Element contents
Series: Elements in Epistemology
An Anti-Sceptical Metaphysics and Epistemology of Perception
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2026
Summary
This Element brings three topics into closer contact: scepticism about the external world, the metaphysics of perception, and the epistemology of perception. It argues that a certain kind of response to external world scepticism is significantly stronger if we make certain theoretical commitments regarding the metaphysics and epistemology of perception. I argue that a neo-Moorean epistemological disjunctivist response to scepticism is much more compelling when underpinned by a naïve realist theory of perceptual phenomenal character and the transparency model of how we acquire knowledge of our perceptual states. The possibility that these theories are true radically alters the dialectical situation with respect to external world scepticism: the sceptical argument is on much shakier ground than is usually appreciated. Integrating our theorising about our knowledge of the external world and our theorising about the metaphysics and epistemology of perception affords a more comprehensive view of our anti-sceptical options.
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- Series: Elements in EpistemologyOnline ISBN: 9781009127080Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication: 27 August 2026
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