1 Introduction: Unbordering the Detention Industrial Complex
On 9 February 2015, the then Home Secretary of the UK, Theresa May, announced that she had commissioned an ‘independent review into the Home Office policies and operating procedures that have an impact on immigration detainee welfare’.Footnote 1 Stephen Shaw, the former Prisons and Probation Ombudsman, was appointed to conduct this inquiry, framed by May as a means of ensuring that individuals ‘with no right to be in the UK’ and who ‘refuse’ to leave would be sought by the Home Office to ‘enforce their removal’ and would nonetheless be treated with ‘dignity and respect’ while detained.Footnote 2 She declared that the purpose of the review was to consider the ‘appropriateness, and application, of current policies and practices concerning the health and wellbeing of vulnerable people in immigration detention and those being escorted in the UK’.Footnote 3 May – who, in 2012, was the architect of the government’s Hostile Environment policy – presented the review as a measure of care, yet one commissioned from within a department committed to deterrence and exclusion.Footnote 4 For his review, Shaw developed a capacious definition for ‘well-being’, drawing on the Care Act 2014 to encompass health, dignity, protection from abuse, and the conditions of everyday life.Footnote 5 His methodology combined visits to each of the immigration removal centres, short-term holding facilities, pre-departure accommodations, and port holding facilities in the country, as well as the Holloway and Wormwood Scrubs prisons, speaking with both staff and detainees, holding forums with groups of detainees, making observations of reception, healthcare, and overnight movements. He met with representatives of the Independent Monitoring Board, asked for and scrutinized written evidence, consulted with many non-governmental stakeholders, and met former detainees. The resulting Review into the Welfare in Detention of Vulnerable Persons (2016) has since become a groundbreaking public document that not only provides an in-depth insight into the detention estate and its practices of ‘care’ but also demonstrates – sometimes inadvertently – the extent to which racialization and racial capitalism serve as governing principles of management in these spaces. Nearly a decade later, as Britain’s detention policies tighten while generating legal challenges, and the Hostile Environment endures, Shaw’s Review remains a crucial lens for interrogating how the state’s border regime converts healthcare into a technology of control, where the rhetoric of welfare conceals the operations of racialized exclusion, cruelty, debility, and premature death.
This Element centres on Shaw’s landmark Review to demonstrate how the British government’s health policies adversely affect the racialized asylum-seeker’s access to healthcare, therefore dictating their right to live. Close-reading the Review, this Element analyses how the state’s practices of ‘care’ within the detention industrial complex are bound up with processes of racialization and how the ethical vocabularies of vulnerabilities, consent, and confidentiality are mobilized to reinforce state power rather than address poor health outcomes. Health, here, is understood as a socially and politically mediated condition shaped by racialized regimes of care, mobility, confinement, and access to treatment. Care is conceptualized throughout this Element as an ambivalent regime that may simultaneously alleviate suffering and facilitate surveillance, exclusion, and abandonment. Central to this analysis is the concept of racialization: immigration policy in the Global North is structurally racialized, such that the vast majority of detainees are ‘non’-white people from the Global South; Robin D. G. Kelley notes that all ‘modern democracies were founded as ethnonational and/or racial states where exclusion and xenophobia were commonplace’.Footnote 6 Yet, it is imperative to remember that the social construction of race is not a fixed identity and whiteness too is always already a racialized subject-position. White privilege becomes the governing principle for formulating immigration policy in the Global North, where policy is devised by defining and constructing whiteness through a position of racial privilege and advantage.Footnote 7 White privilege enables whiteness to become both normative and structurally invisible, and this makes it a powerful tool in the governance of the detention industrial complex and in decisions of who belongs and who cannot be allowed to belong.Footnote 8 This hierarchy of whiteness has historically been constructed wherein membership to whiteness is dictated by proximity to ideologies of Western civilization and its mutable nature has, for example, historically excluded certain Europeans such as Irish, Italians, and Greeks from the boundaries of Western whiteness. In contemporary times, the detention and poor treatment of Albanian people in the detention industrial complex demonstrate this racial hierarchy in action. In December 2023, when an Albanian detainee died on the Bibby Stockholm barge, the BBC reported that workers ‘joked’ there was ‘one less Muslim mouth to feed’.Footnote 9 Here explicit Islamophobia intersects with racism, white privilege, and state-sanctioned hierarchies of care.
In this Element, I argue that the multicultural, multi-ethnic, and multilingual British detention industrial complex operates on a singular concept of racial differentiation that constructs all non-Western Europeans held in these spaces as a uniform racial other. This does not conflate the racism experienced by a Black woman in detention as the exact same kind of racism experienced by a white-skinned Albanian man, but rather, argues that both are systematically positioned outside the bounds of state-sanctioned care. The central framework of this Element is that ‘racial thinking’ becomes a ‘central organizing principle’ in the detention industrial complex; even when the state does not explicitly write about ‘racial difference’, racialization remains central to the formulation of health policy and management, bestowing power on people in charge and shaping both the lived experiences and health outcomes of racialized detainees.Footnote 10 In his Review, Shaw does not categorically reference ‘race’ – the norms of civil service neutrality limit the possibility of structural critique – except for a footnote to an enquiry into ‘allegations of racist mistreatment’ for the Home Office that he carried out as an Ombudsman in 2004.Footnote 11 He does not inform the readers of the outcome to that inquiry but mentions another ongoing inquiry where staff at Yarl’s Wood were captured on camera to be referring to detainees as ‘animals, beasties, and bitches’.Footnote 12 To this incident, Shaw offers no judgement or opinion. However, throughout the Review, Shaw reveals a structure of racialized state power and in his outrages at the mismanagement and cruelty, we can trace an outrage against a machinery that functions on discrimination. Race in these sites is relational: whiteness functions as a governing principle, enabling officials – regardless of their own racial identity – to define and enforce hierarchies of care, surveillance, and discipline. These dynamics illustrate how bio/necropolitics and racial capitalism operate within ostensibly neutral mechanisms of healthcare, shaping not only detainees’ material access to treatment but also the ethical and social meaning of care itself. Healthcare in detention therefore emerges not simply as a mitigating force against state violence but also as a mechanism through which confinement is legitimized, vulnerability adjudicated, and populations differentially exposed to injury and premature death. By foregrounding these entanglements, this Element positions the detention industrial complex as a site where race and power intersect, revealing the structural dimensions of racialization in state governance.
The British Detention Industrial Complex
At the outset, the UK border regime operates on a principle of broadly sorting people into citizens and migrants. Within the category of migrants, there are numerous hierarchies: high-value investors, skilled workers, ‘economic migrants’, asylum-seekers (including the government’s scornful label of ‘bogus’ asylum-seekers), and undocumented people (commonly – and illegally – referred to as ‘illegals’).Footnote 13 Those detained in the various Immigration Removal Centres (IRCs) across the country are primarily asylum-seekers and undocumented people, including individuals convicted of crimes and those intercepted at the border as having ‘no right to enter the United Kingdom’.Footnote 14 These detainees are overwhelmingly racialized people from the Global South, and often include vulnerable populations such as survivors of torture. Asylum-seekers are held while their claims are processed, alongside those who will be ‘returned’ imminently. The UK operates the largest detention system in Europe, notable for its policy of ‘indefinite detention’, whereby people may be held for months or years without a set time limit, leaving them in limbo and often with deteriorating physical and mental health.
At the time of Shaw’s review, there were ten designated IRCs: Dover, Morton Hall, The Verne, Brook House, Campsfield House, Colnbrook, Dungavel, Harmondsworth, Tinsley House, and Yarl’s Wood. Alongside these were two short-term holding facilities, port detention facilities, pre-departure accommodations, and reserved spaces in prisons. Each site was administered either by private companies contracted by the Home Office – such as G4S, Mitie, Serco, and Tascor – or by HM Prison Service in the cases of Dover, Morton Hall, and The Verne. Healthcare provision, until its subsequent transition to the NHS in 2015, was similarly outsourced to private companies, including The Practice, Integrated Care 24, G4S Medical Services, Med-Co Secure Healthcare Services, Tascor Medical Services Limited, and Spectrum. This heavy reliance on private contractors not only structures the day-to-day management of detention but also illustrates how profit-driven mechanisms are intertwined with the racialized governance of these spaces. The outsourcing highlights the economic dimensions of the system where the management of racialized bodies becomes embedded within circuits of profit and governance. I will analyse this dynamic further within the framework of racial capitalism in the following section.
Taken together, these sites, their actors, and the racialized management are what I term the British detention industrial complex.Footnote 15 With this label, I signify more than the collection of IRCs, holding facilities, removal centres, and their attendant contractual bureaucracies – this label captures the method of the entanglement of carceral logics, racialized governance, opaque administrative procedures, and profit-driven management that shape the everyday experiences of detainees. The detention industrial complex operates through the overlapping mechanisms of discrimination, surveillance, control, and economic extraction, with the state and private contractors participating in the governance of racialized bodies. Indefinite detention, the outsourcing of both management and healthcare, and the stratification of migrants according to perceived vulnerability or threat are not merely functional arrangements – they are constitutive of a system in which power, profit, and racial discrimination reinforce one another. By conceptualizing the British border regime in this way, the detention industrial complex highlights the structural interdependencies between state policy, economic incentive, and racialized hierarchies, establishing the analytical frame through which this Element approaches the dispensation of healthcare and bioethics in detention. In the following section, I situate this framework within a wider carceral landscape and outline the methodological and theoretical strands that frame my analysis.
Methodologically Speaking
The detention industrial complex is literally and figuratively entwined with the prison industrial complex: certain sites in the border regime, such as Dover, Morton Hall, and The Verne were administered by HM Prison Service, and the management of all the sites across the detention industrial complex operates through a carceral regime. Harsha Walia traces how this consolidation of spatial carcerality across prisons and borders ‘correlates with wealth concentration, dismantling of public services, and the simultaneous manufacturing and disciplining of surplus populations’.Footnote 16 The outsourcing of detention management and the administration of healthcare to private companies illustrates this logic in practice: racialized people are immobilized, not simply through state power and control, but through an economic model that embeds their containment within circuits of profit. Walia terms this the ‘shared logic of immobilization’, whereby ‘police, prisons, and borders’ collectively function to ‘contain oppressed communities under racial capitalism’.Footnote 17 Bordering and carceral regimes function together to produce and maintain hierarchies of race, class, and citizenship through practices of differential inclusion and exclusion. Ruth Wilson Gilmore’s Golden Gulag complements this by explicitly tying incarceration with racism, which she defines as ‘the state-sanctioned or extralegal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerability to premature death’.Footnote 18 Gilmore demonstrates how incarceration emerges from the convergence of racial capitalism, surplus populations, and state restructuring, showing that prisons are not merely sites of confinement but nodes in a political-economic system that organizes life and death along racialized lines. Connecting the carceral system with the detention system at the beginning of this Element, I situate Britain’s detention industrial complex as part of this global carceral formation: a system in which the detention of racialized migrants is structurally integral to the racial capitalist ordering of society. Reading Walia and Gilmore together makes clear that the detention industrial complex cannot be understood in isolation – as a racial-capitalist formation, borders and prisons operate as mutually reinforcing technologies of racial management and premature death.
The conceptual lens of racial capitalism provides a foundational framework for understanding how the British detention industrial complex operates, and one that I return to by default throughout this Element. Racial capitalism is a system in which economic accumulation is inseparable from the production and management of racialized populations. Stuart Hall emphasized the ‘systemic logic of capitalism – for example managing crises to secure capitalist hegemony – which can articulate with varied racisms’ and emerge within ‘discrete capitalist contexts’.Footnote 19 The detention of racialized migrants fits integrally into these broader circuits of profit, governance, and social control: outsourcing of all services, indefinite detention, and differential treatment of detainees are mechanisms through which both capital and state authority are exercised. Yet, it is imperative to remember that racial capitalism and indeed the conception of the detention industrial complex is not a contemporary, postcolonial phenomenon. As I allude to in Section 4, the legacies of these structures lie firmly in Britain’s violent colonial histories. Sylvia Wynter reads coloniality as ‘the juridico-economic referent of racial difference, thus suggesting the latter as a political signifier’ and is invested in ‘exposing the ethical implications of the European colonial project’.Footnote 20 Wynter’s theorization of the overrepresentation of ‘Man’ ‘as if it were the human itself’ in Western political and social thought further illuminates how these economic and administrative practices are mediated through racialized subjecthood.Footnote 21 In Wynter’s framework, any attempt to ‘unsettle the coloniality of power will call for the unsettling of this overrepresentation’; racialized migrants in detention centres are positioned outside normative constructions of humanity, subjected to policies and practices that deny them ethical recognition.Footnote 22 Where Wynter exposes how coloniality underpins the very category of the human, Jodi Melamed traces how this foundational overrepresentation is continually reproduced within capitalist states through racialized violence, making clear the recursive entanglement of material exploitation and epistemic devaluation. Melamed’s cogent definition of racial capitalism identifies the ‘complex recursivity between material and epistemic forms of racialized violence, which are executed in and by core capitalist states’ and demonstrates ‘the state and concomitant rights and freedoms to be fully saturated by racialized violence’.Footnote 23 Section 3 offers a detailed breakdown to demonstrate the workings of racial capitalism in the dispensation of physical healthcare in the detention industrial complex. By situating the concept of racial capitalism as fundamental to the governance of racialized migrants in detention, this Element establishes that healthcare governance, surveillance, and bureaucratic management in the detention industrial complex function as economic, political, and epistemic hierarchies converging to structure life and death along racialized lines. This theoretical orientation allows us to draw specifically upon Critical Medical Humanities to examine medicine, healthcare, and care as sites of social, political, and ethical contestation and is particularly useful for this study. Rather than adopting a broader health humanities approach concerned primarily with experiences of illness and well-being, I employ Critical Medical Humanities to interrogate how access to care, bodily autonomy, vulnerability, and ethical recognition are differentially produced through racialized structures of state power, detention, and capital accumulation. Such an approach enables healthcare in the detention industrial complex to be understood as a domain through which surveillance, exclusion, debility, and premature death may also be administered.
Having established racial capitalism as the grounding framework for this Element, I move on to the concepts of biopolitics and necropolitics to demonstrate how life and death are administratively managed in the detention industrial complex. In The History of Sexuality Volume 1, Michel Foucault developed the concept of ‘biopolitics’ by drawing the connection between the body as a ‘disciplining’ ‘machine’ and the ‘species body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of biological processes’ as the ‘two poles around which the organisation of power over life was deployed’.Footnote 24 Foucault, famously, did not analyse the imperial context in the History of Sexuality, but in his 1976 Collège de France lectures, race, racism, and biopower feature predominantly. There, Foucault traces the development of state power from the eighteenth century onwards to explain how racism becomes the organizing principle for ‘the murderous function of the State’, whose imperative is to ‘eliminate’ ‘the bad race, the inferior race’ for their own ‘improvement’.Footnote 25 Biopolitics, then, provides the lens to analyse how the state seeks to optimize populations through the administration of care, health, and welfare, even as such practices are deeply entwined with coercion, extraction, and racialized stratification. Achille Mbembe extends and departs from Foucault by developing the concept of necropolitics: ‘contemporary forms of subjugating life to the power of death’ by examining ‘the trajectories by which the state of exception and the relation of enmity have become the normative basis of the right to kill’.Footnote 26 Understanding necropolitics equips us with the capacity to understand how sovereignty is exercised through the power to dictate who ‘is able to live and who must die’.Footnote 27 As I demonstrate in each section of this Element, the policies of the state dictate how racialized migrants are confined, surveilled, and denied meaningful access to healthcare, and their necropolitical governance manifests through the state regulation of bodies and the management of mortality risk. Within Critical Medical Humanities, integrating biopolitics and necropolitics foregrounds the ways in which ethical vocabularies of care, consent, and vulnerability are deployed not only to manage health outcomes but also to reproduce structural inequalities. This bio/necropolitical framework intersects with the logics of racial capitalism, situating healthcare governance in detention as simultaneously a site of capital accumulation, ethical erasure, and racialized control. However, there is an absoluteness in framing detention management as bio/necropolitical governance: if death is the only outcome, we miss how the state also sustains and manages populations in injured, debilitated, or disabled forms. As Jasbir Puar argues, debility and disablement are not accidental by-products but deliberate outcomes of necropolitical governance.Footnote 28 I therefore read biopolitics, necropolitics, and debility together, as intersecting logics that illuminate how detention governs life, injury, and death simultaneously. These frameworks ground my analyses in Sections 2, 3, and 4.
Within this theoretical frame, I treat the strands of racializing assemblage, racial subjection, and dehumanization as methodological tools drawn from Critical Race Theory to examine the detention industrial complex. However, instead of simply defining these concepts, here I foreground their analytic force in tracing how racialized migrants are constituted as subjects within bureaucratic regimes of power. Alexander Weheliye describes racializing assemblages as ‘a set of sociopolitical processes of differentiation and hierarchization, which are projected onto the putatively biological human body’, representing ‘the visual modalities in which dehumanization is practiced and lived’.Footnote 29 The socio-political processes that structure the administration and dispensation of care in the detention industrial complex clearly consecrate this classification of detainees as not quite human. Close-reading Shaw’s Review of healthcare demonstrates how racializing assemblages become instrumental to the biopolitical prerogatives of the necropolitical state. Gilmore identifies ‘dehumanization’ as an ‘ideological displacement’ that enables a group to ‘annihilate another in the name of territory, wealth, ethnicity, religion’, making it also a ‘necessary factor’ in incarceration.Footnote 30 In the detention industrial complex, dehumanization operates as a bureaucratic and medical practice that strips detainees of agency, dignity, and ethical recognition. By integrating these approaches within the framework of racial capitalism, this Element positions the analysis of healthcare in detention as a critical inquiry into the structural and racialized production of life, death, and vulnerability.
