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A birth–death model of advertising and pricing

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 July 2016

S. Christian Albright*
Affiliation:
Indiana University School of Business
Wayne Winston
Affiliation:
Indiana University School of Business
*
∗ Postal address: Indiana University, Graduate School of Business, School of Business Building, Bloomington, IN47401, U.S.A.

Abstract

This paper employs the methods currently used to solve many queuing control models in order to investigate the behavior of a firm's optimal advertising and pricing strategies over time. Given that a firm's market position expands or deteriorates in a probabilistic way which depends upon the current position, the rate of advertising, and the price the firm charges, we present conditions which ensure that the optimal level of advertising is a monotonic function of the firm's market position, and we discuss the economic meaning of these conditions. Furthermore, although the primary focus is upon a non-competitive environment, we develop the above model as a non-zero sum, two-person stochastic game and show that an equilibrium strategy exists which is simple to compute.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Applied Probability Trust 1979 

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