philocles realises his relatedness to natural beauty, he simultaneously becomes emotionally aware that ‘Man’ is ‘made for Contemplation’ of nature (Moral 246 [344]) and that there is ‘no real Good but the Enjoyment of Beauty’ (Moral 354 [422]). Scientific knowledge does not, it seems, support, but rather interrupts, Philocles’ progress.
Noël Carroll tries to complement Carlson’s model by arguing for a ‘less intellective, more visceral sort’ of appreciation, namely the obvious fact that we often are emotionally moved by nature and its beauty.Footnote 169 There are, I think, two promising aspects of Carroll’s so-called arousal model. The first is that it appeals to common sense by insisting that there is a natural overlap between scientific knowledge and emotional arousal. Second, addressing this overlap might help remove the impression that emotional arousal is in any way less deep and meaningful. Though the term ‘deep’ might sound awkward in this context (how do we measure and prove the depth of aesthetic experience?), it makes sense, as Carroll argues, if we consider it ‘in terms of our intensity of involvement and its “thoroughgoingness”’.Footnote 170 Strange as it may seem, this argument is slightly reminiscent of Shaftesbury’s idea about emotional immersion in natural beauty. But only slightly. Because by insisting on an ‘overlap’ between knowledge and emotion, Carroll also preserves, I think, the dualism. While he recognises that the ‘cognitive component of our emotional response does the job of fixing the aspects of nature that are relevant to appreciation’, the mental overlap even so requires a minimum of two parts (awareness of scientific facts and emotional processes), with one part extending over the other.Footnote 171 Hence, what Carroll suggests by his attempt to balance Carlson’s model, is that propositional knowledge and emotion can both complement and detract from one another in our appreciation of nature. Though this might be a good illustration of a persistent dualistic tension in modern social imaginary, it is, I think, destined to blur the historical radicalness that we are dealing with here. While Carroll wants to ‘defend a space for the traditional practice of being moved by nature’ he also insists that such a practice is not ‘reducible’ to religious beliefs, but is in fact ‘fully secular’.Footnote 172 Though the claim that people might be moved emotionally by natural beauty without reference to religious beliefs, is, I think, uncontroversial, the claim that this is, in any sense of the word, a ‘traditional practice’, is certainly not.
Carroll’s impatience to ‘block any reductionist account’ foils insights of the lasting effects of religion in contemporary aesthetic theory and overlooks the complexity of traditional accounts, where knowledge and emotions are inseparable, much like Shaftesbury’s claim that ‘what is at once both Beautiful and True, is, of consequence, Agreeable and GOOD’ (MR 222/224 [183]; see also Moral 346 [416]).Footnote 173 Philocles’ turn away from ‘superficial Beautys’ towards that ‘which lies very absconded and deep’ (Moral 328 [402]) in nature, consists precisely in the formation of the emotional completeness as a virtue (see 3.1). In this completeness or mental integrity, his emotions are neither a secondary effect of scientific knowledge, nor do they overlap with any kind of expertise. Instead, what Shaftesbury suggests in The Moralists, is that Philocles’, or indeed the shepherd’s, disinterested emotional appreciation is (or soon will be) a rational form of knowledge of nature; in short, it is an embodied emotional knowledge. That such emotional knowledge does not fit the desired models of Carlson (or indeed of Berleant) is a bitter pill that he and others have to swallow, at least if he intends to refer to Shaftesbury. I will conclude this section by reflecting in more detail on how Shaftesbury defends the epistemic value of a disinterested contemplation.
4.3 The Epistemic Value of Disinterestedness
While Cudworth’s impact (himself a fellow of the Royal Society and in favour of the new sciences) on Shaftesbury is rarely studied in detail in this particular context, his spirit looms, I think, large in The Moralists. Of course, a massive work like The True Intellectual System of the Universe was destined to touch on a number of issues more or less en passant. One of them was, surprisingly enough, the epistemic value of contemplating nature. Humans, Cudworth stresses, do not always encompass a ‘perfectly Comprehensive Knowledge’ of the essence of things (TISU 639). Not everybody is able to experience the intrinsic value of nature or understand how particulars relate to the whole. It takes, Shaftesbury argues, the gradually evolving insights of Philocles, to be ‘let into a Knowledg of the Animal and Vegetable Worlds’, in order to ‘declare the just Relation of all these Parts to one another’ (Moral 170 [289]). Such insights are not customary in the general public. More frequently than not we must conclude that ‘a Mind which sees not infinitely, can see nothing fully’ (Moral 168 [288]).
