¹ The hearings before the Senate Finance Committee on the Hawley-Smoot bill filled 18 volumes.

² H.R. 8687, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.

³ Reciprocal Trade Agreements, Hearings before the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, 1934, pp. 1–130, passim.

⁴ Ibid., p. 15. See also pp. 4–26.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 80–81. For the opinions of Secretaries Wallace and Roper, see pp. 29 and 130.

⁶ 48 Stat. 943, Sec. 4.

⁷ Senator Barkley made this clear in his testimony. Reciprocal Trade Agreements, Hearings, Senate, 1934, p. 388.

⁸ It is now published in the Federal Register as well. It has been the practice of the State Department to send the notice to each member of Congress and to a regular mailing list of private individuals, firms, and associations that have requested that notices be sent them directly. Extending Reciprocal Foreign Trade Agreement Act, Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, House, 1937, p. 129.

⁹ Executive Order No. 6750, June 27, 1934. The Treasury Department is now also represented.

¹⁰ Department of State, Press Releases, No. 249, July 7, 1934, pp. 7–8.Google ScholarPubMed For a description of the work of the C.R.I., see Tasca, Henry J., The Reciprocal Trade Policy of the United States (Philadelphia, 1938), pp. 53–54, 62–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹¹ Mr. A. M. Fox, of the Tariff Commission and a member of the C.R.I., stated in the hearings on the United Kingdom agreement: “I am sorry I have to discuss this in public hearing, but industry prefers to have these hearings public than to have them privately, so that is why we hold it this way.” Hearings before the Com mittee for Reciprocity Information in Connection with the Negotiation of a Reciprocal Trade Agreement with the United Kingdom, Div. II, Vol. 3, p. 258. These hearings will be referred to hereafter in this paper as Hearings, U.K. Agreement.

¹² The term “concession” refers to a specific undertaking in the trade agreement to afford improved customs treatment to an imported commodity, or to a “binding” (i.e., an assurance that existing treatment will not be made less favorable during the life of the agreement) of present customs treatment.

¹³ See, e.g., the announcement of the intention to negotiate a trade agreement with France, Department of State, Press Releases, No. 292, May 4, 1935, pp. 301–316.Google ScholarPubMed In the case of Cuba, the statistical statement was not printed with the announcement, but was released separately as a publication of the Department of Commerce. Ibid., No. 249, July 7, 1934, pp. 7–9.

¹⁴ These letters are printed in the Congressional Record, Vol. 79, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 6464–6.

¹⁵ Department of State, Press Releases, No. 380, Jan. 9, 1937, pp. 16–18. The Release stated that these features were being “added experimentally” because “experience with trade agreement negotiations had indicated” their “desirability.” The American Tariff League was delighted with the change, calling it “most welcome” and “a vast improvement.” Monthly Bulletin of the American Tariff League, Supplement, Jan., 1937, pp. 1, 3.

¹⁶ Department of State, Press Releases, No. 393, Apr. 10, 1937, pp. 210–211.Google ScholarPubMed

¹⁷ Hearings, U.K. Agreement, Div. II, Vol. 5, p. 568.

¹⁸ Extending Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act, Hearings, Senate, 1937, p. 18. Mr. Sayre especially expressed the fear that the other countries would ask for concessions on items not on the list. In practice, in the case of the Czech agreement it was necessary to add another item to the list after negotiations had begun. Department of State, Press Releases, No. 415, Sept. 11, 1937, p. 225.Google ScholarPubMed In the case of the United Kingdom, the supplementary list included about 50 items. Ibid., No. 435, Jan. 29, 1938, pp. 137–143. The delay was not so great in these cases because hearings had not begun when the supplementary items were released. Had the hearings been completed at the time, presumably an additional notice would have been necessary and additional hearings held.

¹⁹ Concerning the concession list for the United Kingdom agreement, Representative Treadway (Mass.) exclaimed: “The list … reads as if it were an enumeration of the manufactures of my state.” Hearings, U.K. Agreement, Vol. 1, p. 19.

²⁰ In the United Kingdom agreement, the original concession list contained 410 items and the supplementary list 50 items. The final agreement included conces sions of 331 items in the first list and 34 in the second. In 125 cases, however, the final concession was accorded to a more limited class of goods than indicated by the item on the concession list.

²¹ Tasca, op. cit., pp. 66–68.

²² Department of State, Press Releases, No. 379, Jan. 2, 1937, p. 2.Google ScholarPubMed See also C.R.I., Suggestions as to the Method and Character of Representations to the Committee for Reciprocity Information (Dec., 1937), pp. 1–2.

