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In the present essay I compare the 2016 judgment of the International Court ofJustice (ICJ) in Nuclear ArmsRace (Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom) with the Court's 1966judgment in South WestAfrica (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa). A seriesof similarities between the two judgments are obvious: They are two of the threecases in the history of the Court in which the judges were equally split and thePresident had to cast his tie-breaking vote.The critique of the judgments has been exceptionally strong, in 2016 as in 1966.The core of the critique, then as now, has practically been the same—theCourt retreats into an excessive formalism that protects great powers.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ)’s 2016 judgments on the threecases Obligations concerning negotiations relating to cessation of thenuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament show the omnipresenceof the dichotomy between form and substance in the Court's case-law.Commentators and several dissenting judges have stressed that the judgmentsrepresent a landmark in the sense that the Court has radically departed from the consideration of flexible standards in applyingprocedural rules to the determination of the issue of identification of a legaldispute. In other words, it made form prevail over substance.
My very first publication, admittedly written in a language that many AJILUnbound readers might be unable or unwilling to read, was an essay on the Treatyon the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and its effectsvis-à-vis third parties. Already back then, I found it difficult tojustify how an international treaty could rubber-stamp such a highly unevenstate of affairs. The overt acknowledgement of the discrimination betweennuclear and nonnuclear states, the hypocrisy about “unofficial”nuclear states, and the Article VI obligation for nuclear states to negotiateeffective measures of disarmament, largely ignored in the first twenty years ofthe treaty, were all elements that contributed to my perception of unfairness,if not blatant injustice. As a young researcher approaching international lawwith the enthusiasm of the neophyte, however, this looked like a little anomalyin an otherwise fair and equitable international legal order. It did not set offwarning bells about the system as such. After all, international law was geared,at least in my eyes, towards enhancing the wellbeing of humanity. It must havebeen so. And it is not that I leaned particularly on the idealistic side; itseemed normal to me … at the time.
Although caution must be exercised in attributing a policy to the InternationalCourt of Justice, it is difficult not to see the MarshallIslands judgments as part of a longer trend of the Court usingformalistic reasoning to decline cases concerning nuclear weapons.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has mostly emphasized substance overform and developed a pragmatic, flexible, objective, and fact-based analyticalapproach to jurisdiction. That is until a recent series of judgments veeringtowards jurisdictional formalism. However, to truly reflect its designation asthe “World” Court, the UN's principal judicial organ mustsurely adjudicate some of the “big cases” with global securityimplications and involving important obligations erga omnesbeyond strictly bilateral dynamics: the Marshall Islands cases were as good contenders as any for the Court to enhance its legitimacycapital.1 As acorollary, accepting this role might entail that the Court interpret itsjurisdiction in a flexible and progressive manner, which had always been itsmantra up until recently, so that the “big cases” have a chance ofgetting their foot in the door and being litigated.