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Religious Epistemology
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 November 2018
Summary
If epistemology is roughly the study of knowledge, justification, warrant, and rationality, then religious epistemology is the study of how these epistemic concepts relate to religious belief and practice. This Element, while surveying various religious epistemologies, argues specifically for Plantingian religious epistemology. It makes the case for proper functionalism and Plantinga's AC models, while it also responds to debunking arguments informed by cognitive science of religion. It serves as a bridge between religious epistemology and natural theology.
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- Online ISBN: 9781108558365Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication: 29 November 2018
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