²³ Congressional Record, Vol. 79, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., Apr. 26, 1935, p. 6460. It is probable, however, that the well informed had a fairly accurate knowledge of the membership of the Committee for each agreement.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 6465. See also House Report, No. 166, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 21 (Minority views): The C.R.I. conducts hearings, but “an entirely different group conducts these negotiations in secret, star-chamber proceedings.” President Roosevelt denied that the C.R.I. was a “buffer agency,” but his denial does not sound convincing. Mr.Sayre, stated: “Speaking generally, the actual negotiators are men who are not sitting on that Committee [C.R.I.].” Extending Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act, Hearings, Senate, 1937, p. 18.Google Scholar

²⁵ Department of State, Press Releases, No. 398, May 15, 1937, p. 335.Google ScholarPubMed Mr. Henry P. Grady, former chief of the Trade Agreements Division in the State Department and chairman of the Committee on Trade Agreements, was made chairman of the C.R.I. See also Hearings, U.K. Agreement, Div. IV, Vol. 2, pp. 132–143; Sayre, F. B., The Way Forward (New York, 1939), p. 87.Google Scholar Mr. Oscar B. Ryder, vice-chairman of the Tariff Commission, is at present the chairman of the C.R.I. He is also a member of the Committee on Trade Agreements and the Executive Committee on Commercial Policy. Department of State Bulletin, No. 11, Sept. 9, 1939, p. 236. Even with this complete change, some opponents continue to regard the C.R.I. as a “stuffed committee.” Congressional Record, Vol. 84, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., Jan. 10, 1939, p. 229.

²⁶ Some members of the Committee on Trade Agreements, however, are not members of the C.R.I.

²⁷ Executive Order No. 8190, July 5, 1939.

²⁸ It would be unfair, however, to conclude that the trade agreements organization has become subservient to pressure groups. A complete analysis of all trade agreements concluded would be a prerequisite for a definitive statement, but a preliminary glance at the various agreements indicates that the most recent agreements effect more tariff reductions than all of the early agreements combined. Hence it seems plausible to conclude that in making tariff reductions the trade agreements organization is not as afraid of pressure group opposition now as it was originally. Further, even if the changes described above seem serious enough in themselves, they still fall far short of many changes that have been advocated, such as Senate ratification and application of the cost of production formula to tariff reductions.

²⁹ Hearings, U.K. Agreement, Vol. 1, p. 4; Div. IV, Vol. 2, p. 195.

³⁰ Two of the written briefs were printed by request in the Congressional Record (Vol. 83, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., Appendix, pp. 665–666, 756–758), and a few were published privately, but it would be unfair to generalize concerning the quality of all the written briefs from the few that are available. Those available were published because of their propagandist nature, and not because of real information they contained. It is only fair to assume that the majority of the written briefs were of better quality. See statement of Mr.Grady, Henry F., Hearings, U.K. Agreement, Div. I, Vol. 1, p. 54.Google Scholar

³¹ Most of the witnesses gave a summary of the material in their written statement, and some even insisted upon presenting their written statement orally. Ibid., Div. IV, Vol. 2, p. 273.

³² The bearings are not published, but a complete stenographic transcript was taken and is available at the Tariff Commission. The testimony of congressmen before the C.R.I. is usually published in the Appendix to the Congressional Record. For the United Kingdom agreement, see Vol. 83, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., pp. 990–992, 994, 996, 1010–6, 1028–9, 1034, 1037–8, 1042–3, 1046, 1062–3, 1144–5, 1149–50, 1669–70. There has been some agitation in favor of printing all the public hearings. Ibid., Apr. 14, 1938, p. 5461.

³³ Only 2,700 pages of transcript resulted from the first 15 trade agreements. Extending Reciprocal Foreign Trade Agreement Act, Hearings, House, 1937, p. 130.

³⁴ Hearings, U.K. Agreement, Vol. 1, pp. 19, 31, 126. Later Mr. Grady remarked that “we can dispense with oratory.” Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 231. The most interesting of the general statements was that presented by the National League of Women Voters in which it was emphasized that many of the concession items were of vital interest to consumers and asking that the tariff be reduced on them. Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 335–339. This same group had submitted a letter to the Senate Finance Committee when the act came up for renewal. Extending Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act, Hearings, Senate, 1937, p. 517. Optimists may find comfort in this demonstration that the public at large (the consumers) has finally been represented in hearings concerning tariff matters. As usual, labor unions supported domestic producers in opposing American concessions. Thirty spokesmen appeared for the unions, of which only one favored the trade agreement. Hearings, U.K. Agreement, Vol. 2, pp. 340–344.

