Element contents
Health and Disease
Experimental Philosophy of Medicine
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 January 2026
Summary
The concepts of health and disease are fundamental to medical research, healthcare, and public health, and philosophers have long sought to clarify their meaning and implications. Increasingly, it is suggested that progress in this area could be advanced by integrating empirical methods with philosophical reflection. This Element explores the emerging field of experimental philosophy of medicine (XPhiMed), which takes this approach by applying empirical methods to longstanding philosophical debates. It begins with an overview of the philosophical debates and their methodological challenges, followed by an exploration of experimental findings on health, disease, and disorder, along with their implications for philosophy and other fields.
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- Online ISBN: 9781009673679Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication: 19 February 2026
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