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Collective Action and the Group Size Paradox

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 January 2002

Joan Esteban
Affiliation:
Instituto de Análisis Económico (CSIC)
Debraj Ray
Affiliation:
New York University
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Abstract

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According to the Olson paradox, larger groups may be less successful than smaller groups in furthering their interests. We address the issue in a model with three distinctive features: explicit intergroup interaction, collective prizes with a varying mix of public and private characteristics, and nonlinear lobbying costs. The interplay of these features leads to new results. When the cost of lobbying has the elasticity of a quadratic function, or higher, larger groups are more effective no matter how private the prize. With smaller elasticities, a threshold degree of publicness is enough to overturn the Olson argument, and this threshold tends to zero as the elasticity approaches the value for a quadratic function. We also demonstrate that these results are true, irrespective of whether we examine group sizes over the cross-section in some given equilibrium or changes in the size of a given group over different equilibria.

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Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2001
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