³⁵ Importers may feel that their presence at the hearings will offend their domestic connections; many importing firms also handle American goods, and it is possible that they sought to avoid the possibility of antagonizing American producers.

³⁶ Hearings, U.K. Agreement, Div. II, Vol. 4, pp. 486, 499.

³⁷ They usually gave reports of wages in Japan in addition, on the ground that the benefits of the agreement would be extended to Japan under the operation of the most-favored-nation clause.

³⁸ The Trade Agreements Act, of course, does not call for the application of the cost of production formula. Several proposed amendments to the act to include this feature were defeated. However, a member of the C.R.I. stated at the United Kingdom hearings that relative costs of production were being “given their very careful consideration.” Hearings, U.K. Agreement, Div. II, Vol. 4, p. 386.

³⁹ Much of the testimony was given by representatives of trade associations whose appearance assisted in avoiding needless duplication of individuals from the same trade. The C.R.I. had suggested that they appear (C.R.I., op. cit., p. 6). Where they enjoyed the confidence of their members, they could assemble information that might be difficult to secure in any other manner.

⁴⁰ C.R.I., op. cit., pp. 4–6.

⁴¹ Hearings, U.K. Agreement, Div. II, Vol. 3, p. 311.

⁴² Ibid., Div. IV, Vol. 2, p. 150.

⁴³ Ibid., Div. I, Vol. 3, p. 523.

⁴⁴ Examples: Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 52, 162; Div. II, Vol. 4, p. 508. For an exception, see Div. II, Vol. 2, pp. 96–107.

⁴⁵ Ibid., Div. II, Vol. 5, pp. 560, 585; Vol. 6, p. 599; Div. IV, Vol. 2, p. 243.

⁴⁶ Ibid., Div. I, Vol. 4, p. 687; Div. IV, Vol. 3, pp. 319, 340.

⁴⁷ Another weakness of the program lies in the fact that those gaining by it are not as outspoken in their praise as those who feel that they are suffering from it. So many factors may contribute to business prosperity that trade agreement statistics are usually inadequate to convince the business man.

⁴⁸ The Board of Trade, roughly speaking, is the British counterpart of the United States Department of Commerce. The actual Board of Trade is a body of notables (including the Archbishop of Canterbury, who was supposed to advise on the slave trade); but this body has not met since the early part of the nineteenth century. For more than a hundred years, only the President of the Board of Trade has been active. He is a cabinet minister, and is supported by a large staff of permanent civil servants.

⁴⁹ Under the parliamentary form of government, approval of a trade agreement is in most cases a foregone conclusion, since rejection would necessitate the formation of a new cabinet. Agitators for Senate or congressional approval of American trade agreements almost invariably overlook this fact.

⁵⁰ United States Tariff Commission, The Trade Agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom, Vol. I, p. 39.Google Scholar The agreements were usually made with the purpose of correcting an adverse balance of trade by stimulating the export trade of a distressed industry, e.g., cotton textiles or coal. In return for this aid, the export industry submitted to some degree of governmental control; but this usually was conducted on a voluntary basis, nominally at least.

⁵¹ This committee was established in accordance with Section 2 (1) of the Import Duties Act. The President of the Board of Trade (in a letter dated Dec. 22, 1937) stated that the Committee “has within recent years investigated fully the circumstances of most of the industries of the country.” The National Union of Manufacturers Journal (London), Jan., 1938, p. 3361.Google Scholar Hereafter referred to in this paper as N.U.M. Jour.

⁵² Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates, Official Reports, House of Commons, Fifth Series, Vol. 329, Nov. 23, 1937, col. 1053.Google Scholar Hereafter referred to in this paper as Hansard.

⁵³ Final Report of the Committee on Industry and Trade, Cmd. 3282, p. 27. The Report called for “the establishment of a firm tradition that Presidents and high officers of the Board of Trade shall in respect of all important questions of trade relations take the representative leaders of trade and industry so far as practicable into real confidence, at a stage early enough to make consultation fruitful.” Ibid., p. 32.

