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Stability of linear stochastic difference equations in strategically controlled random environments

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 July 2016

Ulrich Horst*
Affiliation:
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
*
∗ Postal address: Institut für Mathematik, Bereich Stochastik, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Unter den Linden 6, D-10099 Berlin, Germany. Email address: horst@mathematik.hu-berlin.de

Abstract

We consider the stochastic sequence {Y t }t∈ℕ defined recursively by the linear relation Y t+1=A t Y t +B t in a random environment. The environment is described by the stochastic process {(A t ,B t )}t∈ℕ and is under the simultaneous control of several agents playing a discounted stochastic game. We formulate sufficient conditions on the game which ensure the existence of Nash equilibria in Markov strategies which have the additional property that, in equilibrium, the process {Y t }t∈ℕ converges in distribution to a stationary regime.

Information

Type
General Applied Probability
Copyright
Copyright © Applied Probability Trust 2003 

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