However, human imperfection is, to Cudworth and Shaftesbury, neither a source of despair, nor a relevant reason to dismiss God as a ‘Non-Entity’ (TISU 638). While one might argue that if God is incomprehensible, he is by default inconceivable to our finite minds, Cudworth instead considers this to be an argument in favour of God’s existence.Footnote 174 Given that the particulars of nature are perfectly organised (be it the sun providing energy necessary to support life on Earth, or the soil supporting the life of plants), our imperfect minds must originate from, depend on, and confirm, a perfect mind (TISU 639). While we cannot ‘Comprehend all Truth’ in nature (here, comprehend is associated with domination and control) – because ‘Truth is Bigger than our Minds’ – we can nevertheless ‘frame certain Ideas and Conceptions, of whatsoever is in the Orb of Being’ (TISU 639). God and nature are incomprehensible in their perfection, but not completely inconceivable (thus we cannot derive God as a non-entity from God as inconceivable).Footnote 175 We can, for instance, ‘approach near to a Mountain, and touch it with our hands, though we cannot encompass it all round, and enclasp it within our arms’ (TISU 639), by which Cudworth means that we (theists and atheists alike) can have an idea of the mountain (or God) without comprehension of its full extension.Footnote 176 As Theocles argues, ‘ALL Nature’s Wonders’ ultimately aim to arouse the ‘Idea of their Author’ (Moral 282 [370]).
The incomprehensibility of perfection consists of a kind of surplus materiality making it in fact ‘more Knowable and Conceivable than any thing’ else (TISU 639; see also Moral 278/280 [367–9]). The ‘Excessive Splendour’ of the sun simply makes it more visible than other stars, but by overpowering our ‘weak sight’ with its perfection it is also destined to make it less observable (TISU 639).
At this point Cudworth’s account takes off in a surprising way and attaches itself to aesthetic ideas that are, on the one hand, firmly rooted in Longinian history, and, on the other hand, in anticipation of the eighteenth-century obsession with the sublime. Because, though we lack a complete comprehension of God and nature, they are ‘Filling up the Mind more, and Acting more strongly upon it’ (TISU 639), thus allowing us to feel that there is indeed a perfection that we can conceive even though it remains incomprehensible. Our passions (‘Devout Veneration, Adoration, and Admiration’) combined with the characteristic topoi of the sublime – ‘a kind of Ecstasie, and Pleasing Horrour’ – provide us with the idea that there is indeed
some Object in the World, so much Bigger and Vaster than our Mind and Thoughts, that it is the very same to them, that the Ocean is to narrow Vessels, so that when they have taken into themselves as much as they can thereof by Contemplation, and filled up all their Capacity, there is still an Immensity of it left without, which cannot enter in for want of room to receive it, and therefore must be apprehended after some other strange and more mysterious manner, viz. by their being as it were Plunged into it, and Swallowed up or Lost in it.
Here, Cudworth (unintentionally or not, I dare not say) draws near a key point about the sublimity of nature with reference to contemplation.Footnote 177 Inspired by Plato’s account of moving beyond lower pleasures in order to experience the world of Form, Longinus – the supposed author of Peri hupsous [Περὶ ὕψους], the only surviving, but incomplete, treatise from antiquity dealing with the sublime – argues that we emotionally desire an intense contemplation of whatever is more divine than ourselves.Footnote 178 Our active minds are attracted by natural objects that are essentially too complex (in perfection) and too extensive (in magnitude) to be fully comprehended. We favour, Longinus stresses, a contemplation of the ‘Nile, the Danube or the Rhine, and still more the Ocean’.Footnote 179 This was a familiar tune in the British and German eighteenth-century discourse on the sublime; whether it concerned the Alps or grand rivers, the active mind was in the act of focused contemplation pushing its limits by expanding – and (happily) failing – to fully comprehend the natural object.Footnote 180 Which didn’t however imply a failure to get an idea of the perfect object itself, on the contrary. The ‘Ecstasie, and Pleasing Horrour’ suggests that our mental effort is in fact emotionally productive in forming an idea of the object (hence pleasing), though, given the experience of its immensity, accompanied by sentiments of horror.
Now, neither Longinus, Cudworth, Shaftesbury, nor forthcoming theorists of the sublime, argue that this ‘mysterious’ experience lacks epistemic value or is unjustified.Footnote 181 If anything, it provides us with insights in the perfection of God and nature’s beauty. Though it was controversial, there was nothing fundamentally wrong with a kind of enthusiastic contemplation where we are emotionally ‘Plunged into’ the object and ultimately ‘Swallowed up or Lost in it’.