⁵⁴ Richardson, J. Henry, “Tariffs, Preferences, and other Forms of Protection,” in Britain in Recovery (London, 1938), pp. 129–130 Google Scholar; Swing, R. G., “Britain's Experiments in State Intervention,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 15, p. 296 (Jan., 1937).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵⁵ The iron and steel duty was the reward for the reorganization of the iron and steel industry and the formation of the British Iron and Steel Federation. The large government subsidy for the construction of the R.M.S. Queen Mary was the reward for the merger of the Cunard and White Star Lines.

⁵⁶ N.U.M. Jour., Jan. 1938, p. 3360.

⁵⁷ Ibid., Dec. 1937, pp. 3352–3; The Times (London), Nov. 30, 1937, p. 9; Ibid., Dec. 2, 1937, p. 22; Ibid., Dec. 21, 1937, p. 14.

⁵⁸ The President of the Board of Trade wrote to the President of the National Union of Manufacturers that the Board of Trade follows “the practice of comprehensive and detailed consultation with trade interests.” N.U.M. Jour., Jan. 1938, p. 3361.

⁵⁹ See letters to Mr. Stanley from Lord Hirst, president of the Federation of British Industries, The Times (London), Nov. 30, 1937, and Jan. 14, 1938.Google ScholarPubMed The Association of British Chambers of Commerce wrote similar letters, ibid., Jan. 13, 1938, p. 9.

⁶⁰ See a letter from Lord Hirst to Mr.Stanley, , The Economist (London), Vol. 130, Jan. 22, 1938, p. 160.Google Scholar He did not ask that the list of possible concession items be made public, but that industry be informed privately of them.

⁶¹ Hansard, Vol. 329, Dec. 2, 1937, col. 2280. See also Vol. 330, Dec. 7, 1937, cols. 174–175; Vol. 330, Dec. 20, 1937, col. 1619; and Vol. 330, Dec. 21, 1937, col. 1761.

⁶² N.U.M. Jour., p. 3358. When the proposal was rejected, the Union complained: “Great Britain happens to have the most formidable and powerful business organization of any in the world, and its leaders include a number of ex-cabinet ministers and men who have special knowledge of American conditions, but the last thing the Government thinks of doing in a matter of this kind is to consult the leaders of the business world as to the advisability of embarking on these com mercial negotiations at this particular time, or to invoke their assistance in carrying those negotiations through.” Ibid., Feb. 1938, p. 3368. The proposal was attacked vigorously in an article in the Birmingham Gazette, Dec. 6, 1937. “State interference in industry is bad enough by itself, but it is seen at its worst when it is allowed to come under the direct influence of interested parties.”

⁶³ See, e.g., Board of Trade Journal (London), Vol. 142, June 22, 1939, p. 905.

⁶⁴ This suggestion was made in two letters to the President of the Board of Trade, the first by the Association of British Chambers of Commerce (The Times, Jan. 13, 1938, p. 9)Google Scholar and the second by the indefatigable National Union of Manufacturers (N.U.M. Jour., Jan., 1938, p. 3360).Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 3361.

⁶⁶ Hansard, Vol. 331, Feb. 8, 1938, col. 815.

⁶⁷ Ibid., Vol. 333, Mar. 29, 1938, col. 1816; Vol. 331, Feb. 8, 1938, cols. 814–5.

⁶⁸ The Times (London), May 7, 1938, p. 8.

⁶⁹ Mr.Williams, stated that “every responsible industrial organization in the country has made urgent representations … and … has received no satisfaction whatever.” Hansard, Vol. 332, Mar. 1, 1938, col. 904.Google Scholar Mr. Amery (a former First Lord of the Admiralty, 1922–24) said: “Our producers, whether agricultural or industrial, are refused the right to know what is asked, but they are told to open their mouths, shut their eyes, and hope for the best.” Ibid., Vol. 333, Mar. 23, 1938, col. 1254. Both of these distinguished members of Parliament would have been dismayed to hear Representative Culkin (New York), in speaking of the proposed Anglo-American agreement, say that in contrast to the “almost complete secrecy” of the United States, “foreign ministries … take their business interests into their confidence when negotiating treaties.” New York Times, Oct. 8, 1938, p. 11.

⁷⁰ British Industries, “The Anglo-U.S.A. Agreement, Federation's Views,” Vol. 33, Jan., 1939, p. 14. The Parliamentary Secretary of the Board of Trade told the House of Commons after the agreement had gone into effect that without the assistance of industry “it would have been very difficult, if not impossible, to have concluded this or any other trade agreement.” Hansard, Vol. 344, Feb. 23, 1939, col. 685.