Scholarship on British immigration detention has generated incisive accounts of governance, securitization, and the expansion of carceral logics. Mary Bosworth’s latest book, Supply-Chain Justice, captures the racial capitalist dimensions of the detention system that is run and organized like a supply chain, dehumanizing the detainees like packages to be moved around.Footnote 31 In fact, Shaw collaborates with Bosworth in his Review to understand the effects of detention on mental health of the detainees. In her extensive body of work, Bosworth demonstrates that detention operates as both a juridical and sociological site where questions of sovereignty, belonging, and legitimacy are negotiated and she draws attention to the institutional dynamics of surveillance, confinement, and the everyday experiences of those held in custody.Footnote 32 Nira Yuval-Davis, Georgie Wemyss, and Kathryn Cassidy have emphasized how immigration enforcement is embedded in everyday bureaucratic and spatial practices, illuminating the administrative infrastructures that sustain the detention and deportation apparatus and demonstrating how governance is enacted through both spectacular and mundane forms of control.Footnote 33 Together, the corpus of scholarship these scholars have produced highlights how migration management is inseparable from processes of racialization, gendering, and national belonging and situate detention within the matrix of racialized border practices that differentiate between lives deemed worthy of protection and those rendered disposable.Footnote 34 This scholarship has powerfully foregrounded the violence and opacity of detention regimes, situating them within the broader infrastructures of migration management and the carceral state. This Element contributes to and extends this scholarship by placing healthcare at the centre of the analysis to help readers understand the stark relationship between state-sanctioned policies condoning violence and the life and death of the marginalized. It reads Stephen Shaw’s Review into the Welfare in Detention of Vulnerable Persons – a text not extensively engaged within existing scholarship – as a key cultural and political artefact to expose how state power is organized through healthcare governance, and how this power structure persists despite changes in government. This is the principal intervention of the Element: the theoretical approach of linking Critical Race Theory (especially the frameworks of bio/necropolitics, dehumanization, racializing assemblages, and racial capitalism) with Critical Medical Humanities will enable readers to comprehend how access to and the quality of medical care for the most marginalized are not secondary questions but central to the racial capitalist logics of detention.
Methodologically, this approach underscores the necessity of close-reading policy documents ‘against the grain’ and attending to the everyday enactments of power, highlighting the ways in which ethical vocabularies are co-opted to reinforce the sovereignty of the state. While close-reading has often resisted codification as a fixed methodological protocol, literary critics have emphasized its character as an interpretive practice attentive to textual details, silences, contradictions, repetitions, categories, and rhetorical strategies.Footnote 35 As Dan Sinykin and Johanna Winant observe, a ‘close reading is an argument. An argument requires a claim. It extends our understanding by reasoning from what is known to be the case – what we can all see in the text – to what is claimed to be the case – how we should understand what we see.’Footnote 36 Such an approach is particularly productive for the analysis of policy documents, which are understood here not as transparent administrative records but as discursive artefacts that organize knowledge, ethical vocabularies, and state power. Building on John Guillory’s elucidation of close-reading as an ‘attention technique’ and Jonathan Kramnick’s conception of close-reading as a ‘compositional practice’ rather than a ‘passive absorption’, a ‘silent decoding of graphic marks’, or ‘exactly reading’, I employ close-reading as a critical method attentive to the linguistic, ethical, and administrative practices through which state power is articulated.Footnote 37 Kramnick suggests that close-reading is a ‘skill of making sentences answer to sentences that constrain and enable what they may do with them’; resistant to abstraction, it ‘takes its shape from the object at hand, from what a given text will and will not allow a reader to do with it’.Footnote 38 Accordingly, this Element treats Shaw’s Review as a cultural artefact whose narrative framings, omissions, contradictions, and classificatory logics render detention and healthcare legible in particular ways and uncover how healthcare and ethics are entangled with practices of surveillance, confinement, and extraction. Close-reading this text enables an examination of how categories such as vulnerability, care, health, and deservingness are linguistically produced, racialized, delimited, mobilized, or disavowed within detention governance. In doing so, the Element extends Critical Medical Humanities approaches by demonstrating the analytical value of close-reading for interrogating policy texts through which access to health, care, and protection is differentially distributed and administered. Ultimately, such a methodology reframes healthcare as central to the organization and justification of the detention industrial complex and expands the scope of Critical Medical Humanities by insisting on the analysis of policy and bureaucratic practices as sites where racialized life, health, and vulnerability are produced and managed – in the register of what Anne Whitehead and Angela Woods have termed the ‘boundary-crossing’ nature of Critical Medical Humanities.Footnote 39
Section 2 examines how the British state mobilizes the category of ‘vulnerability’ in the detention industrial complex to manage and stratify detainee populations. It demonstrates how the arbitrary recognition of vulnerability facilitates racialization, debilitation, deportation, and organized abandonment thereby reifying its imperial and carceral project. Close-reading Shaw’s engagement with the identification of ‘vulnerability’ across contexts, I argue that rather than stabilizing care, the state’s shifting deployment of ‘vulnerability’ justifies debility, disablement, or death as end-goals to themselves, producing or exacerbating the very harms it claims to mitigate. Section 3 turns to the dispensation of physical healthcare in the detention industrial complex, analysing Shaw’s review to argue that hierarchization and dehumanization are fundamental to the racial capitalist administration of detention. Drawing on the theoretical framework of racializing assemblages, the section argues that the denial of medical treatment and basic amenities exemplifies how racial difference is operationalized by the state to regulate life and death. Section 4 focuses on mental healthcare in the detention industrial complex to understand the depths of the crisis, the nature and dispensation of treatment afforded to sick detainee-patients, and the conditions of detention that engender new mental health conditions or exacerbate existing ones among detainees. It traces how Shaw’s appeals to ‘morality’ and ‘ethics’ reveal the affective dimensions of legislation and governance, exposing how necropolitical prerogatives structure the policy of healthcare in detention. Section 5 bookends the dialogue on healthcare context raised in Section 2 by interrogating practices of consent, confidentiality, and privacy. Close-reading instances of supposed consent and breach of privacy and confidentiality listed in the Review, the section analyses how these principles are undermined or bypassed in the detention setting, demonstrating that the withholding of informed consent and the erosion of confidentiality are not incidental breaches but techniques of dehumanization. Together, these sections trace an overarching bio/necropolitical agenda in the state’s disciplinary policies towards racialized people in detention centres and argue that through its policies on providing and regulating healthcare and its conditional access, the government continues its adherence to racial capitalism, hierarchizes the worth of a human life, and dehumanizes racialized humans, stripping them of their dignity to life.
This Element argues that healthcare provision in immigration detention is central to the racial capitalist and bio/necropolitical logics of the British state. By examining how vulnerability, healthcare, bioethics, and consent are mobilized within the detention industrial complex as captured in Shaw’s Review, I demonstrate that the administration of healthcare functions as a key site where the state manages life, health, debility, disability, and death for racialized detainees. The detention industrial complex is not only about border enforcement but also about the systematic regulation of bodies through policies that determine who may be allowed to live and who is consigned to debility, disablement, or premature death. Between 2010 and 2015, Shaw discovers a number of court cases where a breach of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights has been found in respect of vulnerable immigration detainees, signifying that in these cases at least, courts have repeatedly been called upon to adjudicate the failures of the Home Office to uphold even the most basic rights of detainees. Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights announces the ‘prohibition of torture’, clarifying that ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’.Footnote 40 In R (HA (Nigeria)) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] for example, the claimant was ‘suffering from a serious mental illness while he was in detention’ and was ‘not given appropriate medical treatment […] for a prolonged period of more than 5 months’, as well as the Court declared that to force him to return to and stay in detention ‘was at least degrading treatment and if it were necessary to say so, inhuman treatment, contrary to Article 3’.Footnote 41 This judgement, in particular, underscores that the denial of care is not an accidental by-product of detention but rather a deliberate and entrenched outcome of how the system is designed. Shaw finds a number of other court cases which capture negligence of medical treatment, resulting in documented worsening of the claimant’s health conditions, but the court did not recognize them as ‘breach of Article 3’. Of course, for the vast majority of detainees, litigation is impossible, and many are deported with worsened health conditions, their suffering having never been archived. Nevertheless, all of these instances expose how bureaucratic policies directly impact the lives of detainees and are after all manifestations of the state’s commitment to racialized control. Reading Shaw’s landmark Review ‘against the grain’, this Element demonstrates how extractive colonialism and racial capitalism continue to dictate the treatment of people in these carceral spaces, stripping them of their dignity to life. Situating this analysis at the intersection of Critical Race Theory and Critical Medical Humanities, this Element contemplates on the affective politics that lie at the heart of a colonial-capitalist state that disregards reviews and reports and continues on a structured bio/necropolitical agenda to dictate on the right to live (or die) for some of the most marginalized people in the world.
2 Policing Vulnerability in the Detention Centre
For Stephen Shaw, the ‘concept of vulnerability’ is ‘central’ to his approach to the detention care question: in fact, he titles his Review as a ‘Review into the Welfare in Detention of Vulnerable Persons’ and towards the beginning of his Review, he dedicates a substantial section into exploring the meaning and dimensions of the term.Footnote 42 By his own admission, Shaw has not found navigating the meaning of ‘vulnerability’ ‘easy to resolve’.Footnote 43 He cites documents and policies by the Association for the Prevention of Torture/UN High Commission for Refugees and Detention Action and engages in dialogue with Detention Forum and Jean Lambert MEP to understand the depths of ‘vulnerability’ in official usage vis-à-vis the material dimensions of vulnerability in the detention industrial complex. The UN’s Monitoring Immigration Detention: Practical Manual (2014) traces detainee vulnerability on multiple fronts: the deprivation of liberty ‘for periods of non-specific duration’ in unfamiliar settings and languages, and the uncertainty of immediate futures controlled by a system with absolute power over their lives.Footnote 44 The UN also recognizes that the vulnerability of detainees is exacerbated for people with special needs or risk, listing these as ‘women, children, including unaccompanied or separated children, members of different ethnic/tribal groups detained together, victims of torture or trauma, persons with disabilities, the elderly, LGBTQI individuals, or those with urgent medical needs’.Footnote 45 Shaw understands this UN guidance on vulnerability as being ‘pre-determined’ but also ‘increase[ing] or decrease[ing] according to external factors’.Footnote 46 He strengthens this argument by then citing from The State of Detention: Immigration Detention in the UK in 2014 document by Detention Action that detention itself leads to ‘severe harm’ regardless of whether the detainee was vulnerable or not ‘before they were detained’ and thereby proving that ‘detention in the UK is harming people’.Footnote 47 With Detention Forum, Shaw recognizes that the fixed definition of vulnerability within the government guidance of Enforcement Instructions and Guidance ‘overlooks individual characteristics and changes over time’, resulting in not recognizing detainees who ‘do not fit’ within this definition, since vulnerability is a ‘result of a combination of factors’ that can ‘change’ throughout a detainee’s ‘time in detention’.Footnote 48 In his final attempt to formulate an expansive definition of ‘vulnerability’, Shaw converses with Jean Lambert MEP and notes that the UK has ‘opted out’ of the Reception Conditions Directive, which held extensive ‘debate’ on the question of vulnerability. The Directive had considered it ‘insufficient to simply assess individuals at the time of entry’ to the detention industrial complex, adding that the recognition of vulnerability should be an ‘ongoing process’ that can ‘manifest’ over time, exacerbated by ‘health issues, issues related to sexual orientations or others’ while in these spaces.Footnote 49 At once, the state’s decision to opt out of this Directive implies its unwillingness to consider an expansive understanding of vulnerability, one that continues in a state of flux even – and especially – after detention. There is a finality in the action of ‘opting out’, implying a non-recognition of ideas that others consider as valid.
This section argues that the British state’s arbitrary recognition of ‘vulnerability’ produces, stratifies, and governs the detention industrial complex to reify its imperial and carceral project. Close-reading Shaw’s engagement with the identification of ‘vulnerability’ across contexts, I argue that ‘vulnerability’ becomes a fluid category for the state to racialize, produce, and/or exacerbate vulnerability among detainee populations in order to sort them not into regimes of care, but rather into detention, deportation, or organized abandonment. Judith Butler argues that the distribution of vulnerability ‘unequally’ is a way of ‘managing populations’ by the state in such a way that ‘“vulnerable populations” are established within discourse and policy’.Footnote 50 However, in the British detention industrial complex, the complete absence of policies and discourses regulating and governing vulnerability extends Butler’s argument of ‘management’ to uncover a nexus of bio/necropolitical ‘collaboration’, in the register of Jasbir Puar.Footnote 51 I read this collaboration as, first and foremost, a sign of Britain’s past and ongoing imperial project, whose contemporary goals are stratified in the governance of the detention system, exempt from national and international legal ramifications. This nexus also exemplifies the state’s racial capitalist system, in which the detainee, in the Fanonian sense, becomes a colonized subject whose body politic is pathologized and thus rendered disposable.Footnote 52 Each of the categories of ‘vulnerability’ that Shaw raises here and that we analyse in this section becomes crucial aspects of the dispensation (or refusal) of medical care in the following two sections. With that in mind, this section lays out a tactic of critical and theoretical reading that is sceptical of state-sponsored categorization of vulnerability. Instead, analysing how the government responds to each of the categories of ‘vulnerability’, I trace an intention for the production of debility, disablement, and death, where they each become end-goals to themselves, through the slow, accumulative, structurally distributed harm that Lauren Berlant terms ‘slow death’.Footnote 53 For example, among detainees and asylum-seekers ‘released’ after a period of detention, there are greater incidences of ‘heart conditions’ traceable to the ‘psychological and physical damage […] exacerbated due to the anxiety brought by the period in detention’.Footnote 54 This recognition of the imperial state’s strategic investment in ongoing debilitation and disablement (and not necessarily only death as the endpoint) enables us to comprehend the racial capitalist governance of detention and to understand the infrastructural logics and tactics of the (refusal of) dispensation of care in the following sections.
Being Vulnerable
In considering how detention produces and compounds states of precarity, Shaw begins by asking what it means to label someone ‘vulnerable’ in this context. On realizing that ‘vulnerability’, especially in the detention context, is not a fixed category, Shaw consequently works towards locating a ‘useful model’ for its definition and for identifying vulnerability in the detention industrial complex. Recognizing the parallels between carceral and detention systems, he cites HM Inspectorate of Constabulary who noted that ‘The experience of being arrested and taken into police custody intrinsically disempowers the detainee’.Footnote 55 Alongside this, Shaw finds the report of the Jesuit Refugee Society’s DEVAS Project ‘most persuasive’, whose model of the ‘Concentric Circle of Vulnerability’ demonstrates that ‘personal, social and environmental factors can contribute to vulnerability’ and that ‘any one of a wide range of issues associated with those factors can contribute to an individual’s ability to manage their responses to the act of detention – to be or to feel vulnerable’.Footnote 56 Shaw uses this model as a guide to identify vulnerability during his inspection of the detention industrial complex, with the awareness that detention has ‘the potential to harm many types of people’ regardless of their pre-existing special needs. The nexus of ‘personal’, ‘social’, and ‘environmental’ factors that this model considers, argues for the necessity of individual assessment of each detainee for ‘vulnerabilities and special needs that may make it difficult for them to cope in the environment of detention’.Footnote 57 By emphasizing on context, the model gestures towards an expanded view of vulnerability as relational and situational, rather than individualized or pathological. Shaw returns to this model repeatedly over the course of his Review (especially in the context of detainees’ mental health analysed in Section 4), arguing against the state’s tendency to flatten the category of vulnerability through arbitrary selection and bureaucratic simplification.
To understand how vulnerability is recognized – or disregarded – within the detention industrial complex, Shaw examines the Home Office’s approach to categorizing detainees. At the outset, Shaw clarifies that creating a vulnerability ‘checklist’ not only is ‘very difficult’ but it is also ‘not conducive’ to the proper consideration of individual cases. Nevertheless, he reminds us, that the Home Office has effectively used a checklist to list those ‘unsuited to detention’, including unaccompanied children, the elderly, pregnant women, people suffering from serious physical or mental conditions which ‘cannot be satisfactorily managed within detention’, people with ‘independent evidence that they have been tortured’, people with ‘serious disabilities’, and people identified by ‘competent authorities as victims of trafficking’.Footnote 58 As we will see, the phrase ‘satisfactorily managed’, which the Home Office uses repeatedly in its guidelines, is clinically vague: who decides which conditions can be satisfactorily managed or not in detention when there are no specifically named conditions and/or defined policies for said conditions? This discretionary, opaque use of language by non-medical government officials mirrors what disability theorists have described as the instrumentalization of medical diagnosis as a tool of governance.Footnote 59 The Home Office’s checklist exposes the state’s understanding of ‘vulnerability’ not as a marker of the need-care nexus but as a site of administrative calculation. In the next two sections we will examine sites across the detention industrial complex that have no binding policies for administration. In these spaces, the decision on the ‘satisfactory manage[ment]’ of health conditions that could make one eligible or exempt from detention are made arbitrarily by non-medical people in power. Similarly, the UNHCR Detention Guideline (which Shaw footnotes) clearly states that ‘pregnant women and nursing mothers, who both have special needs, should not be detained’.Footnote 60 Yet, as Shaw discovers over the course of his Review, and as we analyse in the next section, pregnant people are indeed repeatedly detained to the severe detriment of their health and pregnancies. Later in his Review, Shaw revisits the Home Office’s ‘category-based approach’. Hesitant to critique it outright, he recommends adding ‘a further clause’ to encompass ‘persons otherwise identified as being sufficiently vulnerable that their continued detention would be injurious to their welfare’ which would also ‘be helpful in respect to those people with a disability’.Footnote 61
To understand how the state arbitrarily recognizes vulnerability, Shaw examines victims of sexual and gender-based violence, a group whose experiences reveal the administrative erasure of trauma. He observes that there is ‘no policy in relation to victims of sexual or gender-based violence’ so he turns to examine ‘victims of sexual violence’ for the category of ‘vulnerability’.Footnote 62 Shaw reviews the existing Home Office policy position of the detention of victims of sexual violence and understands that ‘being the victim of rape or sexual violence is not, in itself, one of the published criteria for exclusion from immigration detention’.Footnote 63 I want to briefly pause here to think alongside Judith Butler and Alexander Weheliye of the metaphorical ramifications of this absence of policy that refuses to recognize victims of rape or sexual violence. Butler writes that when one is ‘shorn of protection’, one is reduced to ‘some sort of ‘bare life’’.Footnote 64 The Home Office’s decision not to mandate recognition of victims of rape not only denies them protection from detention but also refuses to recognize them as victims at all. There is an inherent violence embedded in the casualness with which the Home Office declares that being the victim of rape or sexual violence ‘is not, in itself’, a cause for exclusion; as if the trauma of a victim of sexual violence needs to be compounded by experiencing something else to be deemed worthy of recognition. This refusal of recognition dehumanizes the victims and their reduction to a form of ‘bare life’ at once brings us to Weheliye’s conception of racializing assemblages: through careful ‘sociopolitical processes’ and ‘social organization’ that refuses to formulate policies and refuses to recognize victims as victims, the state inherently hierarchizes these people as ‘not-quite-humans’.Footnote 65 The Home Office further states that, ‘if it [sexual violence] amounted to torture’ or if it had ‘formed part of someone’s trafficking experience’, or if it ‘had impacted on an individual’s mental or physical health’, then it ‘might well warrant exclusion under those criteria’.Footnote 66 The casual phrase ‘might well warrant exclusion’ continues to underlie the violence, here compounded by the stacking of conditions and judged by a non-medical official outside of the purview of written policy or law.
