Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-74656f9884-npj9w Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-10T00:01:36.727Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
Series:   Elements in Metaphysics

Reduction, Emergence and the Metaphysics in Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 February 2025

Carl Gillett
Carl Gillett
Affiliation:
Northern Illinois University

Summary

This Element offers a fresh treatment of the two cycles of reduction-emergence debates in the sciences and their 'reductionist' and 'emergentist' positions. It suggests philosophers have neglected the compositional models/explanations, and 'endogenous' kind of metaphysics, central to these debates. It highlights how such endogenous metaphysics underpins what is termed the 'Dynamic Cycle,' by which scientists develop novel ontological concepts to underwrite new models/explanations to solve scientific problems. And it subsequently shows that the 'reductionist' and 'emergentist' views in the scientific debates follow the Dynamic Cycle. In the first cycle of debates, in the early twentieth century, the Element outlines how 'everyday reductionism' pioneered a novel family of compositional models/explanations in one of the most successful research movements in twentieth-century science. And, in present debates, it frames contemporary emergentist positions offering ontological innovations, underwriting new families of models, to address problems at the cutting-edge of twenty-first-century science.
Get access

Keywords

reductionismemergentismscientific metaphysicsscientific methodemergence

Information

Type
Element
Information
Series: Elements in Metaphysics
Online ISBN: 9781009083423
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication: 20 March 2025

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Element purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

