Element contents
Games in the Philosophy of Biology
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 January 2020
Summary
This is an Element surveying the most important literature using game theory and evolutionary game theory to shed light on questions in the philosophy of biology. There are two branches of literature that the book focuses on. It begins with a short introduction to game theory and evolutionary game theory. It then turns to working using signaling games to explore questions related to communication, meaning, language, and reference. The second part of the book addresses prosociality - strategic behavior that contributes to the successful functioning of social groups - using the prisoner's dilemma, stag hunt, and bargaining games.
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- Online ISBN: 9781108616737Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication: 13 February 2020
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