Shaw then learns that the Home Office had begun a process ‘for signposting to the appropriate services’ those women who identified as victims of sexual violence at the screening in the Asylum Intake Unit. However, these women would ‘not automatically qualify for exclusion’ from the Detained Fast Track (DFT) system for asylum claims, but the Home Office hoped that the information ‘might be of interest’ to the National Asylum Allocation Unit in their decision-making process.Footnote 67 Ultimately, the Home Office had ‘no existing plans to create a formal exemption from immigration detention for women who claim to have been the victims of sexual violence’.Footnote 68 Shaw learns that DFT does not even have ‘any specific policies’ in place for ‘potential victims of rape and sexual violence’, and the legislation is that such cases should be managed under the National Referral Mechanism (NRM) for modern slavery and trafficking or Rule 35. Without formalizing a change in policy or law, this step thus merely becomes a means to share vulnerable information of a victim with a wide group of people in power, relegating the responsibility of making the decision of condemning a victim of rape or sexual violence to detention, to an unelected, non-medical official. Writing about the US government’s arbitrary decisions about indefinite detention without trial in Guantanamo Bay, Butler notes that the decisions are made by ‘officials of governmentality [who] wield sovereign power, understood here as a lawless and unaccountable operation of power’.Footnote 69 In the context of the British detention industrial complex, such ‘officials’ make arbitrary decisions on uncertain grounds about the fate of a victim, and these cannot be challenged due to the absence of any legal codification. At this point, Shaw reminds us of UNHCR’s guideline that notes ‘Victims of torture and other serious physical, psychological or sexual violence also need special attention and should not generally be detained’.Footnote 70 Thus, the Home Office’s decision not automatically to exclude victims of sexual violence from detention contravenes UNHCR guidance. The biopolitical implications of such a structure of decision-making are severe: as Butler reminds us, this power of arbitrary decision-making invests the official with ‘extraordinary power over life and death’ while there remains a ‘clear defiance of international law’ in the context in which that decision is made.Footnote 71 Over the course of his review, Shaw discovered that twenty-two women had been detained at Yarl’s Wood who had reported being a ‘victim of sexual violence’, of whom two had been deported from the country six months later and the others were eventually ‘released’.Footnote 72 Following his own examinations and considering the evidence submitted to him by the organization Women for Refugee Women, Shaw recommends that ‘in common with individuals who have been trafficked or tortured’, there ‘should be a presumption against detention’ for victims of sexual and gender-based violence.Footnote 73 He acknowledges that the Home Office might ‘have some difficulty in establishing the veracity of individuals’ claims to have been such victims’, but he argues for the Home Office to put in place ‘workable arrangements’ for excluding these people from detention altogether.Footnote 74 As asylum-seekers and victims of sexual violence, ‘these people’ are not British subjects. Their subjection to not having their experience recognized as traumatic enough to be excluded from detention, and the necessitation of investigations to establish the veracity of their traumatic experience ultimately strips them of their subjecthood and humanity. Here, we consider the biopolitical processes in which this dehumanization is administered by the state and understand that, even in the absence of laws and policies and the casual outsourcing of decision-making, the state explicitly practices a form of racializing assemblage that effaces victims completely or demands a performance of their trauma for validity and recognition.Footnote 75
Shaw next turns his attention to the criteria of ‘serious mental illness’ as a measure of vulnerability. Referring to the Home Office’s checklist, which lists mental illness that ‘cannot be satisfactorily managed in detention’ as a cause for exemption, Shaw reminds the readers that, even though the clause was introduced in 2010, the government has ‘never’ defined and ‘guidance has never been issued on what this management may consist of or look like’.Footnote 76 As a result, employees across the detention industrial complex have treated the guidance ‘arbitrarily’, with a ‘wait and watch approach’ in which ‘detention is maintained until the individual deteriorates to the point where s/he can no longer be satisfactorily managed’.Footnote 77 In his conversations with the Association of Visitors to Immigration Detainees (AVID) about the evidence, Shaw learns that the phrase ‘satisfactorily managed’ has ‘no clinical meaning’ but is ‘inexact and obscure’.Footnote 78 Through his own inspections five years since the clause was introduced, Shaw finds it ‘perfectly clear’ that ‘people with serious mental illness continue to be held in detention and that their treatment and care does not and cannot equate to good psychiatric practice (whether or not it is ‘satisfactorily managed’)’.Footnote 79 Here, I think alongside Jasbir Puar to identify the real, hidden stakes in this ‘racializing biopolitical logic of security’.Footnote 80 The refusal to treat detainees with severe mental illness, combined with the ‘wait and watch’ approach, effectively sentences them to ‘slow’ death or a faster debilitation/disability.Footnote 81 Section 4 close-reads these decisions of the state through the lens of the long durée of colonialism and deliberate necropolitics of cruelty. But here, I want to dwell on the ramifications of the decision and what it means for the circumstances immediately beyond the text. In the absence of a doctor who suitably diagnoses and treats the mental illness of a detainee, they are surveilled by medically unqualified officials who wait until the detainee-patient has deteriorated even further. During this time, they might already be deported, and if not, they might then be considered for treatment. The details of this treatment are not available for legal or public scrutiny, but Shaw’s observations record them as not ‘equat[ing] to good psychiatric practice’. Puar reminds us that there is ‘a legitimate identification with disability [and illness] that is manifested through state, market, and institutional recognition, if not subjective position: I call myself [ill]’.Footnote 82 I argue here that even the pathway to this legitimate identification is denied to detainees, and the refusal of treatment is only the next natural step for the state that refuses to acknowledge illness. In one of his rare stern outbursts in the Review, Shaw writes, ‘Such a situation is an affront to civilized values.’Footnote 83 This is Shaw’s first use of the word ‘civilized’. Whether or not Shaw’s outburst fully captures the cruelty in the state’s treatment of mentally ill detainees, it would be useful to remember here that the civilizing mission has been used as a justification for colonialism for hundreds for years. Invoking the concept of ‘civilized’ behaviour in the racial capitalist state’s biopolitical management of a racialized asylum-seeker or undocumented person’s severe mental illness is deeply ironic. Shaw recommends that the phrase ‘which cannot be satisfactorily managed in detention’ is ‘removed from the section of the EIG that covers those suffering from serious mental illness’.Footnote 84
Shaw next compiles a list of additional factors that, in his view, make detainees more vulnerable. These include: ‘little or no family or other outside connections’, ‘little or no command of English’, ‘poor literacy levels’, ‘use of languages that are not well represented in detention’, ‘lack of legal representation’, ‘little understanding of immigration case or status’, ‘little understanding of entitlements’, ‘physical ill health’, ‘learning disabilities’, ‘sexual orientation’, ‘transsexual status’, ‘having been a victim of torture’, and ‘having suffered trauma’.Footnote 85 With this catalogue of vulnerabilities, Shaw moves to his next major criterion: post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
To fully understand the depths and dimensions of PTSD among detainees and how the condition manifests itself in the detention industrial complex, Shaw partners with the Helen Bamber Foundation. The Foundation point out that patients suffering from PTSD ‘often need treatment before they can tell their story’ and they ‘do not respond well to direct questioning, especially if they perceive the questioning to be adversarial’. The Foundation warns that such responses before the patients receive any treatment should ‘not be seen as evidence of reduced credibility’, especially for patients suffering from sexual trauma. Shaw quietly notes that he is ‘not convinced that’ these ‘insights’ would be ‘wholly appreciated by Home Office caseworkers’.Footnote 86 Interestingly, at the same time Shaw made these observations regarding the Home Office’s non-recognition of such PTSD treatment, the UK along with third-sector organizations were making policies to recognize recovery narrative as a ‘key technology of recovery’ for victims of trauma in the population.Footnote 87 In the detention industrial complex, proliferation of debility followed by their organized abandonment can occur without hindrance from legal procedures. The process of the biopolitical management of sick detainees dehumanizes them to the point that they are ‘not-quite-humans’ not deserving of consideration or medical care.Footnote 88 This is simply another instance of the state’s refusal to recognize illness in a detainee, thus signalling, as Puar writes, the expectation that racialized bodies have to ‘endure pain, suffering, and injury’.Footnote 89 Here we need to ask what is achieved by this non-recognition (and therefore non-treatment) of trauma/PTSD/mental illness. The biopolitical management of these issues results in, as we have discussed earlier, worse health outcomes for the patient; for the state, then, the ‘social acceptance’ of such outcomes engenders, as Puar argues, ‘the obfuscation and in fact deeper proliferation of debility’.Footnote 90 These outcomes and the implied debility are acceptable after all because the ‘subjects’ here are racialized asylum-seekers or undocumented people – not subjects of the British state even though they occupy liminal spaces within the borders of the state. Moved by some of the traumatic experiences faced by detainees, Shaw cites the Foundation directly: in 2014, the Foundation had received 790 referrals from solicitors representing people detained within DFT. The Foundation’s clinicians investigated these referrals on a ‘case by case basis’ to find ‘2523 human rights violations’, including ‘physical and psychological injuries’ such as:
beatings, cuttings, burns from cigarettes, iron rods, chemicals, being tied, handcuffed, blindfolded, disfigured, raped, head injuries, deprivation of sleep, being held in stress positions, mock executions, electric shocks, finger nails being removed, threats or reprisals against them or their families, debt bondage, witnessing others in prison or a brothel being killed, ritualized violence, and threats of arrest.Footnote 91
It is important to notice here that ‘rape’ was listed as one of the ‘physical and psychological injuries’ resulting in PTSD by a group of qualified clinicians – the same category that was dismissed as not being traumatic ‘enough’ by non-medical personnel of Home Office in charge of deciding who is vulnerable enough for exemption from detention. Shaw is ‘particularly concerned’ that detention, through conditions that serve as a ‘painful reminder of past traumatic experience’, can ‘trigger re-traumatisation’, manifesting as ‘self-injury and worsening psychiatric morbidity’.Footnote 92 Consequently, Shaw recommends that detainee-patients with a ‘diagnosis of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder should be presumed unsuitable for detention’.Footnote 93 The machinery of biopolitical control is exerted through arbitrariness, non-formation of policy, non-recognition of illness, and the consequent refusal of treatment. The result is debility, disability, and death – outcomes rendered acceptable precisely because the bodies at stake are racialized, undocumented, and ultimately considered fungible by the state. The stakes of accountability to international law are minimal when the victims are people with no formal paperwork, excluded from the category of fully human in the eyes of the state.
Where PTSD was at least acknowledged – if only to be misrecognized and mismanaged – the case of learning difficulties reveals a different mode of erasure altogether. Shaw next notes that he was ‘surprised’ that the Home Office makes no mention of ‘detainees with learning difficulties as being unsuited to detention’.Footnote 94 Tracing official correspondence between the Immigration Minister James Brokenshire MP and Sarah Teather MP, Shaw identifies an NHS initiative to develop a learning disability and development tool that ‘screens’ detainees who fit into the criteria and ensures that they are ‘recognized and managed appropriately’.Footnote 95 Yet he concludes that the ‘necessary corollary’ to this issue is that people with learning disabilities ‘should not be subject to the inevitable rigours of immigration detention’ and should instead be ‘presumed unsuitable for detention’.Footnote 96 So far, in Shaw’s assessments of the Home Office’s criteria for vulnerability, we have been able to trace a clear agenda of ‘governance for debility’ – in the register of Puar – in the organized abandonment of sick detainee-patients. However, in its unassessable vulnerability, detainees with learning difficulties remain outside of this model of governance. I argue, the state’s complete effacement of ‘learning disability’ as a category for ‘vulnerability’ in fact aligns with the overall agenda of bio/necropolitical management of these people: which forms of disability are even afforded legibility in formalized categorization before they can be allowed or refused exemption from detention? Here, offering medical care is not even in consideration; rather, it is the refusal of legibility and recognition – a stratifying logic in which conditions that are beyond the purview of further debility are rendered of no political use to the state.
Among the most revealing cases Shaw examines are victims of trafficking, whose vulnerability he investigates with the Poppy Project, a designated ‘First Responder’ within the NRM. According to them, they had first brought to the attention of the government in 2008 that ‘victims of trafficking should not be detained, and that potential victims should not be detained pending an assessment from a specialist NGO’.Footnote 97 They acknowledge to Shaw that they had ‘supported people who had attempted suicide to avoid a return to detention’, explaining that victims of trafficking would end up in detention through multiple routes: after an asylum claim judged ‘suitable’ for DFT; if they have ‘either never disclosed trafficking, or have disclosed but have not been identified as victims of trafficking’; or despite clear indicators [of being a victim of trafficking] during a screening interview’ yet ‘no referral’ being made into the NRM.Footnote 98 The Poppy Project argues that conditions of detention do not ultimately serve victims of trafficking, exacerbating, in many cases, ‘mental health and distress’ especially because ‘experiences of detention are reminiscent of a trafficking situation’.Footnote 99 As a result, a majority of detained women they work with exhibit ‘symptoms of PTSD’. In a later correspondence with Shaw, they emphasize that there are ‘compelling reasons why victims of trafficking should be given time to disclose what has happened to them without the pressures of a detained fast track, and without being in detention’.Footnote 100 The arbitrary detention of trafficking victims – even when it precipitates suicide attempts – demonstrates the state’s necropolitical management of these people where death is an intended outcome of policy. As Puar argues, the biopolitics of debility also affects ‘those whose inevitable injuring is assumed by racial capitalism’.Footnote 101 The Poppy Project’s long trajectory of tracking the lived experiences of victims of trafficking as they navigate the detention industrial complex remains an archive of data on the fates of these people; yet the persistence of structures of cruelty that propel these victims into further grief, harm, and attempts of suicide reflect the state’s ultimate disinterest in the well-being of these people. Shaw’s intervention comes many years later, yet his suggestion of due process reads less as a meaningful intervention than as a minimal concession, underlining how embedded the biopolitics of debility and disability and the necropolitics of cruelty are in the decision-making process.
Shaw extends his most detailed analysis of vulnerability with respect to former prisoners in the detention industrial complex, noting that ‘little of the evidence’ he had received focused on them. Obtaining figures from the Home Office Shaw notes that the twenty ‘longest stayers’ in detention were ‘all ex-offenders’, including one man who has remained in detention for six years even though he served time in prison for two years prior to being detained – his detention beginning the same year that his sentence expired. While Shaw notes that in many cases of detained-prisoners there are ‘problems related in the identification of nationality and in obtaining Emergency Travel Documents’, he powerfully argues that ‘nationality does not equate with identity’: many ‘former prisoners’ would have ‘long-standing connections with the UK, or may in some cases have been born here, so for staff as well as detainees the legitimacy of their detention and removal is not self-evident’.Footnote 102 Shaw substantiates his compelling argument by first reminding his readers that ‘prison history teaches that legitimacy is not a legal nicety’ but rather ‘a core component of institutional stability’ and then citing a report from Detention Action and by detention scholar Mary Bosworth. Detention Action questions who these ‘foreign criminals’ are: babies or small children growing up in poverty and never applying for British passports because ‘they never had the chance of a holiday abroad anyway’.Footnote 103 Detention Action draw attention to children growing up in the care system – under the aegis of the British state – whose carers might not make a passport application for them. Detention Action’s report further clarifies that these children might grow up with Leeds or East London accents, ‘get into trouble with the police, go to prison and finish their sentences’ and are ‘shocked to discover that they are not British’, emphasizing Bosworth’s argument that these people ‘did not realize that they were not citizens, or had not realized that they could be treated differently from others’.Footnote 104 Shaw writes that over the course of his inspection, he met many detainees who matched this description: ‘a young man, born and brought up in North London but whose mother was not a British national at the time of his birth, was to be ‘returned’ to Nigeria, despite never having set foot there’.Footnote 105 Vexed by this incident, Shaw questions the authorities about the ‘welfare’ of this man and ‘many others like him’, only to hear that ‘there was “zero tolerance” for such cases in the Home Office’.Footnote 106 Shaw powerfully states that he does not believe that ‘such language reflects well’ on the Home Office especially since ‘[t]olerance may not be the soundest basis for public policy, but the total absence of sympathy is assuredly a worse one’.Footnote 107
Luke de Noronha writes that in order to fully understand detainees and deportations of people with criminal records, we need to ‘move beyond those liberal accounts that emphasise the victimhood and suffering of particular groups of migrants (e.g. ‘genuine refugees’ and ‘victims of trafficking’)’.Footnote 108 By recognizing the ‘connections between punitive criminal justice policies and aggressive immigration restrictions’ we ‘develop a more expansive account of state racism’.Footnote 109 De Noronha ‘provocatively’ refers to four deportees to Jamaica as ‘Black Britons’ – each of them had grown up in the UK but for various reasons, including the ones identified by Detention Action and Shaw, had not been able to procure British passports in their lifetimes in the UK. Former prisoners’ entanglements in the detention industrial complex demonstrates a logic of carceral continuum, where individuals are criminalized not just for their actions but also for their racialized, migrant status. As argued in the Introduction, detention thus explicitly functions as an extension of prison except there is no recourse to rehabilitation for detainees, only deportation to a country with which they may have no ties whatsoever. The Windrush Scandal highlighted that state-recognized legitimacy is a fluid concept, always centred around racialization: what was once considered as ‘legal’ ‘nationality’ could be denied by the same state decades later.Footnote 110 Shaw’s Review predates the Windrush Scandal, but it demonstrates the same patterns of state-sponsored racialized exclusion which is not simply a bureaucratic oversight, but rather a fundamental contradiction in the state’s logic, where ‘nationality’ becomes a structured racialized barrier. Ultimately, Shaw’s discomfort with the Home Office’s ‘zero tolerance’ policy reveals the institutionalized disregard for human vulnerability and dehumanization of racialized (liminal) subjects, both expendable and always already ‘foreign’ regardless of their ‘long-standing connections with the UK’. Shaw’s discomfort may also signal the contradictions of critiquing detention from within the state apparatus itself. His position as a former Prisons and Probation Ombudsman and Home Office–appointed reviewer affords him unusual access to detention spaces, yet also limits the extent to which the structural logics of racialized state violence can be explicitly articulated.