Aizawa, K. 2007. “The Biochemistry of Memory Consolidation.” Synthese, 155, pp. 65–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Aizawa, K. and Gillett, C. 2014. “Realization, Reduction and Emergence.” In Levy, N. (ed.), Handbook of Neuroethics. Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 49–62.Google Scholar
Aizawa, K. and Gillett, C. (eds.) 2016a. Scientific Composition and Metaphysical Grounding. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-56216-6_1.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Aizawa, K. and Gillett, C. 2016b. “Vertical Relations in Science, Philosophy and the World: Understanding the New Debates over Verticality.” In Aizawa, K. and Gillett, C. (eds.), Scientific Composition and Metaphysical Ground, pp. 1–38. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Aizawa, K. and Gillett, C. 2019. “Defending Pluralism about Compositional Explanations.” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, Part C, 78, 101202.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Alexander, S. 1920. Space, Time and Deity. Two volumes. The Gifford Lectures 1916–18. Toronto: Macmillan.Google Scholar
Andersen, H. and Mitchell, S. (eds.) 2023. The Pragmatist Challenge: Pragmatist Metaphysics for Philosophy of Science. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Andersen, P., Christiansen, P., Emmeche, C., and Finnemann, N. (eds.) 2000. Downward Causation: Minds, Bodies and Matter. Aarhus: Aarhus University Press.Google Scholar
Anderson, P. 1972. “More Is Different: Broken Symmetry and the Nature of the Hierarchical Structure of Science.” Science, 177, pp. 393–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Auyang, S. 1998. Foundations of Complex-Systems Theories in Economics, Evolutionary Biology, and Statistical Physics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bechtel, W. 2005. “Explanation: A Mechanistic Alternative.” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Biology and Biomedical Sciences, 36, pp. 421–41.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bedau, M. 1997. “Weak Emergence.” Philosophical Perspective, 11, pp. 375–99.Google Scholar
Betts, J. G., Young, K., Wise, A. et al. (eds.) 2013. Anatomy and Physiology. BC Campus. Available at https://openstax.org/books/anatomy-and-physiology/pages/1-introduction.Google Scholar
Bickle, J., Craver, C., and Barwich, A. 2022. The Tools of Neuroscience Experiment. New York, NY: Routledge.Google Scholar
Bishop, R., Silberstein, M., and Pexton, M. 2022. Emergence in Context. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bollhagen, A. 2021. “The Inchworm Episode: Reconstituting the Phenomenon of Kinesin Motility.” European Journal of Philosophy of Science, 11, pp. 1–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Boogerd, F., Bruggeman, F., Richardson, R., Stephan, A., and Westerhoff, H. 2005. “Emergence and Its Place in Nature: A Case Study of Biochemical Networks.” Synthese, 145, pp. 131–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brigandt, I. 2011. “Explanation in Biology: Reduction, Pluralism and Explanatory Aims.” Science and Education, 22, pp. 69–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brigandt, I. and Love, A. 2023. “Reductionism in Biology.” In E. Zalta and U. Nodelman (eds.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2023/entries/reduction-biology/.Google Scholar
Broad, C. D. 1925. The Mind and Its Place in Nature. London: Routledge Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
Cartwright, N. 1994. “Fundamentalism vs. the Patchwork of Laws.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 103, pp. 279–92.Google Scholar
Couzin, I. and Krause, J. 2003. “Self-Organization and Collective Behavior in Vertebrates.” Advances in the Studies of Behavior, 33, pp. 1–75.Google Scholar
Craver, C. 2007. Explaining the Brain. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Crick, F. 1966. Of Mice and Molecules. Seattle, WA: University of Washington.Google Scholar
Crook, S. and Gillett, C. 2001. “Why Physics Alone Cannot Define the ‘Physical’.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 31, pp. 333–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dawkins, R. 1982. The Extended Phenotype. San Francisco, CA: W. H. Freeman.Google Scholar
Dawkins, R. 1987. The Blind Watchmaker. New York, NY: Norton.Google Scholar
Dennett, D. 1978. Brainstorms. Montgomery, VT: Bradford Books.Google Scholar
Dennett, D. 1991. “Real Patterns.” Journal of Philosophy, 88, pp. 27–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dennett, D. 1996. Darwin’s Dangerous Idea. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster.Google Scholar
Driesch, H. 1929. The Science and Philosophy of the Organism. 2nd ed. London: Black.Google Scholar
Dupre, J. 2021. The Metaphysics of Biology. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Eddington, A. S. 1928. The Nature of the Physical World. New York, NY: Macmillan.Google Scholar
Ellis, G. 2012. “Top-Down Causation and Emergence.” Interface Focus, 2, pp. 126–40.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Elpidorou, A. and Dove, G. 2018. Consciousness and Physicalism: A Defense of a Research Program. New York, NY: Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fodor, J. 1968. Psychological Explanation. New York, NY: Random House.Google Scholar
Fodor, J. 1974. “Special Sciences: Or, the Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis.” Synthese, 28, pp. 97–115.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Freeman, W. 2000a. How Brains Make Up Their Minds. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar
