Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-8tzhz Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-19T11:33:27.334Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

David Austen-Smith
Affiliation:
University of Rochester
Jeffrey Banks
Affiliation:
University of Rochester

Abstract

Predictions of electoral behavior in a multiparty setting should be a function of the voters' beliefs about how parties will perform following an election. Similarly, party behavior in a legislature should be a function of electoral promises and rewards. We develop a multistage game-theoretic model of three-party competition under proportional representation. The final policy outcome of the game is generated by a noncooperative bargaining game between the parties in the elected legislature. This game is essentially defined by the vote shares each party receives in the general election, and the parties' electoral policy positions. At the electoral stage parties and voters are strategic in that they take account of the legislative implications of any electoral outcome. We solve for equilibrium electoral positions by the parties and final policy outcomes.

Information

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1988

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

Submit a response

Comments

No Comments have been published for this article.