More than anything, Theocles embodies this kind of disinterested contemplation himself, when he is emotionally entranced by the ‘Majestick Beautys of this Earth, and all ye Rural Powers and Graces’ (Moral 246 [344]). As if in a ‘Dream’ he assumes the poetic role of a rational enthusiast showing a ‘sensible kind of Madness’ rather than being ‘downright Raving’ (Moral 248 [346–7]), by which Shaftesbury confirms that a genuine ‘ENTHUSIASM is, in it-self, a very natural honest Passion; and has properly nothing for its Object but what is Good and Honest’ (MR 64 [37–8]; see also Ask 113–14). Of course, there are exceptions, where religious fanatics ‘set adrift to the wide Sea of Passion’ and the mind irrationally ‘approves the Riot, and justifies the wild Effects, by the suppos’d Sacredness of the Cause’ (MR 66 [40]). The enthusiasm inherent in the disinterested contemplation occasionally suffers by being ‘stretch’d too far’ (Moral 144 [271]), as in the case of the Camisards (revolting Huguenots from southern France), a group of ‘Prophesying Enthusiasts’ (LCE 340 [27]), trying to get a foothold in London in 1706 (see LCE 338/340/342 [26–9]).Footnote 182 Though Shaftesbury is of course equally frustrated with the ‘Enemys’ of enthusiasm – self-appointed defenders of what they call ‘Rational Religion’ – which give up ‘Affection’ and ‘Warmth’ and thus raise questions about their own moral and religious ‘Sincerity’ (Moral 144/146 [271]).
Demonstrative reason, aiming to guarantee epistemic value, plays a minor role in this context. What interests Shaftesbury is a reasonable emotional enthusiasm, where reason checks the validity of a disinterested contemplation by forming a cohesive unity with it, rather than being the cause of it.Footnote 183 While a genuine enthusiasm, as practiced by Theocles himself, engages with reason to the extent that enthusiasm incorporates ‘Judgment and Discretion’ (MR 62 [36]), the ecstatic emotional moment when we are, to use Cudworth’s words, ‘Swallowed up or Lost’ in the object, is not defined by any conclusive evidence or scientific proofs ready to satisfy, what Shaftesbury refers to as, ‘cool Philosophy’ (MR 60 [35]). Our ‘Enjoyments’ would merely be ‘SLENDER’ if beauty did not have ‘reference or regard to any higher Majesty’ (MR 56 [31]) where the particular object relates to the whole itself. As the shepherd shows in The Moralists, the disinterested contemplation of the ocean’s beauty is an ecstatic emotional immersion in the perfection of God’s nature and the appropriate rational enthusiasm to the beauty of the whole.
Conclusion
Environmental aesthetics is a fairly new sub-discipline of aesthetics which is, in its turn, a marginalised sub-discipline of Anglo-American philosophy.Footnote 184 In its efforts to find a working identity with reference to nature and natural beauty, it is understandable that environmental aesthetics favours contemporary ethical problems of, for instance, preservation, conservation, and environmental policy issues. However, pleas for a return to ‘historically accurate roots’, and attempts to clarify problems by historical reflection, occasionally occur.Footnote 185 I have focused on two revisionist models that look to history to justify their relevance. The impatience of Berleant and Carlson to highlight their models’ contemporary merit comes, I argue, at the expense of exegetical accuracy. Thus, part of the aim of this study has admittedly been destructive, namely, to pull the plug on future misreadings of Shaftesbury’s theory of natural beauty and to counteract distortions of the concept of disinterestedness. The overall aim, however, has been constructive in the sense that I want to show that Shaftesbury’s philosophy, along with that of the Cambridge Platonists, are valuable historical resources for rethinking the defining crisis of our time.
Early modern philosophy is challenging since it rarely fits current ‘taxonomic segmenting’.Footnote 186 In the case of Shaftesbury that is true both with reference to the past and to the present. Presumably no philosopher of the early-modern period was as playful and keen to challenge popular philosophico-theological dogmas as Shaftesbury. This raises questions of his relevance in a time when the self-image of philosophy is predicated on secular naturalistic principles.Footnote 187 For instance, how do we deal with his claim that realism in divinity is inseparable from moral and aesthetic realism? The common way to address this question is by de-theologizing Shaftesbury’s aesthetics. While this might be an attractive shortcut to define and defend more clearly a particular contemporary model, it tends to backfire, primarily because it perceives the theological assumptions integral to his aesthetics, as antiquated and irrelevant. If anything, I hope this study has showed that they are not.