Freeman, W. 2000b. Neurodynamics: An Exploration of Mesoscopic Brain Dynamics. London: Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Garfinkel, A. 1987. “The Slime Mold Dictyostelium as a Model of Self-Organization in Social Systems.” In Yates, F., Garfinkel, A., Walter, D., and Yates, G. (eds.), Self-Organizing Systems, pp. 181–212. New York, NY: Plenum Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Giere, R. 2010. Scientific Perspectivism. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Gillett, C. 2002a. “The Varieties of Emergence: Their Purposes, Obligations and Importance.” Grazer Philosophische Studien, 65, pp. 89–115.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gillett, C. 2002b. “The Dimensions of Realization: A Critique of the Standard View.” Analysis, 62, pp. 316–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gillett, C. 2006. “Samuel Alexander’s Emergentism: Or, Higher Causation for Physicalists.” Synthese, 153, pp. 261–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gillett, C. 2007a. “Understanding the New Reductionism: The Metaphysics of Science and Compositional Reduction.” The Journal of Philosophy, 104(4), pp. 193–216.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gillett, C. 2007b. “Hyper-Extending the Mind? Setting Boundaries in the Special Sciences.” Philosophical Topics, 351, pp. 161–88.Google Scholar
Gillett, C. 2011. “On the Implications of Scientific Composition and Completeness.” In Corradini, A. and O’Connor, T. (eds.), Emergence in Science and Philosophy, pp. 25–45. New York, NY: Routledge.Google Scholar
Gillett, C. 2013. “Constitution, and Multiple Constitution, in the Sciences: Using the Neuron as a Guide.” Minds and Machines, 23, pp. 309–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gillett, C. 2016a. Reduction and Emergence in Science and Philosophy. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gillett, C. 2016b. “The Metaphysics of Nature, Science, and the Rules of Engagement.” In Aizawa, K. and Gillett, C. (eds.), Scientific Composition and Metaphysical Ground, pp. 205–47. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.Google Scholar
Gillett, C. 2020. “Why Constitutive Mechanistic Explanation Cannot Be Causal.” American Philosophical Quarterly, 57, pp. 31–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gillett, C. 2021. “Using Compositional Explanations to Understand Compositional Levels.” In Brooks, D., DeFrisco, J., and Wimsatt, W. (eds.), Levels of Organization in the Biological Sciences, pp. 233–60. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Gillett, C. 2022. “Engaging the Plural Parts of Science.” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 29, pp. 195–217.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gillett, C. Unpublished. Understanding the Human Body: The Parts of Science, Compositional Models and Integrative Pluralism.Google Scholar
Glennan, S. 2017. The New Mechanical Philosophy. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Glennan, S. 2020. “Corporeal Composition.” Synthese, 198, pp. 11439–62.Google Scholar
Guay, A. and Sartenaer, O. 2016. “A New Look at Emergence: Or When After is Different.” European Journal of Philosophy of Science, 6, pp. 297–322.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Haraway, D. 1976. Crystals, Fabrics and Fields. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Heil, J. 2003. From an Ontological Point of View. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hempel, C. 1965. Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. New York, NY: Free Press.Google Scholar
Hendry, R. 2010. “Emergence vs. Reduction in Chemistry.” In MacDonald, C. and MacDonald, G. (eds.), Emergence in Mind, pp. 205–21. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Humphreys, P. 2016. Emergence: A Philosophical Account. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Illari, P. and Williamson, J. 2012. “What Is a Mechanism?” European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 2(1), pp. 119–35.Google Scholar
Juarrero, A. 1999. Dynamics in Action: Intentional Behavior as a Complex System. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kaiser, M. 2018. “Individuating Part-Whole Relations in the Biological World.” In Bueno, O., Chen, R-L, and Fagan, M. (eds.), Individuation across Experimental and Theoretical Sciences, pp. 63–88. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Kim, J. 1993a. Supervenience and Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kim, J. 1993b. “The Nonreductionist’s Troubles with Mental Causation.” In J. Kim (1993a).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kitcher, P. 1984. “1953 and All That: A Tale of Two Sciences.” Philosophical Review, 93, pp. 335–73.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Ladyman, J. and Ross, D. 2007. Everything Must Go. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Laudan, L. 1977. Progress and its Problems. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Laughlin, R. 2005. A Different Universe: Reinventing Physics from the Bottom Down. New York, NY: Basic Books.Google Scholar
Lewin, R. 1992. Complexity: Life at the Edge of Chaos. New York, NY: Macmillan.Google Scholar
Love, A. 2012. “Hierarchy, Causation and Explanation.” Interface Focus, 2, pp. 115–25.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Love, A. and Huttemann, A. 2011. “Comparing Part-Whole Explanations in Biology and Physics.” In Dieks, D., Gonzalez, W. J., Hartmann, S., et al. (eds.), Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation, pp. 183–200. Berlin: Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Machamer, P., Darden, L., and Craver, C. 2000. “Thinking about Mechanisms.” Philosophy of Science, 67, pp. 1–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mayr, E. 1988. “The Limits of Reductionism.” Nature, 33, p. 475.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McLaughlin, B. 1992. “The Rise and Fall of British Emergentism.” In Beckermann, A., Flohr, H., and Kim, J. (eds.). Emergence or Reduction?, pp. 49–93. New York, NY: de Gruyter.Google Scholar
