Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 August 2014
The purpose of this article is to assess the effect of the winner-take-all feature of the Electoral College on the allocation of resources by candidates to the states in a presidential campaign. Conceptualizing the campaign as a two-person zero-sum infinite game, it is found that the main effect of this feature is to induce candidates to allocate campaign resources roughly in proportion to the 3/2's power of the electoral votes of each state, which creates a peculiar bias that makes voters living in the largest states as much as three times as attractive campaign targets as voters living in the smallest states. Empirically, it is shown that the 3/2's rule explains quite well the time allocations of presidential and vice-presidential candidates in the 1960, 1964, 1968, and 1972 campaigns; for presidential campaigns in 1976 and 1980, optimal allocations are indicated for all fifty states and the District of Columbia. A comparison with optimal allocations under a system of direct popular-vote election of the president reveals that such a system would be less susceptible to manipulative strategies than the Electoral College as well as being compatible with the egalitarian principle of “one man, one vote.”
This article is a condensation of a paper presented at the 1972 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 5–9, 1972. The original paper includes, among other things, mathematical derivations and proofs, and a description of a sequential-strategy model, not included in this article. This back-up material has been published in Steven J. Brams and Morton D. Davis, “Resource-Allocation Models in Presidential Campaigning: Implications for Democratic Representation,” Annals of the New York Academy of Science (Proceedings of the Conference on Democratic Representation and Apportionment: Quantitative Methods, Measures and Criteria), Vol. 219, ed. Lee F. Papayanopoulos (New York: New York Academy of Science, 1973). We wish to acknowledge the very helpful comments made on an early formulation of the models by John C. Harsanyi, Anatol Rapoport, and Lloyd S. Shapley, and on the original paper by Walter Dean Burnham and Norman Nie, none of whom should be held responsible for the present analysis. We are also grateful to Roman Frydman, Elizabeth Gidengil, and Jeffrey Richelson for valuable research assistance.
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