Where deportation exposes the racialized contradictions of ‘nationality’, the case of prisoner-detainees demonstrates how immigration detention operates as a direct extension of the prison system, compounding forms of exclusion and abandonment. Realizing that the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) remains the ‘default provider of spaces’ for the Home Office for prisoners, Shaw traces that there remains no joint NOMS and Home Office policy on ‘the treatment of time’ for these offenders. To fully understand the dimensions of this, Shaw works with Bail for Immigration Detainees (BID) and AVID. BID informs Shaw that prisoner-detainees in the prison industrial complex ‘suffer from multiple, systemic and compounding barriers to accessing justice, with an often devastating effect on their ability to progress their immigration case, seek independent scrutiny of their ongoing detention from the courts and tribunals, and seek release from detention’ alongside their ‘physical and mental wellbeing’.Footnote 111 AVID’s correspondence with Shaw echoes BID’s conclusions, noting that prisoner-detainees are held in high numbers in prisons where ‘they are not protected by the same safeguards, nor do they have equity of access to information, support or resources particular to their status as immigration detainees’.Footnote 112 Shaw acknowledges these ‘significant drawbacks’ with respect to ‘access’ to legal advice and Home Office staff for prisoner-detainees in prisons, although he offers the caveat that in many cases, these prisoners are ‘very serious offenders’, with terrorism, sex offences, and arson among listed offences. Shaw expresses his concern that a complete opposition to the use of prison custody for these offenders would raise questions about securing ‘the safety of the public’.Footnote 113 He recommends that the Home Office ‘consider establishing a joint policy with NOMS on provision for those held in prison under immigration powers’.Footnote 114
Shaw’s concerns about access and public safety take on a different resonance when read through Ruth Wilson Gilmore’s theorization of ‘incapacitation’, which exposes the deeper racial capitalist logics at work in these overlapping carceral systems. Gilmore introduces ‘incapacitation’ as a theory to explain why societies lock people in prisons to ‘lock [them] out’.Footnote 115 According to her, incapacitation underpins ‘the most ambitious prison-building project in the history of the world’ because it ‘doesn’t pretend to change anything about people except where they are’; it is simply ‘a geographical solution that purports to solve social problems by extensively and repeatedly removing people’ and ‘depositing them somewhere else’.Footnote 116 Drawing on Gilmore’s abolition geography, we can understand this as a racial capitalist logic of spatial management. For detainees with a criminal record, the prison industrial complex becomes an extension of the detention industrial complex along with an indefinite extension of, what Rinaldo Walcott labels, the ‘juridical and legislative status of […] nonbeing’.Footnote 117 This condition manages to incapacitate them entirely, with no access to justice until they are deported. NOMS functions as a racial capitalist carceral management wing of the state, an outfit whose sole purpose is to allocate ‘spaces’ to detainee-offenders without recourse to rehabilitation, and in fact, (once again) without any specific legal policy governing the fates of these people. The process of incapacitation, justified by the ruse of ‘the safety of the people’, renders these detainees ultimately disposable, through indefinite containment without care, rights, or recourse.
If detention operates as a carceral continuum for offenders, it functions as a sorting mechanism for LGBTQI detainees, where vulnerability is recognized only to be managed and contained. Shaw works with the UK Lesbian and Gay Immigration Group (UKLGIG) to gauge vulnerability and conditions of detention for homosexual detainees. He cites UKLGIG’s ‘serious concerns’ regarding the ‘quality of asylum decision making’, urging for the ‘individualized and sensitive’ treatment of each case alongside an ‘assessment of credibility’ since the ‘complex nature of claims based on sexual and gender identity’ are usually ‘unsuited to accelerated processing’.Footnote 118 He also notes that he is ‘sympathetic to the argument that transsexual people are unsuited to detention’ based on his own observation of the ‘inability’ of the detention industrial complex to ‘provide appropriate, safe and supportive environment’.Footnote 119 Shaw echoes UKLGIG’s ‘concern’ on learning that ‘transgender women had previously been placed in segregation as a means of “protecting” them from other detainees’.Footnote 120 UKLGIG argued that many LGBTQI applicants should be ‘considered vulnerable’ because of the ‘nature of the acts of persecution frequently experienced’, the ‘poor standard of asylum decisions and existing obstacles in the asylum process, which mitigate against them accessing refugee protection’, and the ‘increasing use of immigration detention and the bullying, abuse and harassment that LGBTI people frequently experience in immigration detention centres’.Footnote 121 Shaw finds these accounts ‘powerful’ although during his own inspection he did not encounter more evidence of the bullying. He recommends the Home Office to ‘consider the need for a separate DSO [Detention Services Orders] on LGBI detainees’ and urges that ‘Anti-bullying policies should include explicit reference to LGBTI detainees’.Footnote 122 The decriminalization of homosexuality in the UK occurred over three decades, with the final laws on civil partnerships for same-sex couples and the legalization of same-sex marriage ratified in 2003 and 2014, respectively. It is therefore interesting to observe that even when these legal shifts suggest a liberalized trajectory for LGBTQI rights for citizens and residents in the country, there persists a state of exception for detainees within the state’s detention industrial complex. Thinking alongside Puar’s concept of ‘homonationalism’, I close-read the state’s policy (or lack thereof) on ‘vulnerability’ towards detained LGBTQI people as operating not as a means of protection but as a stratifying logic. The ‘serious concerns’ regarding the ‘quality’ of decision-making clearly position citizens and residents as more deserving of care while viewing homosexuals and trans detainees as not only ‘non-deserving’ but also treated as a sorting mechanism, making queerness legible in the detention space precisely to isolate or contain it, rather than support it. The segregation of transgender detainees in particular signals not safety, but intensified, organized abandonment, reifying a form of biopolitical management that exploits recognition itself as a tool of control. Therefore, the state operates queerness as a ‘process of racialization’, where queerness becomes racialized not only through the intersections of identities of these people in the detention industrial complex but also through the state’s management of these identities, its selective legibility, and its ultimate refusal of care: as Puar writes, biopolitical management ‘delineates not only which queers live and which queers die – a variable and contestable demarcation – but also how queers live and die’.Footnote 123
Interestingly, Shaw’s recommendations throughout this section of his Review trace a tone of homo- and able-nationalism: his dialogues, his observations, and his language of crisis and criticism mark the detention industrial complex as a site of an aberration that needs to be rectified to meet the standard of the rest of the country outside its walls. Nevertheless, this section challenges us to read this not as an aberration but as the norm. The homo/able-nationalist ideal protects the normative citizen; it is white privilege, cisgender mobility, and access to resources enshrined in the promise of a complex and well-regulated nexus of law, discourse, and policy.Footnote 124 The absence of any such regulatory legal infrastructure in the confines of the detention industrial complex makes it not an aberration but a calculated management of disenfranchized people. State-regulated legibility of vulnerability that relies on the discretion of non-medical officials making arbitrary decisions consolidates the governance logic of the imperial racial capitalist state. At the end, Shaw inspects the stages at which ‘vulnerability’ is assessed by the Home Office. While ‘screening’ for vulnerability was the system for many years, around the time Shaw began writing his Review, the DFT was suspended and Shaw notices that there was ‘no policy available on screening for asylum cases’ because of the suspension. He then learns that there is ‘no unified policy on routing’, with the decision depending on criminal conviction, ‘confirmed mental or physical health condition’, pregnancy status, or advanced age of the detainee.Footnote 125 Shaw argues that the ‘initial consideration of an individual’s fitness for detention and the ongoing assessment of their fitness for continued detention’ should be ‘managed in a consistent way’.Footnote 126 These inconsistencies solidify the state’s acceptable end-goals of debility, disability, and death. After all, debility and disability cannot be quantified, and through cumulative disrepair, they become powerful domains to inflict violence on racialized bodies while simultaneously surpassing means of legal challenges. The bio/necropolitics of cruelty that lies at the heart of such (non-)policy evinces the racial capitalist logic at the heart of the imperialist project of the detention industrial complex: that the state makes certain lives liveable only in their unliveability.Footnote 127
3 The Carceral Biopolitics of Physical Healthcare
At the beginning of the ‘Healthcare’ chapter of his Review, Shaw admits that healthcare is a ‘critical part’ of the detention regime but that the ‘health, safety and wellbeing of all detainees depend on the professional, efficient and timely delivery of healthcare services’.Footnote 128 Before conducting his Review, Shaw asked the British Medical Association for evidence of its practice in the detention centres and holding facilities. While the complete management of each of the detention centres, holding facilities and immigration removal centres had been outsourced to private contractors, the administration of healthcare in sites in England had been moved from private agencies to the NHS just months before Shaw’s examination. In his brief citation of BMA’s concerns and struggles with the dispensation of healthcare to detainees in these sites, Shaw notes that their ‘approach to healthcare may not sit easily with a Home Office objective of ensuring that detainees are ‘fit to fly’ and can therefore be removed from the country’.Footnote 129 The BMA’s ‘approach to healthcare’ referred to here stands for healthcare as a means to address and rectify healthcare issues: with healthcare to heal, to make one better. In their evidence, as also noted by Shaw, the BMA explain that, grappling with the severe negligence of the various private contractual services that preceded them, they wanted to ‘address the previously unmet health needs of a particularly vulnerable group of people’.Footnote 130 The BMA’s ‘approach to healthcare’ aimed to be comprehensive. They attempted to establish better working conditions alongside private agency staff managing the sites, structured consultation times, doctors trained to work in these settings, staff trained in mental healthcare, and a robust multidisciplinary team equipped to address the various challenges of healthcare in these sites.Footnote 131 In his Review, before he launches into his examinations, Shaw notes that this comprehensive response towards healing detainees in these sites would not be acceptable to the kind of healthcare outcomes that the Home Office intended to achieve for the detainees: that is to say, well enough to be deported. This Home Office guidance on ‘fit to fly’ becomes the overarching framework that dictates the terms and conditions for the dispensation of healthcare to detainees in the detention industrial complex.
This section engages with the dispensation of physical healthcare in the detention industrial complex that Shaw encountered and reviewed. At times, his measured reviews become punctured with affective responses to the conditions of living and structures of care that he witnesses. Carefully listening to his affective responses as signifiers of experiences that shape the reception of care for detainees, this section argues that the racial capitalist state operates on the principles of hierarchization and dehumanization in its structural dispensation of care in the detention industrial complex. The section draws on the theoretical framework of racializing assemblages to explain how the administration of the detention industrial complex hinges on a state-sanctioned construct of racial difference that enables staff to withhold not only basic living amenities but also access to healthcare and medication. Alexander Weheliye defines racializing assemblages as a ‘set of sociopolitical processes that discipline humanity into full humans, not-quite-humans, and nonhumans’.Footnote 132 As mentioned in the Introduction, these sites are multicultural, multi-ethnic, and multilingual spaces but the racial capitalist state operates on a singular concept of racial differentiation that constructs all non-Western Europeans held in these spaces as a uniform racial other. This is evident in the ways that staffs refer to detainees as a collective with the same issues, originating from the same unmappable, geographical ‘other’, and thus must be contained like a herd of the same kind of non-humans. Racializing assemblages are a useful tool to read this kind of uniform racial othering especially because Weheliye writes that even when the distinctions are constructed on the basis of nationality or religion, the differentiations continue to ‘obey the procedural tenets of racializing assemblages’ and ‘often are translated into visual phenomena’, representing the ‘visual modalities in which dehumanization is practiced and lived’.Footnote 133 The socio-political processes that govern the administration and dispensation of care in the detention industrial complex clearly consecrate this classification of detainees as not quite human. Close-reading Shaw’s Review of healthcare in each of the sites and using the treatment of pregnant detainees as a case study, this section demonstrates how racializing assemblages are used as a tool to actualize the biopolitical prerogatives of the necropolitical state.
Who Cares?
The consolidation of healthcare services in the English sites from private contractors to the NHS resulted in a partnership agreement between NHS England, Public Health England, and the Home Office’s Immigration Enforcement wing. Shaw explains that the agreement ‘sets out the shared strategic intentions, joint corporate commitments and mutually agreed developmental priorities of NHS England and Home Office [noting how] the respective parties will work together, share and use information, enable referrals to other organizations and further develop commissioning’.Footnote 134 While at the outset, this agenda intends for an organized approach towards dispensing healthcare, the practical outcomes are rooted around surveillance of detainees’ health data (‘work together, share and use information’), control and managing of movement and incarceration (‘enable referrals to other organizations’), and further feeding into the complex corporate racial capitalist process with vague language around ‘strategic intentions’, ‘corporate commitments’, and ‘developmental priorities’. Yet none of these aims are centred around actual dispensation of care and nowhere is this carefully constructed biopolitical agenda clearer than in the Home Office’s arbitrary use of or refusal of Rule 35 reports – something that Shaw investigates repeatedly in the Review. The implementation of Rule 35 makes it mandatory for the doctor to report certain physical and mental health issues of a detainee, particularly if the conditions of detention would have a detrimental effect on their health. While this would directly bear on the clause of the agreement that enables the organizations to ‘share and use information’ for ‘referrals’ or other uses, Shaw repeatedly notes that the Home Office has, on multiple occasions, ‘refused’ Rule 35 reports on grounds that ‘the GP’s opinion “does not constitute independent evidence of torture”’.Footnote 135 Such a capricious use of ‘rules’ that the Home Office itself has carefully laid out in its agreements reveals the underlying biopolitical agenda at the heart of the healthcare structure of the detention industrial complex: when the prerogative is to remove the detainee at any cost, the state’s own devised rules can be rendered inadequate to meet the outcome that has already been decided. Thus when we analyse the shortcomings in the healthcare system that Shaw lays out at the very beginning of his Healthcare section, we realize that the ‘identified priorities’ of the agreement have been written and signed simply to give an impression of a culture of care when they can be bent or ignored at will. Shaw records that, had they been meaningfully implemented, the priorities of all the signatories would have been
better mental health assessment and treatment for detainees
public health – the proactive detection, surveillance and management of infectious diseases and suitable treatment paths
to strengthen multi-agency approaches to managing detainees at serious risk of harm – better learning, process improvement, a multi-agency approach to Assessment Care in Detention and Teamwork (ACDT)
to align commissioning systems – including information governance.Footnote 136
Yet, as Shaw admits, such a comprehensive and systematic approach to healthcare would, after all, ‘not sit easily’ with the Home Office’s priority to ensure that the detainees are ‘fit to fly’ in order to be removed from the country.Footnote 137
In the transition from contractual healthcare providers to the NHS, Shaw identifies problems that need resolutions revealing patterns that reflect the racial capitalist workings of the state. Each site in the detention industrial complex is managed by a private contractor, and Shaw notes that they ‘have reported frustration with their inability to see contracts and to understand service delivery levels under new arrangements [with healthcare provisions now under the NHS]’.Footnote 138 The daily working relationships between the various contractors and the new healthcare providers are strained. Shaw also records that the NHS’s arrival at these sites has led to the re-emergence of ‘legacy issues’ alongside the attempts to set up ‘new arrangements’ which have not only affected the ‘smooth running’ of healthcare services but have also made the NHS realize that their ‘projections [are] outstripped by actual demand’.Footnote 139 So far, with the healthcare provisions outsourced to individual contractors, there was no ‘standard screening assessment’ taken across the detention industrial complex, leading the NHS to acknowledge the ‘challenges in determining common health needs across the population’.Footnote 140 Shaw had solicited for healthcare data from the various service providers before he began his investigation and agreed that the data he had received from them was ‘not sufficiently robust’ and despite him using the flawed data for his Review, healthcare providers would need ‘better information [to make] informed decisions’.Footnote 141
In a capitalist state, financial prerogatives structure the social norms and political forms of governance. The primary imperative of a capitalist state is accumulation – of money and also of wealth beyond money (through possession of land within and outside its borders, and through unfree and ‘free’ labour). David Harvey traces how the state and ‘finance’ operate a ‘nexus’ that traverses complex processes to sustain each other and to become a structure of governance where ‘the state management of capital creation and monetary flows’ become central to the ‘circulation of capital’.Footnote 142 To Harvey’s ‘state-finance nexus’, Jodi Melamed adds the angle of ‘racial violence’. In her groundbreaking analysis of ‘racial capitalism’, Melamed asserts that capitalism is always already racial, in that its accumulation is possible through ‘severe inequality among human groups’ which ‘require loss, disposability, and the unequal differentiation of human value’, and it is racism that ‘enshrines [these] inequalities’ in ways that make capitalist accumulation possible.Footnote 143 From the outset, the British state’s detention industrial complex is a part of the extensive racial capitalist mechanisms of the state. As discussed in the Introduction, race becomes a governing principle in the state’s decisions to detain individuals in and/or deport them from these sites. Racial supremacy becomes the organizing principle that devalues the lives of humans in these spaces. The privatization of services, the monetization of healthcare, and the commodification of the rights and freedoms of the detained in these spaces are some of the complex, ‘innovative’, and ‘creative’ ways in which the state manages, circulates, and, finally, accumulates capital through its venture of the detention industrial complex.Footnote 144 The initial outsourcing of healthcare to private service providers, the later distribution of those contracts to the NHS, and the continued privatized governance of these sites are the state’s ways to generate and distribute money where, as Harvey writes, it is ‘best positioned to exploit profitable opportunities’.Footnote 145 The purpose of these complex business transactions, however, is not simply to provide effective healthcare to the detainees as an outcome – as Shaw records, profit-making private contractors left a ‘legacy’ of issues in unfulfilled contracts, generated ‘flawed’ data and, in omitting to determine the health needs of the detained, they failed to provide them healthcare. In its emphasis on ‘fit to fly’, the state’s imperative is the generation and circulation of money. By managing the access and regulation of healthcare to racialized detainees in its detention industrial complex, the state dispossesses them of their right to dignity of life, and by generating capital through this violent management of healthcare, the state-finance-racial violence nexus enshrines racial capitalism as a central process of governance. Through all this, the state’s benefit is manifold: ideological benefit is ensured through outsourcing responsibility while retaining carceral power; structural benefit is attained through disciplining racialized populations and reinforcing borders; fiscal benefit is accomplished through lower immediate expenditure and the circulation of capital across the detention industrial complex, even if it enriches private companies; and ultimately, all these forms combine in the state’s structural accumulation. After all, racial capitalism operates through the distribution of value and vulnerability – the fusion of racialized disposability, state sovereignty, and capitalist accumulation makes the state’s management of healthcare in detention a racial capitalist venture. While the transition of healthcare management from private contractors to the NHS was in progress, Shaw expressed his belief that this would eventually provide ‘a degree of stability that was previously impossible’, yet he was cognizant of and anxious about the healthcare outcomes in those sites (in Scotland and Northern Ireland) where the NHS did not have any jurisdiction.