A secondary effect of the secularization thesis (problematic as it is) may perhaps be, as Diffey claimed three decades ago, that natural beauty has turned into a ‘refuge for displaced religious emotions’.Footnote 188 At the same time, one might question whether there is any explanatory power left in Diffey’s claim. After all, the ongoing changes in the atmosphere, ocean, cryosphere, and biosphere, affects every region across the globe, with permanent damage to nature and an irreversible loss of species.Footnote 189 The temporary protection that a refuge provides – powerless to solve the root cause – is not as comforting today, as it was three decades ago. But if natural beauty is ‘a last refuge for religious and noumenal truth’ this also suggests that it might retain ‘something of this power even for the secularly and atheistically minded’.Footnote 190 As Lynn White argued already in 1967, modern ‘science and technology have grown out of Christian attitudes towards man’s relation to nature’ and they are undeniably preserved even by ‘those who fondly regard themselves as post-Christians’.Footnote 191 Whether this is attributable to the slow-changing nature of social imaginary, or because we know that such a refuge serves a critical purpose for human self-knowledge, remains an open (and, I guess, unresolvable) question. What we know, however, is that prevailing economic or techno-scientific strategies have failed to foster a necessary shift from distinguishing nature only in anthropocentric terms to deep awareness of how we are, on the one hand, intrinsically linked to nature, and, on the other hand, what kind of moral actions this awareness should spur us to.
Shaftesbury’s theory of natural beauty introduces an opportunity to reflect on what this shift might look like. A key, he argues, is the human capacity to emotionally internalise the virtue of disinterestedness. While scientific evidence of climate change abounds today, facts and knowledge do not seem to solve the problem. The missing link is, I think, that detailed knowledge must be, as Shaftesbury argues, reshaped into moral self-reflection, which is essentially appropriately managed emotions. A virtuous person always exercises her second-order affections (or reflex affections; see 3.1). The disinterested contemplation of nature and God is, as we have seen, a rational form of knowledge as embodied emotion. A fundamental shift from instrumental attitudes to disinterested contemplations is necessary in order to counteract further exploitation of nature and (non-human) animals as endless resources for capital. What is still pending is perhaps not additional scientific evidence of climate change impacts or further capitalisation on its synergies, but our embodied emotional understanding that freedom ‘cannot be achieved by elevating the human being above nature and understanding dignity as a sign of the human’s exemption from the natural and animal world’.Footnote 192 Shaftesbury’s defence of the disinterested attitude includes insights of what this emotional embodiment in fact is; not a passive detachment from nature, but, as we have seen, an active ‘dive into’ its beauty (see 4.1) and a deep recognition of its intrinsic value.
Finally, there is something awkward with the claim that natural beauty is a hideout for emotions redirected from religion, making nature more or less a substitute target. The idea that emotions are relocated from religious beliefs and values to aesthetics seems to blot out their inseparability in human history. Grouping emotions in too neat categories might simply obstruct a recognition of their universal function and value to human experience. Emotions (or, to speak with Shaftesbury, affections) are inseparable from our ‘SENSE of Right and Wrong’, and as such they are ‘a first Principle in our Constitution and Make’ and only endangered by a ‘second Nature’ consisting of ‘contrary Affection[s]’ (Inquiry 92 [44]). Shaftesbury’s point is that functions and values of balanced emotions are consistent over time. As such they are inseparable from virtuous actions. It does not matter if we can rattle off knowledge of nature. As long as it is not emotionally rooted and embodied in natural attitudes and actions, we are destined to pursue our destructive interaction with nature, and the meaning of intrinsic value for a flourishing moral life and happiness must remain obscure.
Acknowledgements
The seed of this book was planted in a collaborative research application with Michael Gill and Emily Brady. I am indebted to their intellectual generosity over the years. I thank the series editor Alexander Hampton, the peer reviewers, the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, and my colleagues at the University of Agder. I dedicate this sixth book to Camilla, my favourite philosopher and the love of my life.
Alexander J. B. Hampton
University of Toronto
Alexander J. B. Hampton is a professor at the University of Toronto, specialising in metaphysics, poetics, and nature. His publications include Romanticism and the Re-Invention of Modern Religion (Cambridge 2019), Christian Platonism: A History (ed.) (Cambridge, 2021), and the Cambridge Companion to Christianity and the Environment (ed.) (Cambridge, 2022).
Editorial Board
Shaun Blanchard, University of Notre Dame, Australia
Jennifer Newsome Martin, University of Notre Dame, USA
Sean McGrath, Memorial University
Willemien Otten, University of Chicago
Catherine Pickstock, University of Cambridge
Jacob H. Sherman, California Institute of Integral Studies
Charles Taliaferro, St. Olaf College
About the Series
In the history of philosophy and theology, many figures and topics are considered in isolation from each other. This series aims to complicate this binary opposition, while covering the history of this complex conversation from antiquity to the present. It reconceptualizes traditional elements of the field, generating new and productive areas of historical enquiry, and advancing creative proposals based upon the recovery of these resources.
