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A Note on “Voting or a Price System in a Competitive Market Structure”*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

John Ferejohn
Affiliation:
California Institute of Technology
Talbot Page
Affiliation:
Resources for the Future, Inc.

Abstract

The purpose of this note is to contribute to the analysis of various sorts of institutions for distributing goods to members of a society. The paper examines what happens when a society is faced with distributing ordinary private goods to its members. It can utilize three different sorts of institutions: a voting system, a price system, or a fixed proportions sharing rule. We suggest that a fixed proportions sharing rule generally will be found preferable by the society to majority rule. We argue that Shubik's assertion that a price system will dominate majority rule is not true without qualification.

Information

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1973

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