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Aggressive Behavior by Clients Toward Public Relief Administrators: A Configurative Analysis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Gabriel Almond
Affiliation:
University of Chicago
Harold D. Lasswell
Affiliation:
University of Chicago

Extract

This study of aggressive behavior by clients on public relief in Chicago in 1932–33 is intended to be relevant to two supplementary kinds of political theory. In so far as relations are found between economic changes and political activity, the findings bear upon the theory of political equilibrium, which seeks to state the general conditions under which political changes occur. In so far as relations are found which bear upon the diffusion of specific political symbols and practices, the results are pertinent to theories of political development, which emphasize the time-bound aspects of political change.

Information

Type
Political Behavior
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1934

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