Merricks, T. 2001. Objects and Persons. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mitchell, S. 2003. Biological Complexity and Integrative Pluralism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mitchell, S. 2009. Unsimple Truths: Science, Complexity and Policy. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mitchell, S. 2012. “Emergence: Logical, Functional and Dynamical.” Synthese, 185, pp. 171–86.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moreno, A. and Mossio, M. 2015. Biological Autonomy. New York, NY: Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nagel, E. 1961. The Structure of Science. New York, NY: Harcourt Brace.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Needham, J. 1936. Order and Life. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Nicolis, G. and Prigogine, I. 1989. Exploring Complexity. New York, NY: Freeman.Google Scholar
Noble, D. 2008. The Music of Life: Biology beyond Genes. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Novikoff, A. 1945. “The Concept of Integrative Levels and Biology.” Science, 101, pp. 209–215.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Pattee, H. 1970. “The Problem of Biological Hierarchy.” In Waddington, C. H., Towards a Theoretical Biology, 3, pp. 117–136. Chicago, IL: Aldine Publishing.Google Scholar
Pattee, H. 1973. “The Physical Basis and Origin of Hierarchical Control.” In Pattee, H., Hierarchy Theory, pp. 91–110. New York, NY: George Braziller.Google Scholar
Pereboom, D. 2002. “Robust Nonreductive Materialism.” Journal of Philosophy, 99, pp. 499–531.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pereboom, D. 2011. Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Prigogine, I. 1968. Introduction to Thermodynamics of Irreversible Processes. New York, NY: Wiley.Google Scholar
Prigogine, I. 1997. End of Certainty. New York, NY: The Free Press.Google Scholar
Prigogine, I. and Stengers, I. 1984. Order out of Chaos: Man’s New Dialogue with Nature. New York, NY: Bantam Books.Google Scholar
Rosenberg, A. 2006. Darwinian Reductionism. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Salmon, W. 1989. Four Decades of Scientific Explanation. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.Google Scholar
Santos, G. 2015. “Ontological Emergence: How Is It Possible? Towards a New Relational Ontology.” Foundations of Science, 20, pp. 429–446.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Scott, A. 2007. The Non-Linear Universe: Chaos, Emergence, Life. New York, NY: Springer.Google Scholar
Shoemaker, S. 2007. Physical Realization. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Siderits, M. 2007. Buddhism as Philosophy: An Introduction. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.Google Scholar
Sullivan, J. 2017. “Coordinated Pluralism as a Means to Facilitate Integrative Taxonomies of Cognition.” Philosophical Explorations, 20, pp. 129–145.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tahko, T. 2021. Unity of Science. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Thalos, M. 2013. Without Hierarchy: The Scale Freedom of the Universe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Van Inwagen, P. 1990. Material Beings. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Weinberg, S. 1992. Dreams of a Final Theory. New York, NY: Random House.Google Scholar
Weinberg, S., 2001. Facing Up: Science and Its Cultural Adversaries. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wilson, E. 1998. Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge. New York, NY: Knopf.Google Scholar
Wilson, E. and Holldobler, B. 1988: “Dense Heterarchies and Mass Communication as the Basis of Organization in Ant Colonies.” Trends in Ecology and Evolution, 3, pp. 65–84.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wimsatt, W. 1976. “Reductionism, Levels of Organization and the Mind-Body Problem.” In Consciousness and the Brain, edited by Globus, G., Maxwell, G., and Savodnik, I., pp. 205–267. New York, NY: Plenum Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wimsatt, W. 2007. Re-engineering Philosophy for Limited Beings. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Winning, J. and Bechtel, W. 2018. “Rethinking Causality in Biological and Neural Mechanisms.” Minds and Machines, 28, pp. 287–310.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Woodger, J. H. 1929. Biological Principles. New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace.Google Scholar
Wright, C. 2012. “Mechanistic Explanation without the Ontic Conception.” European Journal of Philosophy of Science, 2, pp. 375–394.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Accessibility standard: Unknown

Why this information is here

This section outlines the accessibility features of this content - including support for screen readers, full keyboard navigation and high-contrast display options. This may not be relevant for you.

Accessibility Information

Accessibility compliance for the HTML of this Element is currently unknown and may be updated in the future.

Save element to Kindle

To save this element to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Reduction, Emergence and the Metaphysics in Science
  • Carl Gillett, Northern Illinois University
  • Online ISBN: 9781009083423
Available formats
×

Save element to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Reduction, Emergence and the Metaphysics in Science
  • Carl Gillett, Northern Illinois University
  • Online ISBN: 9781009083423
Available formats
×

Save element to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Reduction, Emergence and the Metaphysics in Science
  • Carl Gillett, Northern Illinois University
  • Online ISBN: 9781009083423
Available formats
×