Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-p67k6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-19T17:57:38.246Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Cabinet Terminations and Critical Events

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 September 2000

Daniel Diermeier
Affiliation:
Northwestern University
Randolph T. Stevenson
Affiliation:
Rice University

Abstract

We present an empirical assessment of Lupia and Strøm's noncooperative bargaining model of cabinet terminations. We construct a stochastic version of the model and derive several testable implications. As the next mandatory election approaches: (1) the probability of an early election increases; (2) a cabinet's risks of being replaced without an intermediate election may be flat or even decrease; and (3) the overall chance that a cabinet falls (for whatever reason) increases. Using nonparametric duration analysis on a 15-country data set, we find qualified support for the Lupia and Strøm model. We conclude that the strategic approach is more promising than the nonstrategic alternative, but a more fully dynamic strategic model will be required to account for the dynamics of cabinet stability.

Information

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2000

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

Submit a response

Comments

No Comments have been published for this article.