Racializing Assemblages in the Detention Industrial Complex
In his overview of the healthcare system in the detention industrial complex, Shaw sums up the issues as detainees ‘struggle[ing] to access healthcare’, with reasons including ‘language and cultural issues, lack of knowledge about their rights, and negative perceptions of healthcare’.Footnote 146 He famously observes that there persisted a ‘culture of disbelief’ in the healthcare system where healthcare practitioners refuse to believe the symptoms and health conditions of racialized detainees. Explaining this ‘culture’, Shaw cites reports by the Royal College of Midwives and Women for Refugee Women, to trace the ‘clear inadequacies of the healthcare in detention’ with a culture that thrives on mistrust of the patient. Shaw notes that he has himself ‘encountered such a culture on the part of at least one’ doctor with whom he had interacted.Footnote 147 He records that detainees struggle with ‘access to advice surgeries’, have lengthy waits for appointments, and the ‘quality of advice received’ by them is ‘concerning’.Footnote 148 He records that with the Home Office being ‘one step removed’ from the commissioning of the services, the latter thus ‘distance[s] itself from the arrangements’ and refuses to take any ‘direct responsibility for any failures’.Footnote 149 Working with non-governmental organizations such as Medical Justice and The Poppy Project, Shaw learns that ‘seriously ill detainees [are] being released without proper referral to specialist care (e.g. HIV, antenatal care) in the community’ and that ‘vulnerable and ill detainees [have] died within hours of being released’.Footnote 150 On speaking with detainees across the detention industrial complex, Shaw records instances of ‘rude and dismissive behavior by staff’, ‘poor quality treatment’ including ‘receiving the wrong medication, not being able to discuss medication, misdiagnosis, [and] lack of appointments’, observing how the health of many detainees have ‘deteriorated’ since being moved into detention. Working with Asylum Welcome, Shaw learns that detainees with pre-existing medical conditions and without or with only a short supply of medications are ‘sometimes denied additional supplies including medication for HIV and painkillers for chronic conditions’, while some detainees with health conditions that had medical plans in place ‘were not adhered to’ by medical staff of the detention industrial complex.Footnote 151 The negligence, Shaw notes, is extended to refusal of ‘tests and check-ups [being] carried out when required – including blood tests, ECGs, monitoring of blood pressure and insulin management’.Footnote 152 Shaw reports finding these practices ‘clinically dangerous’ and that they ‘should desist’.Footnote 153 Finally Shaw notes that in-patient care is not available uniformly across the detention industrial complex and the continuity of care is volatile, with patients waiting months for an appointment, suddenly being removed to a different site, and thus then moved to ‘the bottom of the waiting list’ in the new site.Footnote 154
Shaw’s overview of healthcare access and quality in the detention industrial complex reveals a politics of casual cruelty. The long wait to access healthcare in the first place, which Shaw encounters at every site, is a sign of negligence supported by a state-system that sanctions such casual displays of neglect. The casualness of the cruelty is further exemplified by the poor quality of service offered by healthcare personnel, from misdiagnosing the condition to prescribing wrong medication. The phrase ‘culture of disbelief’ perfectly captures the brazen apathy with which the state and state-sanctioned systems of power treat sick and vulnerable people in the detention industrial complex. Their response to a patient’s reporting of symptoms is not through further examination and diagnosis, but rather with a negative affect that centres on the assumption that the patient is lying. If controlling access and wait times are instances of ‘casual’ cruelty, the negative affective response to a patient’s serious health conditions are ‘deliberate’ cruelty; implementing tools such as ‘culture of disbelief’ as a framework to approach the dispensation of healthcare for detainee-patients in the detention industrial complex is racist. Since it operates on the assumption that the racialized detainee-patient would be lying, it signifies how racism enshrines the processes in which the state approaches the question of offering healthcare to detainee-patients and demonstrates that such racism is central to the workings and philosophy of the necropolitical state. The refusal of medication, especially for HIV patients by healthcare staff, the non-adherence to medical plans for ill detainee-patients, and the refusal of treatment for severely sick patients are all instances of the necropolitics of cruelty. It is this cruelty at play along with a failure of the duty of care when severely sick detainees (especially HIV patients) are ‘released’ into the ‘community’ with no medical plan or no clear guidance on the next steps in specialist medical care. It is cruel to refuse healthcare to a sick person on the basis of their race and nationality, especially when the healthcare provider – the person in control of the diagnosis and access to medication – and the state that structures the hierarchization and legitimizes the performance of such cruelty, know that refusal of treatment will inevitably result in the death of the patient. The hierarchization at play here is not simply in the worth of human life, but also in the arbitrariness that dictates whether a sick detainee-patient can access healthcare after all, depending on whether their place on the waiting list is suddenly disrupted by a site transfer, or whether their name finally comes up for an appointment. This arbitrariness reveals the biopolitical prerogatives at the heart of the imperial capitalist state. Ultimately, as Shaw demonstrates, through its complex corporate racial capitalist mechanism, the state, represented by the Home Office, carefully places itself ‘one step removed’ from its arm that controls the dispensation of healthcare in the detention industrial complex, thus absolving itself of all responsibility for systemic failures resulting in deaths of racialized detainee-patients.
During his visit to Colnbrook, Shaw compares the detention industrial complex explicitly with the prison industrial complex. He reports that healthcare at Colnbrook was ‘not as good as was available in prison and it was delivered more slowly than in gaol’.Footnote 155 Detainees there told him that wait times for appointments were too long, nurses were rude, and just like ‘in prison, paracetamol was usually all they would prescribe’.Footnote 156 Shaw encounters these complaints again when he visits Harmondsworth, where in addition to the ‘ill’ treatment by healthcare staff, poor ‘quality’ of healthcare, and long waits to access any care, with patients waiting up to three days to see a nurse and four weeks to see a doctor to only then be prescribed paracetamol, Shaw is concerned by the absence of privacy in the toilets and by the absence of ‘basic hygiene equipment’ in facilities.Footnote 157 By the time of his visit to the third centre – Yarl’s Wood – Shaw realizes that insufficient appointments, long waits for access, ‘rude’ healthcare staff and a ‘lack of consideration’ for patients are common complaints that permeate the system. At Yarl’s Wood, patients with diabetes are the subject of ‘poor treatment’ including ‘failure to administer drugs’, patients are often not told ‘what medication they were being given’, and Shaw grimly notes that ‘pregnant women miscarried in Yarl’s Wood’.Footnote 158 He is affronted by the ‘offensively insanitary’ conditions of the toilets at Dover Dock and on reporting that it was unacceptable to the staff, he was told that this was ‘better than what the detainees have come from’.Footnote 159 He is then surprised to discover that there is ‘no healthcare on site’ and that if any detainee was ‘clearly in pain’, they would be escorted to the local Accident and Emergency. Unconvinced that this solution is ‘sufficiently robust’, Shaw makes a claim for the provision of an on-call doctor. At Larne House, Shaw makes another connection with the prison industrial complex: the outer yard is ‘caged above’ and detainees can only access the yard with an escort because of ‘the number of potential ligature points associated with the netting’; Shaw finds this ‘claustrophobic’ and argues for detainees to have free access to outdoor space.Footnote 160 It is at Larne House that Shaw discovers that ‘90 per cent of the detainees had medical problems’.Footnote 161 Finally, during his inspection of Pennine House, Shaw notes that ‘concern for detainees’ welfare’ is not central to the building and administration of the facility, judged particularly by the ‘absence of natural light and the poor quality of the outside areas’.Footnote 162 He observes that neither Larne House nor Pennine House is ‘governed by statutory rules’ and that, in fact, there are no rules governing short-term holding centres. Shaw finds this to be unacceptable as a ‘matter of good public administration’.Footnote 163
Shaw’s inspection of individual sites within the detention industrial complex lays bare the hierarchization of the worth of human life at work in these sites. In addition to the long waits to access an appointment and rude behaviour of healthcare staff, to be prescribed simply paracetamol regardless of ailment or health condition demonstrates that the lives of detainee-patients and their sufferings hold no value or urgency to the staff in power. Refusing to administer drugs to diabetic patients in detention or not clarifying medications to sick patients, and the utmost negligence towards pregnant detainees resulting in miscarriage are all punitive disciplinary measures for sick racialized detainees with deadly consequences. This negligence and the pattern of behaviour essentially dehumanize racialized humans, exemplified in particular by the response Shaw receives at Dover Dock when he complains against the ‘offensively insanitary’ conditions of the toilets. The staff’s response that these conditions are ‘better than what the detainees have come from’ is explicitly racist. The staff at Dover Dock construct a racial and socio-political difference between the British state (represented by them) and the detainee, and operate on an assumption of inherent (racial) superiority to that of the detainees because they believe that the detainees come from worse circumstances and do not deserve experiences (even – especially – under the detention/carceral industrial complex) that offer them basic human dignity, such as access to clean toilets. As a result, they do not perform their duties of providing essential liveable quarters where the detainees can stay with dignity. It is not surprising therefore that there is also no provision for any offer of healthcare on the premises: the worth of a detainee-patient’s life is so little that there is no consideration for healthcare provision for them. Significantly, the suggestion that if a detainee-patient was in acute pain they might be taken to the nearest Accident and Emergency is offered as a hypothetical solution only when Shaw demanded to know what would happen if such a situation arose. If the racism at Dover Dock is explicit, the dehumanization at Larne House is symbolic, where 90 per cent of the detainees have diagnosed medical problems and access to outdoor space is under a netting of barbed wire, which, to Shaw, gives the illusion of a cage. While the comparison with prison is implied, Shaw’s blunt comparison of the conditions with a ‘cage’ with ‘netting’ above, to which detainees can only be escorted by a member of staff, conjures images of a zoo, with the detainee treated like an animal in captivity, caged and netted in, and escorted outside by a human. In the long durée of imperialism, colonized (racialized) people have been repeatedly stripped of their humanity and compared to animals as a justification for the civilizing process (i.e. colonialism, acquisition of land and property in the form of both ‘human’ and material resources).Footnote 164 In this image of Larne House that Shaw describes, the dehumanization of the detainee is literal: expelled from humanity, they are placed in a cage with netting on top and they cannot be let out without the supervision of a human. In a similar context, Weheliye argues that this ‘expulsion from humanity’ is ‘warranted’ by the state through the argument that these people are ‘biologically’ inferior.Footnote 165
The staff across the detention industrial complex exhibit this philosophy of racial superiority and punitive punishment towards detainee-patients as demonstrated by the structured ‘daily operations’ authorized by the state, to the extent that the state has not even formulated a legal framework of governance to administer holding centres such as Dover Dock and Larne House.Footnote 166 This implies that the state tacitly supports the necropolitical pattern of actions and administration of these sites, with neither the necessity for improvement of living conditions (clean toilets, removal of cages) nor recourse for complaint in the event of a detainee’s deteriorating health circumstances as a result of the living conditions or inaccessibility to healthcare. This combination of deliberate removal of all legislation and accountability by the government, and the supremacist and negligent behaviour of the staff, exemplify the workings of state-sanctioned hierarchization and dehumanization of racially marginalized people. Drawing from the long history of colonialism, the understated argument here is that the subjective difference (and always already the racial difference) between the state, represented by the staff and healthcare officials across these sites, and that of the detainees is so vast that the latter need to be kept segregated, in cages, without access to clean toilets, without any prenatal care, and with generic paracetamol as the only available medication: any deaths, including miscarriage, are collateral damage in the pursuit of keeping these people away from British society, or as Sylvia Wynter powerfully argues, this measure is part of the ‘ongoing imperative of securing the well-being of our present ethnoclass (i.e., Western bourgeois) conception of the human, Man, which overrepresents itself as if it were the human itself’.Footnote 167
Early in his report Shaw declares, ‘There must be exceptional reasons to justify the detention of a pregnant woman.’Footnote 168 Examining all the cases of pregnant detainees across the British detention industrial complex leads him to conclude that not only is there ‘little evidence that this was the case’ but that the eventual release of most pregnant detainees ‘raised questions’ about whether they had been ‘correctly detained’ to begin with.Footnote 169 Shaw strongly asserts that detention has ‘an incontrovertibly deleterious effect on the health of pregnant women’ and cites reports and correspondence with the Royal College of Midwives (RCM), the HM Inspectorate of Prisons, the Association of Visitors to Immigration Detainees (AVID) and Women for Refugee Women to demonstrate this claim. The RCM argued that pregnant detainees are ‘uniquely vulnerable’ because they ‘will always have specific and sometimes serious’ healthcare needs that are ‘time-critical and may impact health outcomes’.Footnote 170 On approaching the Home Office, the latter ‘acknowledged’ RCM’s concern and ‘assured’ that the guidance for case workers for assessing women would be ‘revised’, but they offered no ‘time-frame’ for the revision. The RCM noted that indefinite detention also creates problems for healthcare professionals who struggle to ‘plan and deliver life-saving midwifery healthcare interventions and treatment’ in the face of mounting uncertainty and ‘coordinating quality care’. The RCM stated that the long and uncertain timelines of detentions resulted in the risk of pregnant detainees getting ‘missed’ which would result in ‘risk to the newborn’. They clarified that this in itself directly contravened the recommendations of the All Party Parliamentary Group for Conception to Age 2.Footnote 171 The HM Inspectorate of Prisons informed Shaw that they had found ‘little to suggest’ that pregnant detainees were being detained ‘only in exceptional circumstances’ while AVID, during their inspection of Yarl’s Wood found that pregnant detainees had been ‘detained without evidence of the exceptional circumstances required to justify this’ with one woman being ‘hospitalized twice because of pregnancy related complications’.Footnote 172 Women for Refugee Women also focused on Yarl’s Wood and cited a report that stated that there had been four complaints from pregnant detainees or their partners about ‘what they perceived as an uncaring attitude from healthcare’; two of those women had ‘lost their babies while in detention’.Footnote 173 Medical Justice informed Shaw that the healthcare that pregnant detainees receive in detention is ‘inadequate and falls short of NHS equivalence and the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) Standards’.Footnote 174 This is especially because immigration detention breaks the continuity in their care, and the ‘stress of detention can impact their mental health and their pregnancy’. Their investigations revealed ‘stillbirth, miscarriage and acute psychosis’ as some of the problems experienced by pregnant detainees in the detention industrial complex. After his extensive examinations, Shaw concludes that he has witnessed a ‘significant degree of latitude’ in the Home Office’s handling of pregnant detainees.Footnote 175 Interestingly, in addition to the negligence, Shaw notes that there were no formally published data on the number of pregnant detainees in the detention industrial complex or removed from the UK at any time.Footnote 176 His major complaint is the detention of pregnant people at all, especially if they were not going to be removed immediately – his figures reveal that only 5 per cent of pregnant detainees were removed from the UK, but the rest had been detained for indefinite periods and/or routed numerous times across several points of the detention industrial complex. Shaw suggests that the ‘presumptive exclusion from detention’ for pregnant detainees should be ‘replaced with an absolute exclusion’.Footnote 177
There is a clearly traceable bewilderment in Shaw’s review about the treatment of pregnant detainees across the detention industrial complex. He fails to understand why pregnant people were repeatedly being detained especially when there should not exist any grounds for detaining pregnant people in the first place. In his Review, he discovers grim (and cruel) patterns of treatment towards the medical needs of pregnant detainees, resulting in frequent miscarriages. The detention and treatment of pregnant people in the British detention complex clearly demonstrates the nexus of power and cruelty at play. The power of the healthcare and the operational staff at these sites, manifested on them by the authority of the state, enables them to carry out an unmasked agenda of cruelty through refusal of treatment and the creation of circumstances that exacerbate their vulnerability through uncertainty regarding their immediate futures and constantly ‘rerouting’ them across numerous sites of the detention industrial complex. This nexus clearly clarifies the ultimate biopolitical prerogative of the state, traced through the way the state uses what Foucault termed the ‘technology of power centred on life’.Footnote 178 Foucault introduces ‘biopower’ as a central feature of racism. In her placing of Foucault in the imperial context, Ann Stoler argues that biopower becomes the ‘proliferating presence of fascist, capitalist and socialist state racisms and the discourses of purification that legitimate their violence’.Footnote 179 In the context of pregnant people in the detention centres, the two distinct wings of ‘disciplinary’ and ‘regulatory’ forms of Foucauldian biopower uniquely converge: the refusal of care becomes a disciplinary process and the resultant deaths regulate biological processes and populations of the group of people the state has deemed inferior (‘a biopolitics of the population’).Footnote 180 There is violence etched in the lack of accountability or regulatory processes of the inhuman treatment of pregnant detainees in the detention industrial complex. The violence of white supremacy that enables this silence through the ‘economy of biopower’ implicitly supports the deaths, the pain, and the dehumanization of these people.Footnote 181
What, then, does it mean to be ‘offered healthcare’ in the detention industrial complex where care is metabolized as a mechanism to discipline, to dehumanize, and is often – ironically – a sentence to death? Close-reading Shaw’s Review of physical healthcare provisions across each detention centre, this section demonstrates how the biopolitical prerogatives of the state are enshrined in the ways it structures who cares for detainees and how that care in administered, if at all. In its systematic withholding of healthcare and refusal of adequate care, the state, through its healthcare and administrative staff, practice a necropolitics of cruelty that evades all accountability or regulation; even when the data is withheld and all mechanisms of complaints are closed, the structural hierarchization and dehumanization is still easily traceable. Shaw reports that a ‘breach of Article 3 of the European Convention has been found’ and a culture of neglect across the detention industrial complex ‘over prolonged periods of time’.Footnote 182 The Court noted this as a ‘systemic problem’, and this formal recognition by a court of law is symbolically important, although it failed to achieve any change or improvement in circumstances. The BMA deflect blame regarding the repeated complaints about medical staff being ‘rude’ or refusing or offering adequate treatment by shifting the blame on environment and circumstances: ‘various pressures […] can lead to a decrease in the quality of the consultation’.Footnote 183 The vague response and the shifting of blame to something unquantifiable problematise the question of complexity and ultimately exemplifies the power play at the heart of racial capitalism. Meanwhile, detainee-patients are sorted into the ‘less than human’ category, put in cages, grow progressively sicker and die.
