Element contents
Series: Elements in Philosophy of Law
Contemporary Natural Law Jurisprudence
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 31 July 2026
Summary
Natural law theory is a major contemporary school of philosophy of law. This Element provides a critical overview of recent lines of thought in this tradition. Section 1 considers the defining claims of natural law jurisprudence, including strong and weak natural law views. Sections 2 to 5 examine four contemporary lines of natural law argument: functional arguments, the argument from context, the argument from injustice and the central case method. Functional arguments remain the oldest and best route to the natural law thesis. The argument from context also has promise, whereas the argument from injustice and the central case method fail to yield robust natural law conclusions. Section 6 reflects on the future of natural law jurisprudence. It explores a possible reframing of natural law theories, away from the prevailing emphasis on legal validity or defectiveness, and towards an understanding of law as a natural phenomenon.
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- Series: Elements in Philosophy of LawOnline ISBN: 9781009511100Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication: 20 August 2026
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