4 Governing Mental Healthcare under Detention
At the beginning of the Mental Health section of his Review, Stephen Shaw writes that ‘no issue’ caused him ‘more concern during the course of this review than mental health’.Footnote 184 For Shaw, the ‘concern’ encompassed both ‘the detention and treatment of mental illness’ and ‘the impact that detention itself may have on mental health’.Footnote 185 In fact, over the course of his inspections, Shaw came across cases of severely ill detainee-patients suffering from psychotic illnesses as well as relatively ‘healthy’ patients whose mental ill health had been exacerbated by the conditions of being detained. Realizing that a review of the grim realities of mental health in the detention industrial complex needed more ‘conscious’ and ‘authoritative’ intervention from a specialist, Shaw worked with Professor Mary Bosworth, an academic specializing in British detention systems, along with the charity Mind, the Royal College of Psychiatrists, and the Tavistock Institute to review and understand the depths of mental health crisis and care in these spaces.Footnote 186 Shaw includes Bosworth’s report in the appendix of his Review.
This section carefully close-reads Bosworth’s report and Shaw’s review of the state of mental healthcare in the detention industrial complex to understand the depths of the crisis, the nature and dispensation of treatment afforded to sick detainee-patients, and the conditions of detention that engender new mental health conditions or exacerbate existing ones among detainees. Noticing how ‘morality’ and ‘ethics’ become refrains in Shaw’s review of mental healthcare, this section engages with the affective dimensions of these two principles – paying attention to the silences behind his appeals, I focus on the affective attachments of legislations and governance around mental healthcare that enable actions that elicit such pleas for considerations of ‘morality’ and ‘ethics’ from Shaw. Such a framework equips us to unravel the depths of hierarchization and dehumanization that are used as methods by the state to administer their necropolitical prerogatives. Yet it is important to recognize that this ‘method’ is derived from the long inheritance of British colonialism; reading Shaw’s text alongside Wynter’s theory of the ‘coloniality of Being’ enables us to recognize patterns of dehumanization across colonial history that afforded the status of ‘full’ humans only to the white European colonizer. I argue that appealing to an ethical and moral imperative (like Shaw does) should only come along with a radical decolonial rejoinder that recognizes the long durée of this violence and demands for an epistemic, subjective, affective, and embodied disobedience to the structures and machinery of the necropolitical, racial capitalist state.Footnote 187
The Anatomy of Distress
In their analyses, Bosworth and Shaw find certain patterns of mental health crisis in the detention industrial complex. Bosworth cites an NHS study to argue that the conditions of detention become ‘risk factors’ for mental health because ‘pre-existing medical conditions tend to deepen in detention and are a key cause of mental distress’.Footnote 188 Beyond severe mental illnesses, Bosworth deciphers other factors that result in contributing to mental ‘distress’ for detainees. The ‘duration of detention’ is an important factor that leads to poor mental health outcomes: since the UK ‘does not have a [sic.] statutory upper limit to the period of detention’, the duration of time spent in detention, along with the ‘uncertainty’ associated with that stay, leaving the detainee with no ‘ability to control the outcomes of their lives’ result in them falling into ‘depression’.Footnote 189 As discussed in the previous section, ‘rude’ behaviour by staff, and overall, ‘communication about the immigration case’ by staff across the detention industrial complex also affect the mental health of detainees.Footnote 190 Therefore, at the very outset, the conditions of detention, strategically legislated by the state, often result in the development or worsening of mental health conditions for the detainee: after all, fixing the statutory upper limit, setting a fixed duration for the detention, and conveying outcomes of immigration applications in a timely manner are legislative decisions that the state could make. As we see here, kinds of legislative decisions leave visceral imprints on a detainee.
It is understandable that many asylum-seekers in detention centres would be suffering from ‘pre-existing traumas’ (including torture) from experiences that would have made them seek asylum in the first place.Footnote 191 Exacerbated by conditions of detention, Bosworth argues, these traumas continue to inflict havoc in detainee-patients, especially in the absence of targeted medical care, as we will see in the next section. Asylum-seeking women, who are disproportionately more likely to be victims of sexual assault, violence, and trauma, suffer from a ‘further risk of mental distress’ under conditions of detention.Footnote 192 Bosworth’s research demonstrates that children, who are detained as part of a family, suffer specific mental health repercussions from the experience, including anxiety, depression, ‘sleep difficulties and problems in academic and language development as well as social withdrawal and post-traumatic stress’.Footnote 193 The decision to detain vulnerable women and children in carceral infrastructures displays, as I argue throughout this Element, an intentional necropolitics of cruelty. In analysing of the experiences of pregnant detainees in the previous section, I drew direct connections between the conditions of detention and their poor health outcomes. Similarly, it is unsurprising that victims of torture would have worsened symptoms of trauma and PTSD when forced into these carceral infrastructures with uncertainty about their lives and application outcomes. For children, the trauma of detention is manifested over a long period of time, even after they might be ‘released’ into the community. As we have learnt from the framework of vulnerability and power in the second section, vulnerability never works in isolation; vulnerable detainees in the detention industrial complex, Bosworth notes, are ‘highly stressed’ by the circumstances of their detention, and this effect on their mental health also affects their physical health, resulting in ‘raised prevalence of certain forms of disease and chronic ill health such as diabetes’.Footnote 194 It is important to contextualize this ‘raised prevalence’ against the fact of limited to no access to healthcare in these sites, as examined in the previous section. Therefore, for detainees in the detention industrial complex, not only do their pre-existing traumas get exacerbated by the conditions of detention, but their mental health is worsened, and the effects of this experience manifest through long-term, often chronic physical and mental health conditions. The conditions of detention already hierarchize vulnerable people, and the results of this hierarchization (and arguably dehumanization) manifest in long-term poor health outcomes, affecting the quality of lives, nature of work, and aspirations of these people long after they have been ‘released’. In orchestrating this long-term poor outcome through legislations that clearly exhibit their biopolitical prerogatives, the state demonstrates their intentional necropolitics of cruelty.
Shaw engages with Bosworth’s report alongside his own examinations of the detention industrial complex to conclude that ‘immigration detention has a negative impact upon detainees’ mental health’, and this in itself ‘has clear ethical and practical consequences’.Footnote 195 Similarly, on learning that ‘the impact on mental health increases the longer detention continues’, Shaw writes that the ‘finding’ has ‘evident moral and policy implications’.Footnote 196 Shaw’s tone when he writes the conclusions of his review on mental healthcare is muted, even though, throughout his engagement with reports on the crisis and his encounters with the crisis across the detention industrial complex, Shaw responds affectively to the data and to the ground realities. The attention to Shaw’s tone is important: ‘Tone’, as affect theorists such as Sianne Ngai have articulated, is a bridge between the narrator and the listener.Footnote 197 In the context of this publicly accessible Review, Shaw, a civil servant, conveys the state of the British detention industrial complex to interested members of the public. Yet, as we trace Shaw’s tone and his affective responses to certain observations scattered throughout the text, we realize that his examinations and his conclusions are for himself too. His regular affective responses of dismay at states of care across the complex guide us to the affective dimensions of the issues at stake here. The dire states of mental healthcare in the detention industrial complex, necessitating Shaw to flag them as having ‘ethical and practical consequences’ and with ‘moral and policy implications’, are not accidental; the legislations and forms of governance that result in such consequences and implications arise from affective attachments that enable states to devise socio-political processes that hierarchize and dehumanize vulnerable people. Shaw’s suggestions are succinct: he urges the Home Office to ‘embrace a greater spirit of openness more generally’; citing Bosworth’s conclusion that ‘immigration detention injures the mental health of a range of vulnerable populations’, he prompts the Home Office to ‘draw up a research strategy for immigration detention’, especially by ‘commissioning clinical studies on the impact of detention upon women, and research aimed at improving models of care’.Footnote 198 Shaw’s request for ‘openness’ immediately brings the focus on its opposite, ‘closeness’ as policy, that the Home Office has deployed: ‘closeness’, or a ‘shutting down’, not only through the absence of any research on the effects of the material conditions of detention on especially vulnerable detainees, but also through the absence of medical care for the treatment of mental illness resulting from or exacerbated by detention. ‘Closeness’ or ‘shutting down’ carries with it a sense of violence, through its deliberate denial of opportunities of care. Openness is a positive affect; asking a government to be more ‘open’ in its policies is also a moral indictment on the government’s hitherto restrictive strategies aimed at people in the detention industrial complex. Bosworth’s and Shaw’s investigations ultimately demonstrate how the affective dimensions of policy-making have tangible and visceral effects on the life outcomes of detainees in the detention industrial complex.
Servicing Mental Health
Having established the detrimental effect of detention on the mental health of the detainees, Shaw examines the provisions of mental healthcare in the detention industrial complex. Reviewing reports from Mind, the Royal College of Psychiatrists, and the Tavistock Institute, Shaw concludes that there is ‘no equivalence between the services provided in IRCs and those available in the community’ simply because it is ‘not possible to provide the full range of services to treat mental health conditions that would be available to patients in hospitals or in the community’.Footnote 199 The detention industrial complex exists in an alternate realm of law and governance, as if suspended in a no man’s land, where rights of detainees are truncated, basic services (such as access to health and well-being) that are girdled by international law are unpredictable, and there is an absence of strategies or rules of governance across the sites. Shaw recognizes this alterity and suspension of laws and rights when he admits that the usual services of mental healthcare in British society cannot be replicated within the walls of the detention industrial complex. In his attempt to understand the outright negative reports from these organizations, Shaw begins to unravel what causes the failure in providing basic mental health service across the detention industrial complex. He recognizes that the issues with offering physical healthcare across the sites, such as access and availability, apply to mental healthcare services as well. The overlap between prison and detention industrial complex once again becomes explicit in the case of The Verne, which, Shaw discovers, shares psychiatric services with prisons with whom they share service contracts.
Shaw sets out to assess the mental health needs across the detention industrial complex by asking each site for numbers of detainee-patients on medication or receiving other treatment for mental illness. However, Shaw fails to receive responses to his request from all the sites. Shaw describes the management’s silence as ‘disappointing’ and observes that even the data he received from some sites fails to ‘command confidence’. He notes that the information is not ‘anything more than indicative’ and expresses surprise that the numbers he was sent were ‘as low’ as they were.Footnote 200 It is important to pause here and dwell on the significance of this organized disregard of a civil servant’s official request as well as the organized obfuscation of actual data to tamper with conclusions drawn. As argued in the previous section, the management’s non-response to Shaw’s official request for data would not have been possible without the tacit approval to do so from the state. In this instance too, the management employees at this site, who made this decision, were foot soldiers of the racial capitalist state who could continue to ignore the ‘request’ and not face any consequences. Shaw’s disappointment at the non-response is the only reaction we receive from this tacit act of non-cooperation. The tampering with actual data on mental health – for instance, understating the number of detainees receiving care or misrepresenting treatment levels – that Shaw receives from the other sites who do respond to his request is also an act of state-sanctioned non-cooperation in a similar vein. Shaw puts his disappointment at the non-response and his conviction that the data is not true on record in his Review and moves on; from the silence we decipher that no accountability has been sought. Disregard and obfuscations are also affective responses; silence or hiding the full dimensions of the truth are intentional actions, even though the results appear to be ‘non’-doing. The intention is the decision and the response, and in their full affective dimensions, we can clearly see the biopolitical (and ultimately, necropolitical) prerogatives of the state.
In his quest to find accurate data, Shaw analyses the report by the Health and Wellbeing Needs Assessment Programme to learn that ‘more than one third of detainees’ were reported to have asked ‘for help’ across the complex, but only ‘twenty per cent’ were reported as ‘having seen a doctor’ about ‘mental health problem’ and only a ‘quarter’ had ‘seen a nurse’.Footnote 201 Through his own inspections, Shaw discovers that ‘anti-depressant and anxiolytic medications’ are prescribed ‘at high levels’.Footnote 202 He then finds through Home Office statistics that ‘23 people were sectioned under the Mental Health Act in the period from April 2014 to March 2015’, but through his own inspections he believes that this figure does not ‘capture the degree of serious psychotic illness that exists’.Footnote 203 The ‘management’ of mental healthcare in the detention industrial complex demonstrates the racializing assemblages embedded in the decisions governing the dispensation of care in these sites. Restricting access to mental healthcare to just the 25 per cent of detainees who received it is not simply the workings of a necropolitical state in action (randomly sorting detainees into ‘who may live and who must die’), but it also actively hierarchizes the medical needs of patients and ‘discipline[s]’ them into dehumanization.Footnote 204 The hierarchization works not only through randomly sorting who can access any care at all but also through the alarming levels of prescriptions for ‘anti-depressant and anxiolytic medications’ administered to those who are offered access to a doctor. The dehumanization works across multiple levels: by making the access to any care random, illnesses and healthcare needs of detainee-patients are not taken seriously; and by the selective ‘sectioning’ of severely ill patients in inhumane conditions as we see below, and offering no care at all to the rest of the detainee-patients suffering from ‘serious psychotic illness[es]’, the state does not consider the conditions of these people as necessary or worthy enough to warrant attention. This is an illustrative example of Weheliye’s concept of ‘racializing assemblages’ in action: through these processes of hierarchization and dehumanization, the state clearly demarcates detainee-patients as ‘not-quite-humans’ and ‘nonhumans’, and through carefully structured processes ignores their severe medical needs. In the absence of both data to understand the full dimensions of the mental health crisis and any suitable medical strategy, at this juncture, Shaw’s first recommendation is that the ‘Home Office and NHS England should conduct a clinical assessment of the level and nature of mental health concerns in the immigration detention estate’.Footnote 205
Shaw despairs at the lack of provisions for the dispensation of care for mental health detainee-patients. He says that while he ‘accept[s]’ that the care of these ‘most vulnerable’ detainees is ‘unlikely ever to equate’ with the quality of care available outside the detention industrial complex, ‘to do nothing to remedy’ it is ‘a counsel of despair’.Footnote 206 He powerfully argues for a ‘moral imperative’ to ensure that the ‘best support possible pending transfer or removal’ is provided across the detention industrial complex.Footnote 207 His affective response is a result of observing the fact of detainee-patients suffering the ‘most acute psychotic episodes’ who would be placed in ‘segregation conditions, devoid of comfort and personal attention’ in spaces that are distinctly ‘not suitable for any detainee with serious mental health condition’.Footnote 208 He further finds that detainee-patients with acute suicidal ideation are subjected to ‘one-on-one observations’, sometimes in ‘their own room’ and thus in the presence of their roommates or in segregated accommodation.Footnote 209 He remarks on the absence of ‘care suites’ entirely from the detention industrial complex and urgently recommends their creation as ‘a priority’ for the ‘personalized support’ of those detainee-patients ‘undergoing the most severe stress’.Footnote 210 Citing the Health and Wellbeing Needs Assessment Programme National Summary Report, Shaw argues for the offering of ‘talking therapies’ as ‘an intrinsic part of healthcare provision in immigration detention’.Footnote 211 While throughout his Review he urges the Home Office and the NHS to ‘improve the provision of mental health services for those in immigrant detention’, Shaw ends his review of mental healthcare by making a more radical statement. Although the Immigration Act of 1971 states that there is ‘a statutory ground for maintaining detention on the basis of mental illness’, Shaw argues that he believes it to be ‘entirely inappropriate’ and urges the government to find a ‘suitable legislative opportunity’ and with the ‘agreement’ of the Department of Health, to ‘repeal’ the provision entirely.Footnote 212
Shaw’s plea for a ‘moral imperative’ and a ‘repeal’ of the provision of detention of patients suffering from mental illness at once lays bare the binary between the all-powerful state capable of imprisoning and making legislation and the all-vulnerable, sick detainee-patients. The regulatory norms that Shaw pleads against and requests to be ‘repealed’ have a long durée of history, dehumanizing groups of people based on their race, gender, sexuality, religion, class, and caste through colonial age to the contemporary age of neo-imperialism. While Shaw’s plea for a ‘moral imperative’ and ‘repeal’ divorces itself from this long contextual history – and understandably so, as a civil servant addressing the same government that he is beholden to – it is imperative for us to place these norms that necessitate such pleas against this long project that Wynter calls the ‘coloniality of Being’ and the effects its ‘discursive-material’ have on the ‘production of human life’.Footnote 213 As Nadine El-Enany argues, the ‘ongoing’ project of British colonialism is ‘sustained via the structure of law’, where immigration policy is ‘part of an attempt to control access to the spoils of empire which are located in Britain’, the ‘tool that ensures that disposed people have no claim over what was stolen from them’.Footnote 214 Shaw appeals to the ‘moral imperative’ of the government because there is a lack: a lack of medical care for severely sick people, a lack of compassion required to not detain these people, and ultimately a renunciation of the duty of care in failing to perform this medical duty. Implicitly, this lack dehumanizes these people as not being worthy enough – not being good enough – to deserve care. However, a simple appeal to the ‘moral imperative’ erases the long history of such lack elucidated above, and it does not necessitate a legislative, affective, and indeed, a moral change in the dispensation of care and modes of governance in the detention industrial complex. To fully understand the depths of cruelty meted out in this situation and in these spaces, we need a radical decolonial rejoinder that practices ‘epistemic disobedience’ instead of appealing to the morality of a necropolitical state, identifies the racializing structures of governance as a continued process of inflicting death on the vulnerable, and makes these structures visible to everyone as the state’s legitimized intention of dictating ‘who may live and who must die’.Footnote 215 After all, the state-sanctioned policies that condone this absence of care for these ill detainee-patients directly contribute to the deaths of people in these spaces.
This section close-reads Shaw’s review of mental healthcare in the detention industrial complex to understand the political and material conditions for the dispensation of care for sick detainee-patients and the quality of the care that is meted out to them. Reading across Shaw’s and Bosworth’s reports, the section concludes that surviving in the detention complex itself has a debilitating effect on the detainee’s mental health. Arguing that the absence of a structure of care and, indeed, withholding care for mental illnesses in these spaces are intentional socio-political decisions with specific affective dimensions that function as disciplining processes for the detainee-patient, the section advances the Element’s argument that hierarchization and dehumanization are employed as tools to strip a sick detainee of the right to a better health outcome, and ultimately, life. Finally, this section situates the question of bioethics within the detention industrial complex, showing how the socio-political withholding of care for mentally ill detainees functions as both disciplinary and affective governance and renders the tensions between medical ethics and state bio/necropolitics starkly visible. In doing so, it demonstrates how bio/necropolitics concretely manages life and death within racial capitalism to dabble with ‘the politics of life itself’ and how ethical scrutiny must account for the institutional and affective dimensions of care denied in these spaces.Footnote 216
5 The Epistemology of Privacy, Confidentiality, and Consent
During his inspections across the detention industrial complex, Shaw records repeated and flagrant breaches of privacy and confidentiality: from guards and staff seeking out medical information of detainees to prying into female detainees’ rooms and toilets during intimate moments. This section examines what the conditions of privacy and confidentiality reveal about detainees’ autonomy, dignity, access to healthcare, and overall rights, safety, and well-being under constant surveillance by non-medical personnel, as well as the ethical dimensions of healthcare practice in carceral settings. Shaw also notes some instances of ‘consensual’ sexual relationship between female detainees and guards/officials. This section asks what informed consent can possibly signify when it is sought, if at all, under duress in a carceral setting. Close-reading instances of supposed consent and breach of privacy and confidentiality listed in the Review, I unravel how and why confidentiality was negotiated, if at all, and whether consent was bypassed in these settings, arguing that the tacit undermining of patient confidentiality rules and the procuring of informed consent is another means of dehumanization of a detainee. For an understanding of how surveillance structures the ways of governance in these spaces, I rely on Didier Bigo’s conception of the ‘ban-opticon depositif’ that captures the ‘strengthening of informatics and biometrics’ through ‘a network of heterogeneous and transversal practices’ as ‘modes of surveillance’.Footnote 217 Yet, as I argue, at its core, this surveillance is a racializing surveillance, in the register of Simone Browne: the outcome of this surveillance is the ‘discriminatory treatment of those who are negatively racialized’ by it – the detainees.Footnote 218 The concept of ‘consent’ in the detention industrial complex is murky: as we have learnt from Section 2, there exists a tremendous disparity in power structures between the officials/guards, propped up by state-sanctioned politics on the one hand and vulnerable detainees on the other. Acquiring meaningful consent from detainees under such structures is impossible. Additionally, the supposed surveillance of detainees during their intimate moments could be shown to verge on voyeurism, where the potentially lascivious gaze of the official is sanctioned by the state and thus becomes a tool for domination. The second subsection examines the depths of ‘consent’ in the detention industrial complex with particular reference to instances of supposedly ‘consensual’ sexual relationship reported by Shaw. Ultimately, the section argues that dehumanization remains a central organizing principle of governance in these spaces, especially concerning matters of privacy, confidentiality, and consent.
Privacy and Confidentiality in a Ban-opticon
At Yarl’s Wood, Shaw observes that ACDT was ‘being widely used’. ACDT provides guidance on identifying and supporting those individuals in detention who may have an elevated risk of self-harm and suicide. The women of Yarl’s Wood found ACDT to be ‘universally unpopular’ especially because they ‘thought of it as an invasion of privacy’.Footnote 219 Shaw writes that it appears that ‘searching was used as a way of intimidating detainees’.Footnote 220 At Heathrow’s holding facility, Shaw observes a ‘female detainee [being] searched in front of several people’.Footnote 221 He reports that during searches, these officers ‘examined in detail’ the medications that the detainees had been prescribed, thus ‘effectively accessing personal medical information’.Footnote 222 Shaw observes frequent instances of breach of privacy pertaining to medical information. One woman was transferred from Colnbrook to Yarl’s Wood after being placed on ACDT. Her ACDT interview took place ‘at a desk in the main reception area, within hearing of new arrivals and with work such as baggage searches happening around the officer and the detainee’.Footnote 223 A detained couple was ‘seen together by healthcare, raising questions of privacy’.Footnote 224 At Heathrow’s holding facility, ‘interviews with detainees took place in full hearing of everyone present’.Footnote 225 Shaw reports that in the absence of interpreters, other detainees may be seen ‘interpreting’ during induction – this practice is ‘not conducive to the sharing of confidential information’.Footnote 226 Shaw finds out that nurses and guards are ‘often present during medical consultations outside of the IRCs’ during detainees’ consultations with the GP, and this ‘breaches the confidentiality of the clinical space’.Footnote 227 He discovers that healthcare information ‘provided for one purpose is then shared too widely within the Home Office’.Footnote 228 At the same time, the ‘veracity of medical opinion is questioned using information obtained as part of an asylum decision’.Footnote 229 Working with Medical Justice, Shaw discovers one instance where ‘a doctor had made unprofessional and pejorative comments (…). This report had been forwarded to immigration staff without the detainees’ consent or knowledge’.Footnote 230
I argue that the officials’ treatment of detainees and their disruption of the latter’s privacy operates through a dual mechanism: firstly through the justification of surveillance as security, which Didier Bigo terms the ‘ban-opticon depositif’, and secondly through a sense of power manifested through mere punitive punishment towards detainees that strips them of their dignity and humanity. As Bigo writes, the ‘ban-opticon’ is ‘characterized by the exceptionalism of power (rules of emergency and their tendency to become permanent)’, through the ways it ‘excludes certain groups in the name of their future potential behavior (profiling)’, a process that in the detention industrial complex manifests as constant surveillance, medical data collection, and the normalization of coercive control over detainees’ bodies and information.Footnote 231 Accessing and recording medical information, such as prescribed medications, functions as surveillance and data profiling – an exceptional power that, while occasionally mirrored in other carceral settings, becomes normalized and permanent in immigration detention. As we have learned from the previous sections, this collection of medical data will have ramifications for the detainee, affecting their access to treatment and medication during their time across the detention industrial complex. Yet, I also argue that the public medical interviews of detainees move beyond data extraction: they enact a disciplinary spectacle, rendering detainees’ private health details audible to guards, contractors, officials, and fellow detainees. This public exposure is unnecessary for risk assessment, but central to a regime of dehumanization that marks the non-citizen body as perpetually available for inspection.
Invasive monitoring and voyeuristic observation of female detainees at Yarl’s Wood operate as disciplinary and racializing technologies, systematically undermining privacy, dignity, and autonomy. Shaw reports that former detainees at Yarl’s Wood had ‘reported that male officers came into women’s rooms without knocking and whilst detainees were showering, and that the officers never apologized for these intrusions’.Footnote 232 When one detainee in a bedroom was on ‘constant watch’, the other woman in that room would, ‘by default’, also be under observation by the officer.Footnote 233 The officer would ‘be able to hear whatever either woman was doing in the toilet/bathroom’.Footnote 234 The officer’s presence ‘made it difficult for the women to sleep without covers on hot nights’.Footnote 235 Shaw records that officers at Yarl’s Wood ‘had been heard laughing at having seen detainees naked or on the toilet’.Footnote 236 Extensively quoting from a report by Women for Refugee Women, Shaw writes that thirty-three out of thirty-eight women at Yarl’s Wood had reported being observed by male guards ‘in intimate situations, including while naked, partly naked, in the shower and on the toilet’.Footnote 237 The voyeuristic gaze of male guards and officials spying on vulnerable female detainees in various intimate settings not only enforces gendered hierarchies but also combines both the disparity between the exercise of power and vulnerability in these spaces along with the technology of state-sanctioned racializing surveillance. Simone Browne defines this racializing surveillance as relying on surveillance ‘techniques’ that ‘reify boundaries along racial lines, and, in so doing, it reifies race’.Footnote 238 What, after all, is achieved by the ‘surveillance’ of naked detainee-women in showers by male guards and officials? The action feeds into a habit of constant surveillance and data mining, but there is no data to be gathered from the voyeuristic watching of naked women’s bodies in confinement. Outside of the confines of the detention industrial complex, this voyeurism would be treated as sexual offence, but within its walls, it functions as a disciplinary technology, enforcing obedience, subservience, and a sense of shame through the knowledge of being constantly watched during the most intimate, vulnerable moments. As Foucault reminds us, the force of panoptic surveillance lies less in its active gaze than in the certainty of being observable – a logic that, as Browne shows, extends into the racialized surveillance of Black life, where watchfulness is itself a mode of control.Footnote 239 The voyeurism delivers pleasure to the men, especially in the awareness of the extreme disparity in power structures: the detained-women have nowhere to hide, the gaze strips them of all humanity, and there is no pathway to complain or bring justice to the voyeurs. The continuum of surveillance in these spaces, from medical data collection to voyeuristic observation of bodies, demonstrates how privacy is systematically violated across multiple settings for a variety of reasons, from data collection to perverse self-gratification.
Shaw writes that ‘random searches were carried out by male and female officers’.Footnote 240 For ‘personal searches’, male officers used ‘electronic wands’, but female officers ‘patted down’ the detainees in the presence of male officers.Footnote 241 Shaw also writes about instances at Yarl’s Wood where ‘women have been strip-searched by male members of staff’.Footnote 242 In one instance, a woman ‘had been forced to remove her hijab in front of men in the reception area’.Footnote 243 During random searches, officers would handle ‘clothing, including underwear, without respect and [leave] it lying on the bed’.Footnote 244 At Lunar House, Shaw observes that detainees were being ‘searched in an area where they could be seen by others in the main holding room’.Footnote 245 On suggesting that a ‘screen’ be used for searches, the officers ‘resist’ the idea because apparently screens could be ‘assaulted’, yet when asked when was ‘the last time there was a physical assault on the premises’, the officers ‘could not remember’.Footnote 246 At Eaton House, Shaw observes a female detainee being ‘searched in the holding room by the Tascor escort who had arrived to take her to Colnbrook’, in front of ‘a male detainee and a male member of staff’.Footnote 247 The officials at Eaton House inform that while there had been a curtain for searches in the ante-room, it had been replaced by ‘a cupboard containing food and other equipment’.Footnote 248 In any case, here the staff ‘could view the holding room through a window’ at all times, offering no privacy during searches, regardless of curtains.Footnote 249 At this point, Shaw reminds us of Home Office policy regarding searches. Firstly, ‘searches including removal of clothes must only be undertaken by officers of the same sex as the detainee’, and there must not be ‘members of the opposite sex present or anyone not directly involved in the search’.Footnote 250 Similarly, Shaw notes that, for ‘rub down searches of women not involving the removal of clothes (other than shoes), the search must be carried out by a woman officer’ including, ‘where possible, only female members of staff should be present’.Footnote 251 Finally, when the room of a detainee is searched, ‘the detention centre is required to aim to ensure that the staff members conducting the search are female and that, where possible, all other staff members present are female’.Footnote 252 Although organizations such as Women for Refugee Women and The Poppy Project flagged these instances as blatant breaches of Home Office policy, Shaw notes that, according to the Home Office, it is technically ‘not true’ that men’s presence during a ‘rub down search’ violates policy; rather, the ‘thrust of the policy’ is that ‘men should only be present when there is an operational need’.Footnote 253
Numerous activists and scholars of strip-searching have noted that strip-searching is ‘sexual violence’.Footnote 254 Shaw does not dwell on the details of the public strip-searches he witnesses across the detention industrial complex, but scholarship on the field informs us about the gruesome and violent processes that occur during strip-searches.Footnote 255 Women who are strip-searched by or in front of male members of staff experience compounded assault. Yet it is important to clarify that even same-gender strip-searches do not mitigate the violence – the operational logic here is one of power administered through racial superiority and difference. Shaw’s defence of Home Office policies that justify the searches of women by men obfuscates this central organizing principle of governance through dehumanization in these spaces. Public searches and public strip-searches add an extra layer of trauma to the sense of assault; the spectacle of humiliation while being undressed and searched in public by (or even without) members of the opposite sex is designed to strip the victim of dignity and turn them into an object, a practice that racializes and disciplines bodies as a structural logic of governance. The removal of privacy infrastructure materializes this dehumanization, ensuring constant exposure. The various kinds of technologies of surveillance that we encounter in this section, from medical data collection to perverse voyeuristic gaze to assaults and dehumanization designed as ‘searches’, form a multitude that Haggerty and Ericson term ‘surveillant assemblage’, operating ‘across both state and extra-state institutions’ and often targeting ‘observed body’.Footnote 256 In this context, the gendered, racialized, and publicized nature of searches demonstrates how privacy and bodily autonomy are systemically violated, producing both immediate trauma and long-term subjection to state power.
Who Consents?
Shaw reports that at Yarl’s Wood a young woman ‘had been told by an officer that he would help her with her immigration claim if she slept with him (she did not)’.Footnote 257 At Harmondsworth, Shaw notes that there were ‘allegations from detainees that some staff had used inappropriate language or made threats’.Footnote 258 At Cayley House, Shaw reports that he ‘witnessed behavior confirming […] that women could not always be held separately from men or protected from unwarranted sexual attention’.Footnote 259 At Yarl’s Wood, Shaw also learns of ‘sexual relationships’ between staff and detainees.Footnote 260 Citing a report by the All Party Parliamentary Group on Migration, Shaw writes that ‘the possibility of consenting to sexual contact in detention environment is highly questionable’.Footnote 261 The report, which included submission from solicitors, cited Section 75 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and stated that there exists ‘a number of evidential presumptions in respect of consent to sex’.Footnote 262 While the Act considers circumstances in which ‘consent can be said to be vitiated by the context’, the list does not include ‘the context of a complainant who is detained in immigration detention (or some other detention contexts such as prison or a mental institution) and the perpetrator is their custodian’.Footnote 263 The solicitors state that in this context, the ‘power imbalance is so stark, and the detainee in such a vulnerable position’, that the consent obtained cannot be ‘meaningful’, and thus the Act should be amended to include these circumstances.Footnote 264 Furthermore, the solicitors consider that if any sexual act in these circumstances is ‘prima facie a criminal act, this [amending the Act] might act as an effective deterrent’.Footnote 265 Shaw agrees with the solicitors and believes that this ‘matter’ has ‘implications beyond the Home Office and beyond immigration detention’.Footnote 266
In the preceding sections, we have dissected how power structures exacerbate vulnerabilities in the detention industrial context. Meaningful consent for sexual relationships between a detainee and a guard/official is structurally impossible in these settings because refusal is not really an option for the detainee in these cases of severe power imbalance. Sexual contact in these settings is never neutral, and it is always embedded in coercive state power. Kimberle Crenshaw introduces the concept of ‘intersectional subordination’ that encapsulates the supposed ‘consensual’ sexual exploitation in these settings: already vulnerable women in the detention industrial complex, many victims of sexual violence and other traumas, are then made to engage in sexual contact with men in power in these settings; these men exercise their power over these detainee-women shaping behaviour, compliance, and control. Crenshaw explains that ‘it is frequently the consequence of the imposition of one burden that interacts with preexisting vulnerabilities to create another dimension of disempowerment’.Footnote 267 As we have seen before, carceral settings discipline and dehumanize bodies and minds, and thus soliciting ‘consent’ in these contexts is impossible; Pat Carlen emphasizes that carceral institutions create environments in which detainees’ choices are constrained and compliance becomes a strategy for survival rather than genuine consent.Footnote 268 Joanna Bourke urges us to interrogate the concept of ‘consent’ altogether, paying attention to the circumstances under which consent is elicited, or who is considered worthy of being asked for consent: ‘Absence of consent is a legitimate (and extremely common) way to define rape, but it is not the sole definition.’Footnote 269 We will never be able to fully understand how these women perform compliance as a response to structural pressure for coerced sexual or administrative consent, and we must hold room for these dimensions. As Browne demonstrates, ‘enactments of surveillance’ within carceral and detention spaces are racialized and gendered, producing hypervisibility of certain bodies while stripping them of privacy, dignity, and autonomy.Footnote 270 Foucauldian conception of disciplinary power further clarifies how such spaces operate through the panopticon, through procedural normalization of constant observation into mechanisms of state control. We have just demonstrated how such constant surveillance not only erodes privacy, but – through the voyeuristic gaze consuming the naked bodies of these women during their intimate moments simultaneously – also becomes a means of perverse self-gratification and a mode of control. In her pioneering study of trauma in captivity, Judith Herman writes about ‘organized techniques of disempowerment and disconnection’ that perpetrators use for ‘establishing control over another person’.Footnote 271 The supposed consent that these detainee-women might have given to the male officials in a closed, coercive institution like the detention industrial complex is a product of structural constraints, power asymmetry, and ultimately, institutionalized vulnerability embedded in a system that monitors, records, and exploits their bodies for both disciplinary and voyeuristic purposes.
This section close-reads instances of structured breaches of confidentiality, erosion of privacy, and state-sanctioned episodes of sexual assault to understand how exceptional governance in the detention industrial complex complicate issues of privacy, confidentiality, and consent. Demonstrating how structures of power unfold between a practitioner alongside a security personnel and a detainee-patient in a detention centre, this section demonstrates that procuring consent under such circumstances is always already performative, serving the intentions of the state instead of the vulnerable detainee-patient. By focusing on these three important questions, this section bookends the dialogue on healthcare contexts introduced in Section 2 on patient vulnerability and demonstrates how the limits of care shape the broader ethics and possibilities of medical care under conditions of structural violence. In these settings, privacy, confidentiality, and consent are emptied of their ethical contexts and redeployed as mechanisms of compliance, reinforcing the very exploitative structures that render detainee-patients vulnerable in the first place. Care across the detention industrial complex becomes a cause for extraction and coercion rather than repair.
6 Conclusion: The Necropolitics of Cruelty
Stephen Shaw’s inspection of the health and welfare policies and practices of the British detention industrial complex and his subsequent Review marks a watershed moment in contemporary British immigration politics not because it achieved changes in policy but because it revealed state-sanctioned structural abuse of power, misuse of legal policies, and the state’s bio/necropolitical modes of governance of racialized people. This Element has close-read Shaw’s Review alongside Critical Race Theory and Critical Medical Humanities to demonstrate how state policies around access and quality of care directly contribute to detrimental health outcomes and deaths in detention. Section 2 examined Shaw’s engagement with the state’s arbitrary classification of ‘vulnerability’ to argue that the category itself is mobilized to racialize, produce, and/or exacerbate vulnerability in order to reify the imperial and carceral logics of detention. Section 3 turned to the dispensation of physical healthcare to argue that the racial capitalist state structures care around hierarchization and dehumanization. Section 4 traced the mental healthcare crisis, analysing the conditions that engender new illnesses or exacerbate existing ones, and how affective attachments to legislation elide ethical responsibility. Section 5 examined breaches of confidentiality and supposed consent to argue that undermining medical ethics functions as racializing surveillance and dehumanization. Through rigorous humanistic analysis of government documents, an ethical critical-reading of policy, a conscientious understanding of the ‘non-medical’ dimensions of medical care, and a recognition of the long durée of colonial violence in contemporary state governance, this Element insists on accountability and the practice of organized, epistemic, subjective, affective, and embodied disobedience to the necropolitical, racial capitalist state. Accountability in this context does not imply faith in state mechanisms of reform. Rather, reviews, inquiries, and reports function as documentary archives of institutional violence, preserving evidence for litigation, advocacy, scholarly critique, and abolitionist projects while simultaneously exposing the limits of scrutiny within racial capitalist systems that repeatedly absorb critique without structural transformation.
In this conclusion, I would also like to offer a brief glimpse into the British Medical Association’s (BMA) 2017 response to the Shaw Review which crystallize the questions raised in this Element and problematize the question of accountability. In 2017, the British Medical Association – a professional organization for doctors and medical students in the UK – published a Report entitled Locked Up, Locked Out: Health and Human Rights in Immigration Detention. Although it can be read independently as a reflection on how medical doctors experience the servicing of care under the British detention industrial complex, the Report overtly functions as a response to Shaw’s Review published a year before. From the outset, the BMA straddles ‘dual loyalties, or dual obligations’, defining them as clashing between their ‘direct obligations to their patients’ alongside ‘additional obligations to a third party [the outsourced private company in charge of healthcare services, later the NHS, and ultimately, the Home Office]’.Footnote 272 By casting this tension as simply a matter of professional ethics rather than structural complicity, the BMA erodes the systemic violence that is embedded in the administration of care in the detention industrial complex. They note that doctors ‘may be subjected to subtle pressures’ which, ‘if unchecked, could potentially contravene the human rights of detainees’.Footnote 273 They urge for vigilance of doctors in areas of ‘problems around access to healthcare, medical involvement in age assessment procedures, and the use of restraint and force in the detention setting’.Footnote 274 They advise doctors to ‘resist’ any ‘unreasonable constraints on their clinical independence which are not in the best interests of patients’.Footnote 275 In illustrating an example of such ‘resistance’, the BMA echo Shaw’s frustration with the particularities of healthcare dissemination in these spaces: a doctor might diagnose a patient with a condition whose treatment might not be available within the detention industrial complex and would ‘meet resistance from centre staff or management on the basis of financial or resource consideration’.Footnote 276 Nevertheless, even in such difficult circumstances, the BMA’s advice to the doctor is merely to ‘refocus on their primary obligations as set out in the General Medical Council’s Good Medical Practice’.Footnote 277 Such an advice turns resistance against coercion and cruelty into a question of professional integrity, following principles based on a book, rather than recognizing that adherence to medical ethics is difficult but necessary work, especially when regimes structure access to care through bio/necropolitical models of governance.
In Section 2, I extensively analyse how the state weaponizes the category of ‘vulnerability’ to produce, exacerbate, and racialize vulnerability in detention. The BMA echo Shaw’s concern with the Home Office’s definition of vulnerability, pointing out that the Home Office’s guidance was subjected to a High Court challenge in 2017 where ‘it was held that the Home Office had adopted an incorrect definition of torture, and that as a result, many victims of torture held in immigration detention on the basis of that definition had been unlawfully detained’.Footnote 278 Like Shaw, the BMA is critical of Rule 35 (discussed in Section 3), yet their reservations against it obfuscate deeper issues. For instance, the Home Office guidance on Rule 35 states that ‘IRC medical practitioners are not expected to have specialist medical training’. The BMA point out that ‘it cannot be assumed’ that ‘IRC GPs will have knowledge of the identification, assessment and reporting of injuries inflicted during torture, which can lead to problems in relation to Rule 35(3)’.Footnote 279 Their complaint is that ‘reports have been rejected’ because ‘they do not constitute independent evidence of torture, because doctors had recorded the signs of torture without expressing a clinical opinion as to whether the injuries were consistent with the account given by the individual’.Footnote 280 Their recommended solution to this problem is merely ‘an issue that could be addressed with further training’.Footnote 281 By presenting training as a solution, the BMA sidesteps the political question of whether the conditions of detention in Britain are, after all, compatible with medical ethics and the racialized logics that underpin who are rendered ‘detainable’ in the first place. In Section 4, we analyse how surveillance structures the governance of these spaces, breaching confidentiality and privacy. The BMA recognize this issue but remind readers that doctors have ‘a duty under law’ to share information in the ‘absence of consent’, especially where ‘it is in public interest’.Footnote 282 They advise that the ‘benefits of making such a disclosure’ should be ‘carefully weighed against the harms associated with breaching confidentiality’ and ultimately doctors ‘must ensure they can justify their decision’.Footnote 283 In doing so, the BMA reframes structural breaches of confidentiality as matters of personal discretion, diluting the systemic stakes of racialized surveillance.
Ultimately, the BMA does not address Shaw’s criticisms about the poor quality of care, including complaints about refusal of care by medical personnel to sick detainees in the detention industrial complex. Instead, the BMA writes about a ‘concerning […] risk’ for doctors in these settings to ‘become cynical and absorb the “culture of disbelief”’.Footnote 284 Referring to complaints about prescribing paracetamol or refusing to call an ambulance for an emergency, the BMA simply suggest that doctors should ‘maintain an approach that meets professional standards and is compassionate’, offering ‘continuing practice in a community setting’ to grow their compassion and professionalism.Footnote 285 By locating the solution of unprofessionalism and unethical behaviour in the cultivation of compassion in community clinics, the BMA reduces structural violence and necropolitical cruelty to a deficit in adequate professional practice, leaving accountability as a disposable affect, at the discretion of the individual practitioner. While Shaw’s Review calls for accountability, both within the Home Office and the state’s structures of governance as well as among medical practitioners responsible for imparting care in these settings, the BMA Report, on the other hand, neutralizes accountability by obscuring the racialized structures of violence that organize detention itself; by framing the problem as individual cynicism rather than structural violence, they mirror the Home Office’s own mechanisms of deflection. In their Report, responsibility is endlessly deferred: the choice of not prescribing important medications or even holding medical appointments is not addressed, and the deliberate racialized decision centring on the ‘culture of disbelief’ is diluted by excusing the practitioners as being ‘cynical’ in the detention environment. As we have seen in the previous sections, detained patients have no means of lodging complaints, and the BMA’s response to egregious, unethical behaviour is simply guiding the people responsible to published books or suggesting they practice medicine in ‘community’ settings outside the detention industrial complex. There is violence embedded in non-action, especially when this non-action leads to worse health outcomes and deaths for vulnerable people. Through this violence of non-action and non-acknowledgement, the BMA mimic the dynamics of the Home Office by transforming structural violence into questions of individual conduct, ethics, or compassion. In doing so, these organizations demonstrate how accountability is persistently displaced and expose the nexus of complicity and power play that enable the bio/necropolitical structure of the detention industrial complex to function.
The British detention industrial complex has been scrutinized regularly by international law-keeping and non-governmental bodies. In 2012, four years before Shaw published his Review, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) conducted an investigation into the treatment of a group of undocumented people during their removal from the UK to Sri Lanka by a chartered flight operated by the United Kingdom Border Agency (UKBA). The delegation travelled in the chartered flight to Colombo but noted that they were ‘forbidden to leave the aircraft on arrival in Colombo’ and were thus unable to observe UKBA’s actual handover procedure.Footnote 286 In their subsequent report to the UK government, they asked for ‘making an explicit reference to the possibility for national or international monitoring bodies – such as the CPT – to observe removal operations to the country of destination, including the hand-over procedure to the local immigration authorities, when negotiating future readmission agreements’.Footnote 287 The forbidding of international monitoring agencies such as the CPT from performing their duties is a form of censorship – by preventing the delegates from leaving the flight to observe how the UKBA handles the handover of the detainees explicitly suppresses information and allows the state to carry out sensitive operations without scrutiny or accountability. In the Report that they submitted to the UK government in 2013, the CPT delegation documented abuses in the treatment of the undocumented people during the process of their ‘removal’: at Brook House both male and female detainees were searched ‘in the corridor in front of the departure desk, offering no real privacy’; during transfer ‘all detainees – even elderly persons or persons moving with difficulty’ were subjected to ‘unjustified’ ‘indiscriminate use of a control technique’; during the transfer process, the CPT also noted the absence of ‘psychological support and counseling’, ‘provision of humanitarian and medical contact points at the destination’, and the ‘presence of an interpreter’; the CPT observed that vulnerable detainees under ACDT were ‘handcuffed’ for several hours during transfer, which they found ‘excessive for someone who was under constant and close surveillance’.Footnote 288 Four years later, similar concerns regarding lack of privacy, dehumanizing searches, and constant surveillance reappear as points of concern in Shaw’s Review. These practices that the CPT record in their report tie directly to the argument of state-sanctioned bio/necropolitical logic that I have traced throughout this Element: the CPT delegates witness the detainees being reduced to disposable, securitized bodies rather than human subjects. At the time of the CPT investigation, ‘fit to fly’ was not a requirement to remove undocumented people from the UK. The CPT noted that a private company, Reliance, was contracted by the UKBA to operate overseas escorts and recommended that a ‘fit to fly’ certificate should be systematically issued by a medical doctor for each detainee ‘without delay’.Footnote 289 The lack of privacy was a repeated concern in the CPT report, with the delegates advising against the multiple ‘rub-down searches’ especially when each detainee was under close surveillance by multiple escorts throughout the whole journey.Footnote 290 On the flight, they observed that detainees were not offered privacy even in the toilets, with ‘the door of the toilet [being] left slightly open for security reasons’.Footnote 291 The same ‘security reasons’ were cited for not offering ‘blankets or pillows’ to detainees during the flight, and the CPT urged the government to ‘reconsider their policy on both issues’.Footnote 292 Affective attachments are embedded in the policies that justify the removal of sick people without any medical assessment or all stripping of their privacy even during vulnerable moments; the bureaucratic language of ‘security reasons’ sanitizes cruelty by reframing the withholding of privacy and medical care as administrative necessity, rather than racialized violence. Ultimately, the CPT report highlights that even international scrutiny cannot interrupt the everyday necropolitical governance of detention.
If the CPT’s findings show international scrutiny at work, domestic civil-society groups highlight the same failures from within. Over the course of his Review, Shaw works with Medical Justice, a charity that works with volunteer doctors to document torture and serious medical conditions among detainees in the British detention industrial complex. In 2015, they published a report on how segregation was misused in immigration detention.Footnote 293 Based on Freedom of Information Act requests, their own casework with detained clients, medical records, legal documents, and Home Office files and policy, the report documented how segregation was misused in these spaces through its ‘overuse’, not following legal guidelines regarding length of segregation outlined in Rule 40, segregation being used ‘as healthcare facility’, the lack of ‘proper authorization of segregation’, ‘poor governance’, ‘poor monitoring and record-keeping’, regular ‘inappropriate use of force’, ‘age disputed cases’ held in segregation, and ultimately deaths in segregation followed by no investigation.Footnote 294 Their case study reveals segregation not as an exceptional breakdown but as a routine technique of governance and captures the necropolitics of cruelty as governance policy. The Medical Justice report demonstrates how civil society interventions try to hold the state accountable, but segregation practices reveal how (necropolitical) cruelty is bureaucratized and normalized. Read together, the Shaw Review and the reports by the CPT and Medical Justice reveal a pattern: they all repeatedly find the same failures, but states of power remain unmoved.
Despite repeated scrutiny from civil society and international monitoring bodies, deaths in detention continue. In October 2024, a man died at Brook House detention centre following prolonged abuse – the second such death at the centre in two years, and seven years after a public enquiry uncovered ‘incidents of mistreatment’, ‘unnecessary pain’ inflicted on detainees, ‘dangerous restraint techniques’, the ‘forcible removal of detainees while they were naked or near naked’, and systemic targets of ‘racist, homophobic, and humiliating language’.Footnote 295 In July 2023, the barge Bibby Stockholm was used by the then government to hold single, male asylum-seekers while their claims were being processed. The barge soon experienced Legionella outbreaks, making conditions unliveable, and in December 2023, an Albanian asylum-seeker was found dead after a suspected suicide.Footnote 296 Both sites are run on billion-pound contracts outsourced to private companies: Serco at Brook House and CTM on the Bibby Stockholm – illustrating the entrenched racial capitalist model that sustains necropolitical cruelty through privatization. This model remains unchanged across successive governments: the policy of racial capitalist violence persists regardless of political affiliation, following a system that Mary Bosworth terms ‘supply chain justice’.Footnote 297
In his Review, Shaw tables lists of deaths across the detention industrial complex; each number representing an anonymous life lost in custody. These deaths – and the many that have followed – are not aberrations but rather the logical outcomes of a system of governance structured by racial capitalism, racializing assemblages, and bio/necropolitics. Shaw’s Review documents how racialization becomes a tool of governance in these spaces, enforcing debility, disablement, dehumanization, and death through the outsourcing of violence and the erasure of redress. Yet the afterlife of his Review lies in its limits: the state has continued to profit from a racial capitalist supply chain soaked with the blood of racialized people. What sustains this system is not simply government policy but affective politics: the bureaucratic sanitization of cruelty, the language of ‘security’ and racialized surveillance that cloak violence in administrative necessity, and the routinization of inflicting trauma as ‘care’. Despite numerous documented reviews, reports, and inquiries, the endurance of this system demonstrates the triumph of a structure that transforms bio/necropolitical cruelty into common sense. To confront this structure demands more than further scrutiny; it requires abolition, and a reckoning with the affective politics that make racial capitalist violence tolerable, ordinary, and ongoing.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the Leverhulme Trust (grant number: ECF-2021-415).
Andrew Mangham
University of Reading, UK
Andrew Mangham is Professor of English Literature and Medical Humanities at the University of Reading, UK. For Cambridge University Press, he has edited the Cambridge Companion to Sensation Fiction and, with Clark Lawlor, Literature and Medicine: the Eighteenth Century and Literature and Medicine: the Nineteenth Century. He is the author of We Are All Monsters: How Deviant Organisms Came to Define Us (MIT Press, 2023), The Science of Starving in Victorian Literature, Medicine and Political Economy (OUP, 2020), Dickens’s Forensic Realism: Truth, Bodies, Evidence (Ohio State UP, 2017), and Violent Women and Sensation Fiction (Palgrave, 2007). He is also editor, with Daniel Lea, of The Male Body in Medicine and Literature (Liverpool UP, 2018) and, with Greta Depledge, The Female Body in Medicine and Literature (Liverpool UP, 2013).
Alanna Skuse
University of Reading, UK
Alanna Skuse is Associate Professor of English Literature at the University of Reading, UK. She is the author of Constructions of Cancer in Early Modern England: Ravenous Natures (Palgrave, 2016), Surgery and Selfhood in Early Modern England: altered bodies and contexts of identity (CUP, 2021) and Hurt Feelings: Wounding Oneself in Early Modern Literature (Palgrave, 2025). She has written for academic journals, edited volumes and non-academic publications on topics including Shakespeare, early modern drama, Amazons, cancer and self-harm. Her first book for popular audiences is The Surgeon, the Midwife, the Quack: how to stay alive in Renaissance England (OneWorld, 2025).
Advisory Board
Tristanne Connolly (University of Waterloo)
Liping Guo (Peking University)
Travis Chi Wang Lau (Kenyon College)
Nolwazi Mkhwanazo (University of Pretoria)
Avishek Parui (Indian Institute of Technology)
Brid Phillips (University of Western Australia)
Lindsey Row-Heyveld (Luther College)
Rohan Deb Roy (University of Reading)
Alison Schwartz (St. George’s University of London)
Hülya Yildiz (Middle East Technical University)
Byrad Yyelland (Virginia Commonwealth University)
Marie Arong (University of the Philippines Cebu)
Jurgen Pieters (Ghent University)
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